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THE    INTERNATIONAL 

PSYCHO  -  ANALYTI CAL 

LIBRARY 

No.  6 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL  LIBRARY 

EDITED   BY  ERNEST  JONES,  M.D. 

No.  6 

GROUP     PSYCHOLOGY 

AND    THE    ANALYSIS 

OF   THE    EGO 

SIGMUND  FREUD,  MD.,  LL.D. 


AUTHORIZED    TRANSLATION    BY 

JAMES  STRACHEY 


FIFTH  IMPRESSION 


LONDON 

THE  HOGARTH  PRESS,  42  WILLL\M  IV  STREET.  W.C.2 

AND  THE  INSTITUTE  OF  PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 

1949 


BOSTON   UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL  OF  qnriAi   x^/r^oir 


PUBLISHED    BY 

The  Hogarth    Press    Ltd 

LONDON 

Clarke,  Irwin  &  Co.  Ltd 

TORONTO 


This  Translation 

First  published  1922 

Second  Impression  1 940 

Third  Impression  1 945 

Fourth  Impression   1948 

Fifth  Impression  1949 

f.OPYRIC.HT 


PRINTED  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  BY 
LOWE  AND  BRYDONE  PRINTERS  LTD.,  LONDON,  N.VV.IO 


cr  t. 


173 


TRANSLATOR'S  NOTE 


A  comparison  of  the  following  pages  with  the 
German  original  {^Massenpsychologie  und  Ich-Analyse, 
Internationaler  Psychoanalytischer  Verlag,  Vienna,  192  i) 
will  show  that  certain  passages  have  been  transferred 
in  the  English  version  from  the  text  to  the  footnotes. 
This  alteration  has  been  carried  out  at  the  author's 
express  desire. 

All  technical  terms  have  been  translated  in 
accordance  with  the  Glossary  to  be  published  as  a 
supplement  to  the  International  Jo7irnal  of  Psycho- 
Analysis . 

J.  s. 


BOSTON  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 


CONTENTS 


I  Introduction       .  .  .  . 

II  Le  Bon's  Description  of  the  Group  Mind 

in  Other  Accounts  of  Collective  Mental  Life 

IV  Suggestion  and  Libido 

V  Two  Artificial  Groups:  the  Church  and  the  Army 

VI  Further  Problems  and  Lines  of  Work 

i/VII  Identification 

^YSl  Being  in  Love  and  Hypnosis 

IX  The  Herd  Instinct 

X  The  Group  and  the  Primal  Horde 

XI  A  Differentiating  Grade  in  the  Ego 

Xn  Postscript  .... 


Pbro 

•                                   •                                   • 

I 

• 

5 

• 

■     23 

•                         « 

■     33 

he  Army 

.     41 

• 

.     52 

•                                  k 

.    60 

•                                   • 

.     71 

•                                   • 

.     81 

•                                   • 

.     90 

•                                   • 

.    lOI 

•                                      a 

.  no 

GROUP   PSYCHOLOGY  AND 
THE  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EGO 


I 

INTRODUCTION 


The  contrast  between  Individual  Psychology  and  Social 
or  Group  ^  Psychology,  which  at  a  first  glance  may 
seem  to  be  full  of  significance,  loses  a  great  deal 
of  its  sharpness  when  it  is  examined  -more  closely. 
It  is  true  that  Individual  Psychology  is  concerned 
with  the  individual  man  and  explores  the  paths  by 
which  he  seeks  to  find  satisfaction  for  his  instincts;  but 
only  rarely  and  under  certain  exceptional  conditions 
is  Individual  Psychology  in  a  position  to  disregard  the 
relations  of  this  individual  to  others.  In  the  individual's 
mental  life  someone  else  is  invariably    involved,    as  a 

*  P Group'  is  used  throughout  this  translation  as  equivalent 
to  the  rather  more  comprehensive  German  ^ Masse\  The  author 
uses  this  latter  word  to  render  both  McDougall's  'group',  and 
also  Le  Bon's  ^foule\  which  would  more  naturally  be  translated 
'crowd '-in  English.  For  the  sake  of  uniformity,  however,  'group' 
has  been  preferred  in  this  case  as  well,  and  has  been  substituted 
for  'crowd'  even  in  the  extracts  from  the  English  translation  of 
Le  Bon. — Translator ?[ 


2       Grotip  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

model,  as  an  object,  as  a  helper,  as  an  opponent, 
and  so  from  the  ver}^  first  Individual  Psychology  is  at 
the  same  time  Social  Psychology  as  well — in  this 
extended  but  entirely  justifiable  sense  of  the  words. 

The  relations  of  an  individual  to  his  parents  and 
to  his  brothers  and  sisters,  to  the  object  of  his  love, 
and  to  his  physician — in  fact  all  the  relations  which 
have  hitherto  been  the  chief  subject  of  psycho- 
analytic research — may  claim  to  be  considered  as 
social  phenomena;  and  in  this  respect  they  may  be 
contrasted  with  certain  other  processes,  described  b}^ 
us  as  '  narcissistic ' ,  in  which  the  satisfaction  of  the 
instincts  is  partially  or  totally  withdrawn  from  the 
influence  of  other  people.  The  contrast  between 
social  and  narcissistic — Bleuler  would  perhaps  call 
them  'autistic' — mental  acts  therefore  falls  wholly 
within  the  domain  of  Individual  Psycholog}^  and  is 
not  well  calculated  to  differentiate  it  from  a  Social 
or  Group  Psychology. 

The  individual  in  the  relations  w^hich  have  already 
been  mentioned — to  his  parents  and  to  his  brothers 
and  sisters,  to  the  person  he  is  in  love  with,  to  his 
friend,  and  to  his  physician — comes  under  the  influence 
of  only  a  single  person,  or  of  a  ver}^  small  number 
of  persons,  each  one  of  whom  has  become  enormously 
important  to  him.  Now  in  speaking  of  Social  or 
Group  Psychology  it  has  become  usual  to  leave  these 
relations  on  one  side  and  to  isolate  as  the  subject  of 


Introduction  3 

inquirv^  the  influencing  of  an  individual  by  a  large 
number  of  people  simultaneously,  people  with  whom 
he  is  connected  by  something,  though  otherwise  they 
may  in  many  respects  be  strangers  to  him.  Groups 
Psychology  is  therefore  concerned  with  the  individual' 
man  as  a  member  of  a  race,  of  a  nation,  of  a  caste, 
of  a  profession,  of  an  institution,  or  as  a  component  > 
part  of  a  crowd  of  people  who  have  been  organised 
into  a  group  at  some  particular  time  for  some  definite 
purpose.  When  once  natural  continuity  has  been 
severed  in  this  w^ay,  it  is  easy  to  regard  the  pheno- 
mena that  appear  under  these  special  conditions  as 
being  expressions  of  a  special  instinct  that  is  not  \ 
further  reducible,  the  social  instinct  ('herd  instinct',  ^ 
'group  mind'),  which  does  not  come  to  light  in  any 
other  situations.  But  we  may  perhaps  venture  to 
object  that  it  seems  difficult  to  attribute  to  the  factor 
of  number  a  significance  so  great  as  to  make  it  capable 
by  itself  of  arousing  in  our  mental  life  a  new  instinct 
that  is  otherwise  not  brought  into  play.  Our  ex- 
pectation is  therefore  directed  towards  two  other 
possibilities:  that  the  social  instinct  may  not  be  a 
primitive  one  and  insusceptible  of  dissection,  and  that 
it  may  be  possible  to  discover  the  beginnings  of  its 
development  in  a  narrow^er  circle,  such  as  that  of  the 
family. 

Although  Group  Psychology  is  only  in  its  infancy, 
it   embraces  an  immense    number    of  separate    issues 


4       Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

and  offers  to  investigators  countless  problems  which 
have  hitherto  not  even  been  properly  distinguished 
from  one  another.  The  mere  classification  of  the 
different  forms  of  group  formation  and  the  description 
of  the  mental  phenomena  produced  by  them  require 
a  great  expenditure  of  observation  and  exposition, 
and  have  already  given  rise  to  a  copious* literature. 
Anyone  who  compares  the  narrow  dimensions  of  this 
little  book  with  the  extent  of  Group  Psychology  will 
at  once  be  able  to  guess  that  only  a  few  points  chosen 
from  the  whole  material  are  to  be  dealt  with  here. 
And  they  will  in  fact  only  be  a  few^  questions  with 
which  the  depth-psychology  of  psycho-analysis  is 
specially  concerned. 


n 

LE  BON'S  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  GROUP  MIND 


Instead  of  starting  from  a  definition,  it  seems 
more  useful  to  begin  with  some  indication  of  the 
range  of  the  phenomena  under  review,  and  to  select 
from  among  them  a  few  specially  striking  and 
characteristic  facts  to  which  our  inquiry  can  be 
attached.  We  can  achieve  both  of  these  aims  by 
means  of  quotation  from  Le  Bon's  deservedly  famous 
work  Psychologic  des  fotdcs) 

Let  us  make  the  matter  clear  once  again.  If  a 
Psychology,  concerned  with  exploring  the  predis- 
positions, the  instincts,  the  motives  and  the  aims  of 
an  individual  man  down  to  his  actions  and  his  rela- 
tions with  those  who  are  nearest  to  him,  had  completely 
achieved  its  task,  and  had  cleared  up  the  whole  of 
these  matters  with  their  inter-connections,  it  would 
then  suddenly  find  itself  confronted  by  a  new  task 
which  would  lie  before  it    unachieved.     It    would    be 

*  The  Crowd:  a  Study  of  the  Popular  Mind,  Fisher  Unwin, 
1 2th.  Impression,  1920. 


6       Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

obliged  to  explain  the  surprising  fact  that  under  a 
certain  condition  this  individual  whom  it  had  come 
to  understand  thought,  felt,  and  acted  in  quite  a 
different  way  from  what  would  have  been  expected. 
And  this  condition  is  his  insertion  into  a  collection 
of  people  which  has  acquired  the  characteristic  of  a 
^psychological  group'.  What,  then,  is  a  'group'? 
How  does  it  acquire  the  capacity  for  exercising  such 
a  decisive  influence  over  the  mental  life  of  the 
individual?  And  what  is  the  nature  of  the  mental 
change  which  it  forces  upon  the  individual? 

It  is  the  task  of  a  theoretical  Group  Psychology 
to  answ^er  these  three  questions.  The  best  way  of 
approaching  them  is  evidently  to  start  with  the  third. 
Observation  of  the  changes  in  the  individual's  reactions 
is  what  provides  Group  Psychology  with  its  material; 
for  every  attempt  at  an  explanation  must  be  preceded 
by  a  description  of  the  thing  that  is  to  be 
explained. 

I  will  now  let  Le  Bon  speak  for  himself.  He 
says:  'The  most  striking  peculiarity  presented  by  a 
psychological  group  ^  is  the  following.  Whoever  be 
the  individuals  that  compose  it,  however  like  or 
unlike  be  their  mode  of  life,  their  occupations,  their 
character,  or  their  intelligence,  the  fact  that  they 
have  been  transformed  into  a  group  puts  them  in 
possession  of  a  sort  of  collective  mind    which    makes 

^  [See  footnote  page  i.] 


Le  Bon' s  Description  of  the  Group  Mind  7 

them  feel,  think,  and  act  in  a  manner  quite  different 
from  that  in  which  each  individual  of  them  would 
feel,  think,  and  act  were  he  in  a  state  of  isolation. 
There  are  certain  ideas  and  feelings  which  do  not 
come  into  being,  or  do  not  transform  themselves  into 
acts  except  in  the  case  of  individuals  forming  a  group. 
The  psychological  group  is  a  provisional  being  formed 
of  heterogeneous  elements,  which  for  a  moment  are 
combined,  exactly  as  the  cells  which  constitute  a 
living  body  form  by  their  reunion  a  nev/  being  which 
displays  characteristics  very  different  from  those 
possessed  by  each  of  the  cells  singly.'  (p.  29.)^ 

We  shall  take  the  libert\'  of  interrupting  Le 
Bon's  exposition  with  glosses  of  our  own,  and  shall 
accordingly  insert  an  observation  at  this  point.  If 
the  individuals  in  the  group  are  combined  into  a 
unity,  there  must  surely  be  something  to  unite  them, 
and  this  bond  might  be  precisely  the  thing  that  is 
characteristic  of  a  group.  But  Le  Bon  does  not  answer 
this  question;  he  goes  on  to  consider  the  alteration 
which  the  individual  undergoes  when  in  a  group  and 
describes  it  in  terms  w-hich  harmonize  well  with  the 
fundamental  postulates  of  our  own  depth-psychology. 

'  It  is  easy  to  prove  how  much  the  individual 
forming  part  of  a  group  differs  from  the  isolated 
individual,  but  it  is  less  easy  to  discover  the  causes 
of  this  difference. 

^  [References  are  to    the  English  translation. — Translator?^ 


8       Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

*  To  obtain  at  any  rate  a  glimpse  of  them  it  is 
necessary  in  the  first  place  to  call  to  mind  the  truth 
established  by  modern  psychology,  that  unconscious 
phenomena  play  an  altogether  preponderating  part 
not  only  in  organic  life,  but  also  in  the  operations 
of  the  intelligence.  The  conscious  life  of  the  mind  is' 
of  small  importance  in  comparison  with  its  uncon- 
scious life.  The  most  subtle  analyst,  the  most  acute 
observer,  is  scarcety  successful  in  discovering  more 
than  a  very  small  number  of  the  conscious^  motives 
that  determine  his  conduct.  Our  conscious  acts '  are 
the  outcome  of  an  unconscious  substratum  created  in 
the  mind  in  the  main  by  hereditary  influences.  This 
substratum  consists  of  the  innumerable  common 
characteristics  handed  down  from  generation  to 
generation,  which  constitute  the  genius  of  a  race. 
Behind  the  avowed  causes  of  our  acts  there  undoubt- 
edly lie  secret  causes  that  we  do  not  avow,  but 
>  behind  these  secret  causes  there  are  many  others 
more  secret  still,  of  which  we  ourselves  are 
ignorant.^  The  greater  part  of  our  daily  actions  are 
the  result  of  hidden  motives  which  escape  our 
observation. '  (p.  30.) 

^  [The  German  translation  of  Le  Bon,  quoted  by  the  author, 
reads  ^ beivusster' \  the  English  translation  has  'unconscious';  and 
the  original  French  text  ^ inconscients\— Translator.] 

'  [The  English  translation  reads  'which  we  ourselves  ignore' — 
a  misunderstanding  of  the  French  word  'ignorees\ — Translator.] 


Le  Bon's  Description  of  the  Group  Mind  9 

Le  Bon  thinks  that  the  particular  acquirements 
of  individuals  become  obliterated  in  a  group,  and 
that  in  this  way  their  distinctiveness  vanishes.  The 
racial  unconscious  emerges;  what  is  heterogeneous  is 
submerged  in  what  is  homogeneous.  We  may  say 
■~that-^the  mental  superstructure,  the  development  of 
which  in  individuals  shows  such  dissimilarities,  is 
removed,  and  that  the  unconscious  foundations,  which 
are  similar  in  everyone,  stand  exposed  to  view.  ^ 

In  this  way  individuals  in  a   group    would    come\^ 
to  show  an  .average  character.    But  Le  Bon  believes  ^ 
that  they  also  display  new  characteristics    which  they 
have    not    previously    possessed,    and    he    seeks   the 
reason  for  this  in  three  different  factors. 

^*The  first  is  that  the  individual  forming  part  of  t.- 
a  group  acquires,  solely  from  numerical  considerations, 
a  sentiment  of  invincible  power  which  allows  him  to' 
yield  to  instincts  which,  had  he  been  alone,  he  would 
perforce  have  kept  under  restraint.  He  will  be  the 
less  disposed  to  check  himself  from  ±he  consideration 
that,  a  group  being  anonymous,  and  in  consequence 
irresponsible,  the  sentiment  of  responsibility  which 
always  controls  individuals  disappears  entirely.'  (p.  33.)     y 

From  our  point  of  view  we  need  not  attribute 
so  much  importance  to  the  appearance  of  new 
characteristics.  For  us  it  would  be  enough  \o  say 
that  in  a  group  the  individual  is  brought  under  con- 
ditions which  allow  him   to    throw  off  the  repressions  ' 


4 


I O     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

of  his  unconscious  instincts.  Theapparently  new 
^characteristics  whichhg_,tben^  displays  are  in  fact 
the  mamlestations  of  this  unconscious^  in  which  all 
that  is    evil    in    tHe    human    mind   is    contained  as  a 


pFedisposition.  We  can  find  no  difficulty  inunder^ 
standing    tEe~*  disappearance    of    conscience    or    of  a 

^sehse  of -responsibility  in  these  circumstances.  It  has 
long  been  our  contention  that  '  dread  of  society  [soziale 
Angsty  is  the  essence  of  what  is  called  conscience.^ 

^  ■"'^  *The  second  cause,  which  is  contagion,  also 
intervenes  to  determine  the  manifestation  in  groups 
of  their  special  characteristics,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  trend  they  are  to  take.  Contagion  is  a  pheno- 
menon of  which  it  is  easy  to  establish  the  presence, 
but  that  it  is  not  easy  to  explain.  It  must  be  classed 

-t 

among  those  phenomena  of  a  Jiypnotix:  order,  which 
we  shall  shortly  study.  In  a  group  every  sentiment 
and  act   is    contagious,    and    contagious    to    such    a 


■  *  There  is  some  difference  between  Le  Bon's  view  and 
ours  owing  to  his  concept  of  the  unconscious  not  quite  coinciding 
with  the  one  adopted  by  psycho-analysis.  Le  Bon's  unconscious 
more  especially  contains  the  most  deeply  buried  features  of  the 
racial  mind,  which  as  a  matter  of  fact  lies  outside  the  scope  of 
psycho-analysis.  We  do  not  fail  to  recognize,  indeed,  that  the 
ego's  nucleus,  which  comprises  the  'archaic  inheritance'  of  the 
human  mind,  is  unconscious;  but  in  addition  to  this  we 
distinguish  the  'unconscious  repressed',  which  arose  from  a 
portion  of  that  inheritance.  This  concept  of  the  repressed  is  not 
to  be  found  in  Le  Bon. 


Le  Bon's  Description  of  the  Group  Mind         1 1 

degree  that  an  individual  readily  sacrifices  his  personal 
interest  to  the  collective  interest.  This  is  an  aptitude 
very  contrary  to  his  nature,  and  of  which  a  man  is 
scarcely  capable,  except  when  he  makes  part  of  a 
group.'  (p.  33.) 

We  shall  later  on  base  an  important  conjecture 
upon  this  last  statement. 

*  A  third  cause,  and  by  far  the  most  important, 
determines  in  the  individuals  of  a  group  special  cha- 
racteristics which  are  quite  contrary  at  times  to 
those  presented  by  the  isolated  individual.  I  allude 
to  that  suggestibility  of  which,  moreover,  the  contagion 
mentioned  above  is  only  an  effect. 

'  To  understand  this  phenomenon  it  is  necessary 
to  bear  in  mind  certain  recent  physiological  discoveries. 
We  know  to-day  that  by  various  processes  an  individ-  \ 
ual  may  be  brought  into  such  a  condition  that, 
having  entirely  lost  his  conscious  personality,  he  obeys 
all  the  suggestions  of  the  operator  who  has  deprived 
him  of  it,  and  commits  acts  in  utter  contradiction 
with  his  character  and  habits.  The  most  careful 
investigations  seem  to  prove  that  an  individual  im- 
mersed for  some  length  of  time  in  a  group  in  action 
soon  finds  himself — either  in  consequence  of  the 
magnetic  influence  given  out  by  the  group,  or  from 
some  other  cause  of  which  we  are  ignorant — in  a 
special  state,  which  much  resembles  the  state  of 
fascination    in    which    the    hypnotised    individual   finds 


1 2     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

himself  in  the  hands  of  the  hypnotiser.  .  .  .  The 
conscious  personality  has  entirely  vanished ;  will 
and  discernment  are  lost.  All  feelings  and  thoughts 
are  bent  in  the  direction  determined  by  the 
hypnotiser. 

'  Such  also  is  approximately  the  state  of  the 
individual  forming  part  of  a  psychological  group.  He 
is  no  longer  conscious  of  his  acts.  In  his  case,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  hypnotised  subject,  at  the  same 
time  that  certain  faculties  are  destroyed,  others  may 
be  brought  to  a  high  degree  of  exaltation.  Under 
the  influence  of  a  suggestion,  he  will  undertake  the 
accomplishment  of  certain  acts  with  irresistible  im- 
petuosity. This  impetuosity  is  the  more  irresistible  in 
the  case  of  groups  than  in  that  of  the  hypnotised 
subject,  from  the  fact  that,  the  suggestion  being  the 
same  for  all  the  individuals  of  the  group,  it  gains  in 
strength  by  reciprocity.'     (p.  34.) 

*  We  see,  then,  that  the  disappearance  of  the 
conscious  personality,  the  predominance  of  the  un- 
conscious personality,  the  turning  by  means  of  sug- 
gestion and  contagion  of  feelings  and  ideas  in  an 
identical  direction,  the  tendency  to  immediately  trans- 
form the  suggested  ideas  into  acts;  these,  we  see,  are 
the  principal  characteristics  of  the  individual  forming 
part  of  a  group.  He  is  no  longer  himself,  but  has 
become  an  automaton  who  has  ceased  to  be  guided 
by  his  will.'     (p.  35.) 


Le  Bon' s  Description  of  the  Group  Mind  1 3 

I  have  quoted  this  passage  so  fully  in  order  to 
make  it  quite  clear  that  Le  Bon  explains  the  condition 
of  an  individual  in  a  group  as  being  actually  hypnotic, 
and  does  not  merely  make  a  comparison  between 
the  two  states.  We  have  no  intention  of  raising  any 
objection  at  this  point,  but  wish  only  to  emphasize 
the  fact  that  the  tw^o  last  causes  of  an  individual 
becoming  altered  in  a  group  (the  contagion  and  the 
heightened  suggestibility)  are  evidently  not  on  a  par, 
since  the  contagion  seems  actually  to  be  a  manifestation 
of  the  suggestibility.  Moreover  the  effects  of  the  two 
factors  do  not  seem  to  be  sharply  differentiated  in 
the  text  of  Le  Bon's  remarks.  We  may  perhaps 
best  interpret  his  statement  if  we  connect  the  contagion 
with  the  eftects  of  the  individual  members  of  the 
group  upon  one  another,  w^hile  we  point  to  another 
source  for  those  manifestations  of  suggestion  in  the 
group  which  are  put  on  a  level  with  the  phenomena 
.of  hypnotic  influence.  But  to  w^hat  source?  We 
cannot  avoid  being  struck  with  a  sense  of  deficiency 
when  we  notice  that  one  of  the  chief  elements  of 
the  comparison,  namely  the  person  who  is  to  replace 
the  hypnotist  in  the  case  of  the  group,  is  not  mentioned 
in  Le  Bon's  exposition.  But  he  nevertheless  dis- 
tinguishes between  this  influence  of  fascination  which 
remains  plunged  in  obscurity  and  the  contagious  effect 
which  the  individuals  exercise  upon  one  another  and 
by  which  the  original  suggestion  is  strengthened. 


1 4     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

Here  is  yet  another  important  consideration  for 
helping  us  to  understand  the  individual  in  a  group: 
*  Moreover,  by  the  mere  fact  that  he  forms  part  of 
an  organised  group,  a  man  descends  several  rungs 
in  the  ladder  of  civilisation.  Isolated,  he  may  be  a 
cultivated  individual;  in  a  crowd,  he  is  a  barbarian — 
that  is,  a  creature  acting  by  instinct.  He  possesses 
the  spontaneity,  the  violence,  the  ferocity,  and  also 
the  enthusiasm  and  heroism  of  primitive  beings. ' 
/  (p.  36.)  He  then  dwells  especially  upon  the  low^ering  in 
intellectual  ability  which  an  individual  experiences  when 
he  becomes  merged  in  a  group.^ 

Let  us  now  leave  the  individual,  and  turn  to 
the  group  mind,  as  it  has  been  outlined  by  Le  Bon. 
It  shows  not  a  single  feature  which  a  psycho-analyst 
would  find  any  difficulty  in  placing  or  in  deriving 
from  its  source.  Le  Bon  himself  shows  us  the  way 
by  pointing  to  its  similarity  with  the  mental  life  of 
primitive  people  and  of  children  (p.  40). 

A  group  is  impulsive,  changeable  and  irritable. 
It  is  led  almost  exclusively  by  the  unconscious.^  The 

^  Compare  Schiller's  couplet: 
Jeder,  sieht  man  ihn  einzeln,  ist  leidlichklug  und  verstandig; 

Sind  sie  in  corpore,  gleich  wird  euch  ein  Dummkopf  daraus. 
[Everyone,  seen  by  himself,  is  passably  shrewd  and  discerning; 

When  they're  in  corpore,   then  straightway  you'll  find 

he's  an  ass.] 

^  '  Unconscious  '  is  used  here  correctly  by  Le  Bon  in  the 
descriptive  sense,    where   it  does  not  only  mean  the  'repressed'. 


Le  Bon' s  Description  of  the  Group  Mind  1 5 

impulses  which  a  group  obeys  may  according  to 
circumstances  be  generous  or  cruel,  heroic  or  cowardly, 
but  they  are  always  so  imperious  that  no  personal 
interest,  not  even  that  of  self-preservation,  can  make 
itself  felt  (p.  41).  Nothing  about  it  is  premeditated. 
Though  it  may  desire  things  passionately,  yet  this 
is  never  so  for  long,  for  it  is  incapable  of  perse- 
verance. It  cannot  tolerate  any  delay  between  its 
desire  and  the  fulfilment  of  what  it  desires.  It  has 
a  sense  of  omnipotence;  the  notion  of  impossibility 
disappears  for  the  individual  in  a  group. ^ 

A  group  is   extraordinarily   credulous    and   open 
to    influence,     it    has    no    critical    faculty,    and    the 
improbable  does  not  exist  for  it.  It  thinks  in  images,  w- 
which    call    one    another    up    by    association    (just    as 
they  arise  with  individuals  in  states  of  free  imagination), 
and  whose   agreement   with   reality  is   never   checked 
by  any  reasonable  function  \Instanz\?  The_jeelings__of^ 
a  group    are   always   very   simple  and  very  exagger-'^ 
ated.     So    that    a    group    knows   neifheP~doubt    nor 
uncertainty.^"       "  """  ~^ 

^  Compare  Totem  unci  Tabu,  III.,  'Animismus,  Magie,  und 
Allmacht  der  Gedanken.'  [Totem  and  Taboo.  New  York,  Moffat,  10 18. 
London,  Kegan  Paul,  19 19.] 

^  [See  footnote  p.  69.] 

^  ^  In  the  interpretation  of  dreams,  to  which,  indeed,  we 
owe  our  best  knowledge  of  unconscious  mental  life,  we  follow  a 
technical  rule  of  disregarding  doubt  and  uncertainty  in  the  narrative 


1 6     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

It  goes  directly  to  extremes;  if  a  suspicion  is 
expressed,  it  is  instantly  changed  into  an  incontrovertible 
certainty;  a  trace  of  antipathy  is  turned  into  furious 
hatred  (p.   56).^ 

Inclined  as  it  itself  is  to  all  extremes,  a  group 
can  only  be  excited  by  an  excessive  stimulus.  Anyone 
who  wishes  to  produce  an  effect  upon  it  needs  no 
logical   adjustment   in   his    arguments;   he   must   paint 


of  the  dream,  and  of  treating  every  element  of  the .  manifest 
dream  as  being  quite  certain.  We  attribute  doubt  and  uncer- 
tainty to  the  influence  of  the  censorship  to  which  the  dream-work 
is  subjected,  and  we  assume  that  the  primary  dream-thoughts  are 
not  acquainted  with  doubt  and  uncertainty  as  critical  processes. 
They  may  naturally  be  present,  like  everything  else,  as  part  of 
the  content  of  the  day's  residue  which  leads  to  the  dream. 
(See  Die  TraumdeuHtng,  6.  Auflage,  192 1,  S.  386.  \The  Inter- 
pretation of  Dreams.  Allen  and  Unwin,  3rd.  Edition,  191 3, 
p.  409.])  .       ■ 

^  The  same  extreme  and  unmeasured  intensification  of 
every  emotion  is  also  a  feature  of  the  affective  life  of  children, 
and  it  is  present  as  well  in  dream  life.  Thanks  to  the  isolation 
of  the  single  emotions  in  the  unconscious,  a  slight  annoyance 
during  the  day  will  express  itself  in  a  dream  as  a  wish  for  the 
offending  person's  death,  or  a  breath  of  temptation  may  give  the 
impetus  to  the  portrayal  in  the  dream  of  a  criminal  action. 
Hanns  Sachs  has  made  an  appropriate  remark  on  this  point:  'If 
we  try  to  discover  in  consciousness  all  that  the  dream  has  made 
known  to  us  of  its  bearing  upon  the  present  (upon  reality),  we 
need  not  be  surprised  that  what  we  saw  as  a  monster  under  the 
microscope  of  analysis  now  reappears  as  an  infusorium.'  {Die 
Tratmideutung,  S.  457.  [Translation  p.  493.]) 


Le  Bon' 5  Description  of  the  Group  Mind  1 7 

in  the  most  forcible  colours,  he  must  exaggerate, 
and  he  must  repeat  the  same  thing  again  and 
again. 

Since  a  group  is  in  no  doubt  as  to  what  con- 
stitutes truth  or  error,  and  is  conscious,  moreover,  of 
its  own  great  sti-ength,  it  is  as  intolerant  as  it  is 
obedient  to  authority.  It  respects  force  and  can 
only  be  slightly  influenced  by  kindness,  which  it 
regards  merely  as  a  form  of  weakness.  What  it 
demands  of  its  heroes  is  strength,  or  even  violence. 
It  wants  to  be  ruled  and  oppressed  and  to  fear  its 
masters.  Fundamentally  it  is  entirely  conservative, 
and  it  has  a  deep  aversion  from  all  innovations  and 
advances  and  an  unbounded  respect  for  tradition 
(p.  62). 

In  order  to  make  a  correct  judgement  upon  the 
morals  of  groups,  one  must  take  into  consideration 
the  fact  that  when  individuals  come  together  in  a 
group  all  their  individual  inhibitions  fall  away  and  all 
the  cruel,  brutal  and  destructive  instincts,  which  lie 
dormant  in  individuals  as  relics  of  a  primitive  epoch, 
are  stirred  up  to  find  free  gratification.  But  under 
the  influence  of  suggestion  groups  are  also  capable 
of  high  achievements  in  the  shape  of  abnegation, 
unselfishness,  and  devotion  to  an  ideal.  While  with 
isolated  individuals  personal  interest  is  almost  the 
only  motive  force,  with  groups  it  is  very  rarely 
prominent.     It  is  possible  to    speak   of  an    individual 


1 8     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

having  his  moral  standards  raised  by  a  group  (p.  65). 
Whereas  the  intellectual  capacity  of  a  group  is  always 
far  below  that  of  an  individual,  its  ethical  conduct 
may  rise  as  high  above  his  as  it  may  sink  deep 
below  it. 

Some  other  features  in  Le  Bon's  description 
show  in  a  clear  light  how  well  justified  is  the  identi- 
fication of  the  group  mind  with  the  mind  of  primitive 
people.  In  groups  the  most  contradictory  ideas  can 
exist  side  by  side  and  tolerate  each  other,  without 
any  conflict  arising  from  the  logical  contradiction 
between  them.  But  this  is  also  the  case  in  the  un- 
conscious mental  life  of  individuals,  of  children  and  of 
neurotics,  as  psycho-analysis  has  long  pointed  out.^ 

^  In  young  children,  for  instance,  ambivalent  emotional 
attitudes  towards  those  who  are  nearest  to  them  exist  side  by 
side  for  a  long  time,  without  either  of  them  interfering  with 
the  expression  of  the  other  and  contrary  one.  If  eventually  a 
conflict  breaks  out  between  the  two,  it  is  often  settled  by  the 
child  making  a  change  of  object  and  displacing  one  of  the 
ambivalent  emotions  on  to  a  substitute.  The  history  of  the  devel- 
opment Of  a  neurosis  in  an  adult  will  also  show  that  a  sup- 
pressed emotion  may  frequently  persist  for  a  long  time  in  un- 
conscious or  even  in  conscious  phantasies,  the  content  of  which 
naturally  runs  directly  counter  to  some  predominant  tendency, 
and  yet  that  this  antagonism  does  not  result  in  any  proceedings 
on  the  part  of  the  ego  against  what  it  has  repudiated.  The 
phantasy  is  tolerated  for  quite  a  long  time,  until  suddenly  one 
day,  usually  as  a  result  of  an  increase  in  the  affective  cathexis 
[see  footnote  page  48]  of  the  phantasy,  a  conflict  breaks  out 
between  it  and  the  ego  with  all  the  usual  consequences.    In  the 


Le  Bon's  Description  of  the  Group  Mind  19 

A  group,  further,  is  subject  to  the  truly  magical 
power  of  words;  they  can  evoke  the  most  formidable 
tempests  in  the  group  mind,  and  are  also  capable  of 
stilling  them  (p.  117).  ^Reason  and  arguments  are 
incapable  of  combating  certain-  words  and  formulas. 
They  are  uttered  with  solemnity  in  the  presence  of 
groups,  and  as  soon  as  they  have  been  pronounced 
an  expression  of  respect  is  visible  on  every  coun- 
tenance, and  all  heads  are  bowed.  By  many  they 
are  considered  as  natural  forces,  as  supernatural 
powers.'  (p.  117.)  It  is  only  necessary  in  this  con- 
nection to  remember  the  taboo  upon  names  among 
primitive  people  and  the  magical  powers  which  they 
ascribe  to  names  and  words.  ^ 

And,-  finally,  groups  have  never  thirsted  after 
truth.    They  demand  illusions,  and  cannot  do  without 

process  of  a  child's  development  into  a  mature  adult  there  is  a 
more  and  more  extensive  integration  of  its  personality,  a  co- 
ordination of  the  separate  instinctive  feelings  and  desires  which 
have  grown  up  in  him  independently  of  one  another.  The  analogous 
process  in  the  domain  of  sexual  life  has  long  been  known  to  us 
as  the  co-ordination  of  all  the  sexual  instincts  into  a  definitive 
genital  organisation.  {Drei  Abhandlungen  zur  Sexualtheorie,  1 90 5. 
[Three  Contributions'  to  the  Sexual  Theory.  Nervous  and  Mental 
Disease  Monograph  Series,  No.  7,  1910.])  Moreover,  that  the 
unification  of  the  ego  is  liable  to  the  same  interferences  as  that 
of  the  libido  is  shown  by  numerous  familiar  instances,  such  as 
that  of  men  of  science  who  have  preser\^ed  their  faith  in  the 
Bible,  and  the  like. 

*  See  Totem  unci  Tabu. 


20     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

them.  They  constantly  give  what  is  unreal  precedence 
over  what  is  real;  they  are  almost  as  strongly  in- 
fluenced by  what  is  untrue  as  by  what  is  true.  They 
have  an  evident  tendency   not  to  distinguish  between 

the  two  (p.  ^^), 

We  have  pointed  out  that  this  predominance  of 
the  life  of  phantasy  and  of  the  illusion  born  of  an 
unfulfilled  wish  is  the  ruling  factor  in  the  psychology 
of  neuroses.  We  have  found  that  what  neurotics 
are  guided  by  is  not  ordinary  objective  reality  but 
psychological  reality.  A  hysterical  symptom  is  based 
upon  phantasy  instead  of  upon  the  repetition  of  real 
experience,  and  the  sense  of  guilt  in  an  obsessional 
neurosis  is  based  upon  the  fact  of  an  evil  intention 
which  was  never  carried  out.  Indeed,  just  as  in 
dreams  and  in  hypnosis,  in  the  mental  operations 
of  a  group  the  function  for  testing  the  reality  of 
things  falls  into  the  background  in  comparison  with 
the  strength  of  wishes  with  their  affective  cathexis.^ 

What  Le  Bon  says  on  the  subject  of  leaders  of 
groups  is  less  exhaustive,  and  does,  not  enable  us  to 
make  out  an  underlying  principle  so  clearly.  He 
thinks  that  as  soon  as  living  beings  are  gathered 
together  in  certain  numbers,  no  matter  whether 
they  are  a  herd  of  animals  or  a  collection  of  human 
beings,  they  place  themselves  instinctively    under    the 

^  [See  footnote  p.  48.] 


Le  Bon's  Description  of  the  Group  Mind         2 1 

authority  of  a  chief  (p.  134).  A  group  is  an  obed- 
ient herd,  which  could  never  live  without  a  master. 
It  has  such  a  thirst  for  obedience  that  it  submits 
instinctively  to  anyone  who  appoints  himself  its  master. 

Although  in  this  way  the  needs  of  a  group  carry 
it  half-way  to  meet  the  leader,  yet  he  too  must  fit  in 
with  it  in  his  personal  qualities.  He  must  himself  be 
heldji-iascination  by  a  strong  faith  (in  an  idea)  in 
order  to  awaken  the  group's  faith  j  he  must  possess 
a  strong  and  inipnsing  will,  which  the  group,  which 
has  no  will  of  its  own,  can  accept  from  him.  Le 
Bon  then  discusses  the  different  kinds  of  leaders,  and 
the  means  by  which  they  work  upon  the  group.  On 
the  whole  he  believes  that  the  leaders  make  themselves 
felt  by  means  of  the  ideas  in  which  they  themselves 
are  fanatical  believers. 

Moreover,  he  ascribes  both  to  the  ideas  and  to 
the  leaders  a  mysterious  and  irresistible  power,  which 
he  calls  'prestige'.  Prestige  is  a  sort  of  domination 
exercised  over  us  by  an  individual,  a  work  or  an  idea. 
It  entirely  paralyses  our  'critical  faculty,  and  fills  us 
with  astonishment  and  respect.  It  would  seem  to 
arouse  a  feeling  like  that  of  fascination  in  hypnosis 
(p.  148).  He  distinguishes  between  acquired  or  arti- 
ficial and  personal  prestige.  The  former  is  attached 
to  persons  in  virtue  of  their  name,  fortune  and  reput- 
ation, and  to  opinions,  works  of  art,  etc.,  in  virtue 
of  tradition.    Since   in   every    case    it   harks   back  to 


U"' 


22     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

the  past,  it  cannot  be  of  much  help  to  us  in  under- 
standing this  puzzling  influence.  Personal  prestige  is 
attached  to  a  few  people,  who  become  leaders  by 
means  of  it,  and  it  has  the  effect  of  making  every- 
thing obey  them  as  though  by  the  operation  of  some 
magnetic  magic.  All  prestige,  however,  is  also 
dependent  upon  success,  and  is  lost  in  the  event  of 
failure  (p.   159). 

We  cannot  feel  that  Le  Bon  has  brought  the 
function  of  the  leader  and  the  importance  of  prestige 
completely  into  harmony  with  his  brilliantly  executed 
picture  of  the  group  mind. 


Ill 

OTHER  ACCOUNTS  OF  COLLECTIVE 

MENTAL  LIFE 


We  have  made  use  of  Le  Bon's  description  by 
way  of  introduction,  because  it  fits  in  so  well  with 
our  own  Psychology  in  the  emphasis  which  it  lays 
upon  unconscious  mental  life.  But  we  must  now  add 
that  as  a  matter  of  fact  none  of  that  author's  state- 
ments bring  forward  anything  new.  Everything  that  he 
says  to  the  detriment  and  depreciation  of  the  mani- 
festations of  the  group  mind  had  already  been  said 
by  others  before  him  with  equal  distinctness  and 
equal  hostility,  and  has  been  repeated  in  unison  by 
thinkers,  statesmen  and  writers  since  the  earliest 
periods  of  literature.^  The  two  theses  which  com- 
prise the  most  important  of  Le  Bon's  opinions,  those 
touching  upon  the  collective  inhibition  of  intellectual 
functioning  and  the  heightening  of  affectivity  in  groups, 

*  B.  Kraskovic  jun. :  Die  Psychologie  der  Kollektivitdien. 
Translated  [into  German]  from  the  Croatian  by  Siegmund  von 
Posavec.  Vukovar,  191 5.  See  the  body  of  the  work  as  well  as 
the  bibliography. 


24     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

had  been  formulated  shortly  before  by  Sighele.*  At 
bottom,  all  that  is  left  over  as  being  peculiar  to  Le 
Bon  are  the  two  notions  of  the  unconscious  and  of 
the  comparison  with  the  mental  life  of  primitive 
people,  and  even  these  had  naturally  often  been 
alluded  to  before  him. 

But,  what  is  more,  the  description  and  estimate 
of  the  group  mind  as  they  have  been  given  by  Le 
Bon  and  the  rest  have  not  by  any  means  been  left 
undisputed.  There  is  no  doubt  that  all  the  phenomena 
of  the  group  mind  which  have  just  been  mentioned 
have  been  correctly  observed,  but  it  is  also  possible 
to  distinguish  other  manifestations  of  the  group 
formation,  which  operate  in  a  precisely  opposite  sense, 
and  from  which  a  much  higher  opinion  of  the  group 
mind  must  necessarily  follow. 

Le  Bon  himself  was  prepared  to  admit  that  in 
certain  circumstances  the  morals  of  a  group  can  be 
higher  than  those  of  the  individuals  that  compose  it, 
and  that  only  collectivities  are  capable  of  a  high 
degree  of  unselfishness  and  devotion.  ^  While  with 
isolated  individuals  personal  interest  is  almost  the 
only  motive  force,  with  groups  it  is  very  rarely 
prominent.'  (p.  65.)  Other  writers  adduce  the  fact 
that   it   is    only   society  which   prescribes   any   ethical 

*  See  Walter  Moede :  *Die  Massen- und  Sozialpsychologie  im 
kritischen  Oberblick.'  Meumann  and  Scheibner's  Zeitschrift  fur 
pddagogische  Psychologie  und  experimentelle  Pddagogik.  191 5,  XVI. 


0 
Other  Accounts  of  Collective  Mental  Life        25 

standards  at  all  for  the  individual,  while  he  as  a 
rule  fails  in  one  way  or  another  to  come  up  to  its 
high  demands.  Or  they  point  out  that  in  exceptional 
circumstances  there  may  arise  in  communities  the 
phenomenon  of  enthusiasm,  which  has  made  the 
most  splendid  group  achievements  possible. 

As  regards  intellectual  work  it  remains  a  fact, 
indeed,  that  great  decisions  in  the  realm  of  thought 
and  momentous  discoveries  and  solutions  of  problems 
are  only  possible  to  an  individual,  working  in  solitude. 
But  even  the  group  mind  is  capable  of  genius  in 
intellectual  creation,  as  is  shown  above  all  by  language 
itself,  as  well  as  by  folk-song,  folk-lore  and  the  like. 
It  remains  an  open  question,  moreover,  how  much 
the  individual  thinker  or  writer  owes  [to  the  stimulation 
of  the  group  in  which  he  lives,  or  whether  he  does 
more  than  perfect  a  mental  work  in  which  the  others 
have  had  a  simultaneous  share. 

In  face  of  these  completely  contradictory  accounts, 
it  looks  as  though  the  work  of  Group  Psycholog}'- 
were  bound  to  come  to  an  ineffectual  end.  But  it 
is  easy  to  find  a  more  hopeful  escape  from  the 
dilemma.  A  number  of  very  different  formations  have 
probably  been  merged  under  the  term  ^  group '  and 
may  require  to  be  distinguished.  The  assertions  of 
Sighele,  Le  Bon.  find  the  rest  relate  to  groups  of  a 
short-lived  character,  which  some  passing  interest  has 
hastily  agglomerated  out  of  various  sorts  of  individuals. 


26     Gro2ip  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

The  characteristics  of  revolutionary  groups,  and 
especially  those  of  the  great  French  Revolution,  have 
unmistakably  influenced  their  descriptions.  The  op- 
posite opinions  owe  their  origin  to  the  consideration 
of  those  stable  groups  or  associations  in  which 
mankind  pass  their  lives,  and  w^hich  are  embodied  in 
the  institutions  of  society.  Groups  of  the  first  kind  stand 
in  the  same  sort  of  relation  to  those  of  the  second 
as  a  high  but  choppy  sea  to  a  ground  swell. 

McDougall,  in  his  book  on  The  Group  Mind^ 
starts  out  from  the  same  contradiction  that  has  just 
been  mentioned,  and  finds  a  solution  for  it  in  the 
factor  of  organisation.  In  the  simplest  case,  he  says, 
the  '  group '  possesses  no  organisation  at  all  or  one 
scarcely  deserving  the  name.  He  describes  a  group 
of  this  kind  as  a  'crowd'.  But  he  admits  that  a 
crowd  of  human  beings  can  hardly  come  together 
without  possessing  at  all  events  the  rudiments  of 
an  organisation,  and  that  precisely  in  these  simple 
groups  many  of  the  fundamental  facts  of  Collective 
Psychology  can  be  observ^ed  with  special  ease  (p.  22). 
Before  the  members  of  a  random  crowd  of  people 
can  constitute  something  in  the  nature  of  a  group  in 
the  psychological  sense  of  the  word,  a  condition  has 
to  be  fulfilled;  these  individuals  must  have  something 
in    common  with   one   another,  a  common   interest   in 

^  Cambridge  University  Press,  1920. 


Other  Accounts  of  Collective  Mental  Life        27 

an  object,  a  similar  emotional  bias  in  some  situation 
or  other,  and  ('consequently',  I  should  like  to^ 
interpolate)  *  some  degree  of  reciprocal  influence ' , 
(p.  23).  The  higher  the  degree  of  'this  mental 
homogeneity',  the  more  readily  do  the  individuals 
form  a  psychological  group,  and  the  more  striking 
are  the  manifestations  of  a  group  mind. 

The  most  remarkable  and  also  the  most  im- 
portant result  of  the  formation  of  a  group  Is  the 
'  exaltation  or  intensification  of  emotion '  produced 
in  every  member  of  it  (p.  24).  In  McDougall's 
opinion  men's  emotions  are  stirred  in  a  group  to  a 
pitch  that  they  seldom  or  never  attain  under  other 
conditions;  and  it  is  a  pleasurable  experience  for 
those  who  are  concerned  to  surrender  themselves  so 
unreservedly  to  their  passions  and  thus  to  become 
merged  in  the  group  and  to  lose  the  sense  of  the 
limits  of  their  individuality.  The  manner  in  which 
individuals  are  thus  carried  away  by  a  common  im- 
pulse is  explained  by  McDougall  by  means  of  what 
he  calls  the  'principle  of  direct  induction  of  emotion 
by  way  of  the  primitive  sympathetic  response'  (p.  25), 
that  is,  by  means  of  the  emotional  contagion  with 
which  we  are  already  familiar.  The  fact  is  that  the 
perception  of  the  signs  of  an  emotional  state  is 
calculated  automatically  to  arouse  the  same  emotion 
in  the  person  who  perceives  them.  The  greater  the 
number  of  people    in    whom    the    same    emotion  can 


28     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

\y  be  simultaneously  observed,  the  stronger  does  this 
automatic  compulsion  grow.  The  individual  loses  his 
power  of  criticism,  and  lets  himself  slip  into  the 
same  emotion.  But  in  so  doing  he  increases  the 
excitement  of  the  other  people,  who  had  produced 
this  effect  upon  him,  and  thus  the  emotional  charge 
of  the  individuals  becomes  intensified  by  mutual 
interaction.  Something  is  unmistakably  at  work  in 
the  nature  of  a  compulsion  to  do  the  same  as  the 
others,  to  remain  in  harmony  with  the  many.  The 
coarser  and  simpler  emotions  are  the  more  apt  to 
spread  through  a  group  in  this  way  (p.   39). 

This  mechanism  for  the  intensification  of  emotion 
is  favoured  by  some  other  influences  which  emanate 
from  groups.  A  group  impresses  the  individual  with 
a  sense  of  unlimited  power  and  of  insurmountable 
peril.  For  the  moment  it  replaces  the  whole  of 
human  society,  which  is  the  wielder  of  authorit}^, 
whose  punishments  the  individual  fears,  and  for  whose 
sake  he  has  submitted  to  so  many  inhibitions.  It  is 
clearly  perilous  for  him  to  put  himself  in  opposition 
to  it,  and  it  will  be  safer  to  follow  the  example  of 
those  around  him  and  perhaps  even  'hunt  with  the 
pack'.  In  obedience  to  the  new  authority  he  may 
put  his  former  '  conscience '  out  of  action,  and  so 
surrender  to  the  attraction  of  the  increased  pleasure 
that  is  certainly  obtained  from  the  removal  of  in- 
hibitions.    On    the    whole,    therefore,    it    is    not    so 


Other  Accounts  of  Collective  Mental  Life        29 

remarkable  that  we  should  see  an  individual  in  a 
group  doing  or  approving  things  which  he  would 
have  avoided  in  the  normal  conditions  of  life;  and  in 
this  way  we  may  even  hope  to  clear  up  a  little  of 
the  mystery  which  is  so  often  covered  by  the 
enigmatic  word  *  suggestion'. 

McDougall  does  not  dispute  the  thesis  as  to 
the  collective  inhibition  of  intelligence  in  groups 
(p.  41).  He  says  that  the  minds  of  lower  intelligence 
bring  down  those  of  a  higher  order  to  their  own 
level.  The  latter  are  obstructed  in  their  activity, 
because  in  general  an  intensification  of  emotion 
creates  unfavourable  conditions  for  sound  intellectual 
work,  and  further  because  the  individuals  are  intim- 
idated by  the  group  and  their  mental  activity  is 
not  free,  and  because  there  is  a  lowering  in  each 
individual  of  his  sense  of  responsibility  for  his  own 
performances. 

The  judgement  with  which  McDougall  sums 
up  the  psychological  behaviour  of  a  simple  ^  unorga- 
nised' group  is  no  more  friendly  than  that  of 
Le  Bon.  Such  a  group  *  is  excessively  emotional, 
impulsive,  violent,  fickle,  inconsistent,  irresolute  and 
extreme  in  action,  displaying  only  the  coarser  emo- 
tions and  the  less  refined  sentiments;  extremely 
suggestible,  careless  in  deliberation,  hasty  in  judg- 
ment, incapable  of  any  but  the  simpler  and 
imperfect  forms  of  reasoning;   easily  swayed  and  led, 


30     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

lacking  in  self-consciousness,  devoid  of  self-respect  and 
of  sense  of  responsibility,  and  apt  to  be  carried  away 
by  the  consciousness  of  its  own  force,  so  that  it 
tends  to  produce  all  the  manifestations  we  have 
learnt  to  expect  of  any  irresponsible  and  absolute 
power.  Hence  its  behaviour  is  like  that  of  an  unruly 
child  or  an  untutored  passionate  savage  in  a  strange 
situation,  rather  than  like  that  of  its  average  member; 
and  in  the  worst  cases  it  is  like  that  of  a  wild  beast, 
rather  than  like  that  of  human  beings.'  (p.  45.) 

Since  McDougall  contrasts  the  behaviour  of  a 
highly  organised  group  with  what  has  just  been  des- 
cribed, we  shall  be  particularly  interested  to  learn 
in  what  this  organisation  consists,  and  by  what 
factors  it  is  produced.  The  author  enumerates  five 
/  ^  principal  conditions '  for  raising  collective  mental 
^  life  to  a  higher  level. 

The  first  and  fundamental  condition  is  that  there 
should  be  some  degree  of  continuity  of  existence  in 
the  group.  This  may  be  either  material  or  formal: 
the  former,  if  the  same  individuals  persist  in  the 
group  for  some  time;  and  the  latter,  if  there  is 
developed  within  the  group  a  system  of  fixed  positions 
which  are  occupied  by  a  succession  of  individuals. 

The  second  condition  is  that  in  the  individual 
member  of  the  group  some  definite  idea  should  be 
formed  of  the  nature,  composition,  functions  and 
capacities  of   the  group,    so    that    from    this    he    may 


Other  Accounts  of  Collective  Alental  Life         3  i 

develop  an  emotional  relation  to  the  group  as  a 
whole. 

The  third  is  that  the  group  should  be  brought 
into  interaction  (perhaps  in  the  form  of  rivalry)  with 
other  groups  similar  to  it  but  differing  from  it  in 
many  respects. 

The  fourth  is  that  the  group  should  possess 
traditions,  customs  and  habits,  and  especially  such  as 
determine  the  relations  of  its  members  to  one 
another. 

The  fifth  is  that  the  group  should  have  a  definite 
structure,  expressed  in  the  specialisation  and  differ- 
entiation of  the  functions  of  its  constituents. 

According  to  McDougall,  if  these  conditions 
are  fulfilled,  the  psychological  disadvantages  of  the 
group  formation  are  removed.  The  collective  lower- 
ing of  intellectual  ability  is  avoided  by  withdrawing 
the  performance  of  intellectual  tasks  from  the  group 
and  reserving  them  for  individual  members  of  it. 

It  seems  to  us  that  the  condition  which 
McDougall  designates  as  the  '  organisation '  of  a 
group  can  with  more  justification  be  described  in 
another  way.  The  problem  consists  in  how  to  pro- 
cure for  the  group  precisely  those  features  which 
were  characteristic  of  the  individual  and  which  are 
extinguished  in  him  by  the  formation  of  the  group. 
For  the  individual,  outside  the  primitive  group, 
possessed    his    own    continuity,    his    self-consciousness, 


32     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

his  traditions  and  customs,  his  own  particular  func- 
tions and  position,  and  kept  apart  from  his  rivals. 
Owing  to  his  entry  into  an  ^  unorganised '  group  he  had 
lost  this  distinctiveness  for  a  time.  If  we  thus  recog- 
nise that  the  aim  is  to  equip  the  group  with  the 
attributes  of  the  individual,  we  shall  be  reminded 
of  a  valuable  remark  of  Trotter's,^  to  the  effect  that 
the  tendency  towards  the  formation  of  groups  is  bio- 
logically a  continuation  of  the  multicellular  character 
of  all  the  higher  organisms. 

^  Instincts  of  the  Herd  in  Peace  and  War.  Fisher  Unwin,  1916. 


I 


IV 

SUGGESTION    AND    LIBIDO 


^ 


We  started  from  the  fundamental  fact  that  an 
individual  in  a  group  is  subjected  through  its  influence 
to  what  is  often  a  profound  alteration  in  his  mental 
activity.  His  emotions  become  extraordinarily  inten- 
sified, while  his  intellectual  ability  becomes  markedly 
reduced,  both  processes  being  evidently  in  the 
direction  of  an  approximation  to  the  other  individuals 
in  the  group;  and  this  result  can  only  be  reached 
by  the  removal  of  those  inhibitions  upon  his  instincts 
which  are  peculiar  to  each  individual,  and  by  his 
resigning  those  expressions  of  his  inclinations  which 
are  especially  his  own.  We  have  heard  that  these 
often  unwelcome  consequences  are  to  some  extent 
at  least  prevented  by  a  higher  *  organisation '  of  the 
group;  but  this  does  not  contradict  the  fundamental 
fact  of  Group  Psychology — the  two  theses  as  to 
the  intensification  of  the  emotions  and  the  inhibition 
of  the   intellect   in  primitive   groups.     Our   interest  is 


I 


34      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

now  directed  to  discovering  the  psychological  explan- 
ation of  this  mental  change  which  is  experienced  b}' 
the  individual  in  a  group. 

It  is  clear  that  rational  factors  (such  as  the  in- 
timidation of  the  individual  which  has  already  been 
mentioned,  that  is,  the  action  of  his  instinct  of  self- 
preservation)  do  not  cover  the  observable  phenomena. 
Beyond  this  what  we  are  offered  as  an  explanation 
by  authorities  upon  Sociology  and  Group  Psychology 
is  always  the  same,  even  though  it  is  given  various 
names,  and  that  is — the  magic  w^ord  'suggestion'. 
Tarde  calls  it  '  imitation ' ;  but  we  cannot  help 
agreeing  with  a  writer  who  protests  that  imitation 
comes  under  the  concept  of  suggestion,  and  is  in 
fact  one  of  its  results.^  Le  Bon  traces  back  all  the 
puzzling  features  of  social  phenomena  to  two  factors: 
the  mutual  suggestion  of  individuals  and  the  prestige 
of  leaders.  But  prestige,  again,  is  only  recognizable 
by  its  capacity  for  evoking  suggestion.  McDougall 
for  a  moment  gives  us  an  impression  that  his  prin- 
ciple of  '  primitive  induction  of  emotion '  might  enable 
us  to  do  without  the  assumption  of  suggestion.  But 
on  further  consideration  we  are  forced  to  perceive 
that  this  principle  says  no  more  than  the  familiar 
assertions    about    imitation'    or    'contagion',    except 


*  Brugeilles:  'L'essence  du  phenomene  social:  la  suggestion.' 
Revne  philosophiqne,   1913,  XXV. 


Suggestion  and  Libido  35 

for  a  decided  stress  upon  the  emotional  factor. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  something  exists  in  us 
which,  when  we  become  aware  of  signs  of  an  emo- 
tion in  someone  else,  tends  to  make  us  fall  into  the 
same  emotion;  but  how  often  do  we  not  successfully 
oppose  it,  resist  the  emotion,  and  react  in  quite  an 
opposite  way?  Why,  therefore,  do  w^e  invariably  give 
way  to  this  contagion  when  we  are  in  a  group? 
Once  more  we  should  have  to  say  that  what  com- 
pels us  to  obey  this  tendency  is  imitation,  and  what 
induces  the  emotion  in  us  is  the  group's  suggestive 
influence.  Moreover,  quite  apart  from  this,  McDougall 
does  not  enable  us  to  evade  suggestion;  we  hear 
from  him  as  well  as  from  other  writers  that  groups 
are  distinguished  by  their  special  suggestibility. 

We  shall  therefore  be  prepared  for  the  statement 
that   suggestion    (or    more    correctly    suggestibility)    is. 
actually  an  irreducible,  primitive  phenomenon,    a  fun-  "* 
damental   fact  in  the   mental   life  of  man.   Such,   too, 
was   the    opinion    of   Bernheim,    of   whose    astonishing  \ 
arts    I   was    a    witness    in    the   year    1889.   But  I  can^ 
remember  even    then    feeling    a    muffled    hostility    to 
this   tyranny    of   suggestion.     When     a     patient    who 
showed  himself  unamenable    was    met  with  the  shout: 
*  What  are  you  doing?   Vous  vous  contresuggestionnez!\ 
I  said   to    myself   that    this    was    an    evident    injustice 
and  an  act  of  violence.     For  the    man    certainly  had 
a  right   to    counter-suggestions   if  they  were  trying  to 


36      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

subdue  him  with  suggestions.  Later  on  my  resistance 
took  the  direction  of  protesting  against  the  view  that 
suggestion,  which  explained  everything,  was  itself  to 
be  preserved  from  explanation.  Thinking  of  it,  I 
repeated  the  old  conundrum  :  ^ 

Christoph  trug  Christum, 
Christus  trug  die  ganze  Welt, 
Sag'  wo  hat  Christoph 
Damals  hin  den  Fuss  gestellt?^ 

Christophorus   Christum,    sed  Christus   sustulit  orbem: 
Constiterit  pedibus  die  ubi  Christophorus? 

Now  that  I  once  more  approach  the  riddle  of 
suggestion  after  having  kept  away  from  it  for  some 
thirty  years,  I  find  there  is  no  change  in  the  situation. 
To  this  statement  I  can  discover  only  a  single  ex- 
ception, which  I  need  not  mention,  since  it  is  one 
which  bears  witness  to  the  influence  of  psycho-analysis. 
I  notice  that  particular  efforts  are  being  made  to 
formulate  the  concept  of  suggestion  correctly,  that 
is,    to  fix  the  conventional  use  of  the  name.^  And  this 

*  Konrad  Richter:  'Der  deutsche  S.  Christoph.'  Berlin, 
1896,  Acta  Germanic  a,  V,  i. 

^[Literally:  *  Christopher  bore  Christ;  Christ  bore  the  whole 
world;  Say,  where  did  Christopher  then  put  his  foot?'] 

'  Thus,  McDougall:  *A  Note  on  Suggestion.'  Journal  of 
Neurology  and  Fsy chop aihology,   1920,  Vol.  I,  No.   i. 


Suggestion  and  Libido  37 

is  by  no  means  superfluous,  for  the  word  is  acquiring 
a  more  and  more  extended  use  and  a  looser  and 
looser  meaning,  and  will  soon  come  to  designate 
any  sort  ot  influence  whatever,  just  as  in  English, 
where  '  to  suggest '  and  '  suggestion '  correspond  to 
our  nahelegen  and  Anregung.  But  there  has  been  no 
explanation  of  the  nature  of  suggestion,  that  is,  of 
the  conditions  under  which  influence  without  adequate 
logical  foundation  takes  place.  I  should  not  avoid 
the  task  of  supporting  this  statement  by  an  analysis  of 
the  literature  of  the  last  thirty  years,  if  I  were  not 
aware  that  an  exhaustive  inquiry  is  being  undertaken 
close  at  hand  which  has  in  view  the  fulfilment  of  this 
very  task. 

Instead  of  this  I  shall  make  an  attempt  at  using 
the  concept  of  libido  for  the  purpose  of  throwing 
light  upon  Group  Psychology,  a  concept  which  has 
done  us  such  good  service  in  the  study  of  psycho- 
neuroses. 

Libido  is  an  expression  taken  from  the  theory 
of  the  emotions.  We  call  by  that  name  the  energy  I 
(regarded  as  a  quantitative  magnitude,  though  not 
at  present  actually  mensurable)  of  those  instincts 
which  have  to  do  with  all  that  may  be  comprised 
under  the  word  Move'.  The  nucleus  of  what  we 
mean  by  love  naturally  consists  (and  this  is  what  is 
commonly  called  love,  and  what  the  poets  sing  of) 
in  sexual  love  with   sexual  union  as  its  aim.     But  we 


38      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

do  not  separate  from  this — what  in  any  case  has  a 
share  in  the  name  *  love ' — on  the  one  hand,  self-love, 
and  on  the  other,  love  for  parents  and  children, 
friendship  and  love  for  humanity  in  general,  and  also 
devotion  to  concrete  objects  and  to  abstract  ideas. 
Our  justification  lies  in  the  fact  that  psycho-analytic 
research  has  taught  us  that  all  these  tendencies  are 
an  expression  of  the  same  instinctive  activities;  in 
relations  between  the  sexes  these  instincts  force  their 
way  towards  sexual  union  ^  but  in  other  circumstances 
they  are  diverted  from  this  aim  or  are  prevented 
from  reaching  it,  though  always  preserving  enough 
of  their  original  nature  to  keep  their  identity  recog- 
nizable (as  in  such  features  as  the  longing  for 
proximity,  and  self-sacrifice). 

We  are  of  opinion,  then,  that  language  has  carried 
out  an  entirely  justifiable  piece  of  unification  in 
creating  the  word  ^  love '  with  its  numerous  uses,  and 
that  we  cannot  do  better  than  take  it  as  the  basis 
of  our  scientific  discussions  and  expositions  as  well. 
By  coming  to  this  decision,  psycho-analysis  has  let 
loose  a  storm  of  indignation,  as  though  it  had  been 
guilty  of  an  act  of  outrageous  innovation.  Yet  psycho- 
analysis has  done  nothing  original  in  taking  love  in 
this  *  wider '  sense.  In  its  origin,  function,  and  relation 
to  sexual  love,  the  ^ Eros'  of  the  philosopher  Plato 
coincides  exactly  with  the  love  force,  the  libido,  of 
psycho-analysis,     as    has    been    shown    in    detail    by 


Suggestion  and  Libido  39 

Nachmansohn  and  Pfister;^  and  when  the  apostle  Paul, 
in  his  famous  epistle  to  the  Corinthians,  prizes  love 
above  all  else,  he  certainly  understands  it  in  the  same 
'  wider '  sense.^  But  this  only  shows  that  men  do 
not  alw^ays  take  their  great  thinkers  seriously,  even 
when  they  profess  most  to  admire  them. 

Psycho-analysis,  then,  gives  these  love  instincts 
the  name  of  sexual  instincts,  a  potiori  and  by  reason 
of  their  origin.  The  majority  of  '  educated '  people 
have  regarded  this  nomenclature  as  an  insult,  and 
have  taken  their  revenge  by  retorting  upon  ps3^cho- 
analysis  with  the  reproach  of  ^  pan-sexualism'.  Anyone 
who  considers  sex  as  something  mortifying  and  hu- 
miliating to  human  nature  is  at  liberty  to  make  use 
of  the  more  genteel  expressions  'Eros'  and  *  erotic'. 
1  might  have  done  so  myself  from  the  first  and  thus 
have  spared  myself  much  opposition.  But  I  did  not 
want  to,  for  I  like  to  avoid  concessions  to  faint- 
heartedness. One  can  never  tell  where  that  road  may 
lead  one;  one  gives  way  first  in  words,  and  then  little 
by  little  in  substance  too.  I  cannot  see  any  merit  in 
being    ashamed    of    sex;     the    Greek    word    *  Eros', 

^  Nachmansohn:  *Freuds  Libidotheorie  verglichen  mit  der 
Eroslehre  Platos'.  Internationale  Zeitschrift  fiir  Psychoanalyse, 
191 5,  Bd.  in;  Pfister:  'Plato  als  Vorlaufer  der  Psychoanalyse', 
ibid.,  192 1,  Bd.  VII.  ['Plato:  a  Fore-Runner  of  Psycho-Analysis'. 
International  Journal  of  Psycho- Analysis,   1922,  Vol.  III.] 

^  'Though  I  speak  with  the  tongues  of  men  and  of  angels,  and 
have  not  love,  I  am  become  as  sounding  brass,  or  a  tinkling  cymbal.' 


40     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

which  is  to  soften  the  affront,  is  in  the  end  nothing 
more  than  a  translation  of  our  German  word  Liebe 
[love];  and  finally,  he  whq  knows  how  to  wait  need 
make  no  concessions. 

We  will  try  our  fortune,  then,  with  the  sup- 
position that  love  relationships  (or,  to  use  a  more 
neutral  expression,  emotional  ties)  also  constitute  the 
essence  of  the  group  mind.  Let  us  remember  that 
the  authorities  make  no  mention  of  any  such  relations. 
What  would  correspond  to  them  is  evidently  con- 
cealed behind  the  shelter,  the  screen,  of  suggestion. 
Our  hypothesis  finds  support  in  the  first  instance 
from  two  passing  thoughts.  First,  that  a  group  is 
clearly  held  together  by  a  power  of  some  kind:  and 
to  what  power  could  this  feat  be  better  ascribed 
than  to  Eros,  who  holds  together  everything  in  the 
world?  Secondly,  that  if  an  individual  gives  up  his 
distinctiveness  in  a  group  and  lets  its  other  members 
influence  him  by  suggestion,  it  gives  one  the  im- 
pression that  he  does  it  because  he  feels  the  need 
of  being  in  harmony  ^ith  them  rather  than  in  op- 
position to  them — so  that  perhaps  after  all  he  does 
it  ^ihnen  zu  Liebe'} 

^  [An  idiom  meaning  *for  their  sake'.  Literally:  *for  lore 
of  them'. — Translator.] 


V 

TWO  ARTIFICIAL  GROUPS:  THE  CHURCH 

AND  THE  ARMY 


We  may  recall  from  what  we  know  of  the 
morphology  of  groups  that  it  is  possible  to  distinguish 
very  different  kinds  of  groups  and  opposing  lines  in 
their  development.  There  are  very  fleeting  groups 
and  extremely  lasting  ones;  homogeneous  ones,  made 
up  of  the  same  sorts  of  individuals,  and  unhomoge- 
neous  ones;  natural  groups,  apd  artificial  ones,  requiring 
an  external  force  to  keep  them  together;  primitive 
groups,  and  highly  organised  ones  with  a  definite 
structure.  But  for  reasons  which  have  yet  to  be 
explained  we  should  like  to  lay  particular  stress  upon 
a  distinction  to  v/hich  the  authorities  have  rather 
given  too  little  attention;  I  refer  to  that  between 
leaderless  groups  and  those  with  leaders.  And,  in 
complete  opposition  to  the  usual  practice,  we  shall 
not  choose  a  relatively  simple  group  formation  as 
our  point  of  departure,  but  shall  begin  with  highly 
organised,    lasting    and    artificial    groups.      The    most 


42      Group  Psychology  and  the  A^ialysis  of  the  Ego 

interesting  example  of  such  structures  are  churches — 
communities  of  believers — and  armies. 

A  church  and  an  army  are  artificial  groups,  that 
is,  a  certain  external  force  is  employed  to  prevent 
them  from  disintegrating  and  to  check  alterations  in 
their  structure.  As  a  rule  a  person  is  not  consulted, 
or  is  given  no  choice,  as  to  whether  he  wants  to 
enter  such  a  group;  any  attempt  at  leaving  it  is 
usualty  met  with  persecution  or  wdth  severe  punish- 
ment, or  has  quite  definite  conditions  attached  to  it. 
It  is  quite  outside  our  present  interest  to  enquire 
why  these  associations  need  such  special  safeguards. 
We  are  only  attracted  by  one  circumstance,  namely 
that  certain  facts,  which  are  far  more  concealed  in 
other  cases,  can  be  observed  very  clearly  in  those 
highly  organised  groups  which  are  protected  from 
dissolution   in   the   manner   that   has   been  mentioned. 

In  a  church  (and  we  may  with  advantage  take 
the  Catholic  Church  as  a  type)  as  well  as  in  an 
army,  however  different  the  two  may  be  in  other 
respects,  the  same  illusion  holds  good  of  there  being 
a  head — in  the  Catholic  Church  Christ,  in  an  army 
its  Commander-in-Chief — who  loves  all  the  individuals 
in  the  group  with  an  equal  _^  Love.  Everything 
depends  upon  this. illusion;  if  it  were  to  be  dropped, 
then  both  Church  and  army  would  dissolve,  so  far 
as  the  external  force  permitted  them  to.  This  equal 
love    was   expressly   enunciated   by  Christ:   *  Inasmuch 


Two  Artificial  Groups:  the  Church  and  the  Army    43 

as  ye  have   done  it  unto  one  of  the   least  of  these 
my  brethren,    ye  have  done  it  unto  me.'     He  stands 
to   the   individual   members   of  the  group  of  believers 
in   the   relation   of  a   kind   elder  brother;  he  is  their 
father    surrogate.      All   the    demands   that    are   made 
upon    the    individual    are    derived    from    this    love    of 
Christ's.       A     democratic     character     runs     through 
the   Church,    for  the    very   reason  that  before    Christ 
everyone    is    equal,    and   that    everyone'  has   an   equal 
share    in  his  love.     It   is  not  without  a   deep  reason 
that  the    similarity  between   the   Christian    communit}'' 
and    a    family    is    invoked,    and    that    believers    call 
themselves     brothers     in     Christ,     that    is,     brothers 
through    the    love    which    Christ   has   for  them.   There 
is     no     doubt     that     the     tie     which     unites     each 
individual   with    Christ    is    also    the    cause    of  the    tie 
which  unites   them  with  one  another.     The  like  holds  ^ 
good    of    an    ai'my.     The    Commander-in-Chief    is    a 
father  who  loves  all  his  soldiers  equally,  and  for  that 
reason    they    are    comrades    among    themselves.     The 
army    differs    structurally    from    the    Church    in    being 
built   up   of  a   series  of  such  groups.     Ever}^  captain 
is,  as  it  were,  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  father 
of  his    company,    and    so    is   every  non-commissioned 
officer     of    his    section.     It    is    true    that    a    similar 
hierarchy  has  been  constructed  in  the  Church,  but  it 
does   not   play   the   same  part  in  it  economically;  for 
more  knowledge   and   care  about  individuals  may  be 


44      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

attributed  to  Christ  than  to  a  human  Commander-in- 
Chief/ 

It   is   to    be    noticed    that  in   these   two  artificial 
groups  each  individual  is  bound    by  libidinaP    ties  on 

^  An  objection  will  justly  be  raised  against  this  conception 
of  the   libidinal  [see  next  foot-note]  structure  of  an  army  on  the 
ground    that    no    place   has   been   found   in   it   for   such  ideas  as 
those  of  one's  country,  of  national  glory,  etc.,  which  are  of  such 
importance    in    holding   an   army   together.     The   answer   is   that 
that  is  a  dififerent  instance  of  a  group  tie,  and  no  longer  such  a 
simple    one;    for    the    examples    of   great    generals,    like    Caesar, 
Wallenstein,   or   Napoleon,   show   that   such   ideas   are   not  indis- 
pensable to  the  existence  of  an  army.     We  shall  presently  touch 
upon    the    possibility    of   a    leading   idea   being  substituted  for  a 
leader   and  upon  the  relations  between  the  two.     The  neglect  of 
this  libidinal  factor  in  an  arrny,  even  when  it  is  not  the  Only  factor 
operative,    seems    to    be    not    merely    a   theoretical   omission  but 
also  a  practical   danger.     Prussian   militarism,  which  was  just   as 
unpsychological   as   German   science,  may  have  had  to  suffer  the 
consequences   of  this   in   the   great  war.   We  know  that  the  war 
neuroses  which   ravaged  the  German  army  have  been  recognized 
as  being  a  protest  of  the  individual  against  the  part  he  was  ex- 
pected to  play  in  the  army;  and  according  to  the  communication 
of  E.  Simmel  [Kriegsneurosen  und  ^ Psychisches  Trauma'.  Munich, 
191 8),    the  hard  treatment  of  the  men  by  their  superiors  may  be 
considered  as  foremost  among  the  motive  forces  of  the   disease.  If 
the   importance    of  the    libido's    claims   on   this  score   had   been 
better  appreciated,  the  fantastic  promises  of  the  American  Presi- 
dent's  fourteen   points   would   probably   not   have  been    believed 
so  easily,  and  the  splendid  instrument  would  not  have  broken  in 
the  hands  of  the  German  leaders. 

^  [Here  and  elsewhere  the  German  ^hbidinos'  is  used  simply 
as    an    adjectival    derivative    from   the   technical    term    ^ Libido' \ 


Two  Artificial  Groups :  the  Church  and  the  Army    45 

the  one  hand  to  the  leader  (Christ,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief)  and  on  the  other  hand  to  the  other 
members  of  the  group.  How  these  two  ties  are 
related  to  each  other,  whether  they  are  of  the  same 
kind  and  the  same  value,  and  how  they  are  to  be 
described  psychologically — these  questions  must  be 
reserved  for  subsequent  enquiry.  But  we  shall  ven- 
ture even  now  upon  a  mild  reproach  against  the 
authorities  for  not  having  sufficiently  appreciated  the 
importance  of  the  leader  in  the  psychology  of  the 
group,  while  our  own  choice  of  a  first  object  for 
investigation  has  brought  us  into  a  more  favourable 
position.  It  would  appear  as  though  we  were  on 
the  right  road  towards  an  explanation  of  the  principal 
phenomenon  of  Group  Psychology — the  individual's 
lack  of  freedom  in  a  group.  If  each  individual  is 
bound  in  two  directions  by  such  an  intense  emotional 
tie,  we  shall  find  no  difficulty  in  attributing  to  that 
circumstance  the  alteration  and  limitation  which  have 
been  observed  in  his  personality. 

A  hint  to  the  same  effect,  that  the  essence  of 
a  group  lies  in  the  libidinal  ties  existing  in  it,  is  also 
to  be  found  in  the  phenomenon  of  panic,  which  is 
best  studied  in  military  groups.  A  panic  arises  if 
a    group    of    that    kind    becomes    disintegrated.     Its 

'libidinal'  is  accordingly  introduced  in  the  translation  in  order 
to  avoid  the  highly-coloured  connotation  of  the  English  'libi- 
dinous'.—  Translator \ 


46      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

characteristics  are  that  none  of  the  orders  given 
by  superiors  are  any  longer  listened  to,  and 
that  each  individual  is  only  solicitous  on  his  own 
account,  and  without  any  consideration  for  the  rest. 
The  mutual  ties  have  ceased  to  exist,  and  a  gigantic 
and  senseless  dread  [Angst]  is  set  free.  At  this 
point,  again,  the  objection  will  naturally  be  made 
that  it  is  rather  the  other  way  round;  and  that  the 
dread  has  grown  so  great  as  to  be  able  to  disregard 
all  ties  and  all  feelings  of  consideration  for  others. 
McDougall  has  even  (p.  24)  made  use  of  the  case 
of  panic  (though  not  of  military  panic)  as  a  typical 
instance  of  that  intensification  of  emotion  by  con- 
tagion ('primary  induction')  upon  which  he  lays  so 
much  emphasis.  But  nevertheless  this  rational  method 
of  explanation  is  here  quite  inadequate.  The  ver\^ 
question  that  needs  explanation  is  why  the  dread  has 
become  so  gigantic.  The  greatness  of  the  danger 
cannot  be  responsible,  for  the  same  army  which  now 
falls  a  victim  to  panic  may  previously  have  faced 
equally  great  or  greater  danger  with  complete 
success;  it  is  of  the  very  essence  of  panic  that  it 
bears  no  relation  to  the  danger  that  threatens,  and 
often  breaks  out  upon  the  most  trivial  occasions. 
If  an  individual  in  panic  dread  begins  to  be  solicitous 
/only  on  his  own  account,  he  bears  witness  in  so 
doing  to  the  fact  that  the  emotional  ties,  which  have 
hitherto  made  the    danger    seem    small   to  him,    have 


Two  Artificial  Groups:  the  Church  and  the  Army     47 

ceased  to  exist.  Now  that  he  is  by  himself  in  facing 
the  danger,  he  may  surely  think  it  greater.  The  fact 
is,  therefore,,  that  panic  dread  presupposes  a  relaxation 
in  the  libidinal  structure  of  the  group  and  reacts  to 
it  in  a  justifiable  manner,  and  the  contrary  view — 
that  the  libidinal  ties  of  the  group  are  destroyed 
owing  to  dread  in  the  face  of  the  danger — can  be 
refuted. 

The  contention  that  dread  in  a  group  is  increas- 
ed to  enormous  proportions  by  means  of  induction 
(contagion)  is  not  in  the  least  contradicted  by  these 
remarks.  McDougall's  view  meets  the  case  entirely 
when  the  danger  is  a  really  great  one  and  when  the 
group  has  no  strong  emotional  ties — conditions  which 
are  fulfilled,  for  instance,  when  a  fire  breaks  out  in  a 
theatre  or  a  place  of  amusement.  But  the  really 
instructive  case  and  the  one  which  can  be  best  em- 
ployed for  our  purposes  is  that  mentioned  above,  in 
which  a  body  of  troops  breaks  into  a  panic  although 
the  danger  has  not  increased  beyond  a  degree  that 
is  usual  and  has  often  been  previously  faced.  It  is 
not  to  be  expected  that  the  usage  of  the  word 
*  panic '  should  be  clearly  and  unambiguously  deter- 
mined. Sometimes  it  is  used  to  describe  any  collec- 
tive dread,  sometimes  even  dread  in  an  individual 
when  it  exceeds  all  bounds,  and  often  the  name 
seems  to  be  reserved  for  cases  in  which  the  outbreak 
of   dread   is  not  warranted   by   the    occasion.     If  we 


48      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

take  the  word  '  panic '  in  the  sense  of  collective 
dread,  we  can  establish  a  far-reaching  analogy. 
Dread  in  an  individual  is  provoked  either  by  the 
greatness  of  a  danger  or  by  the  cessation  of  emo- 
tional ties  (libidinal  cathexes^  \Libidobesetzungen\)\  the 
latter  is  the  case  of  neurotic  dread.^  In  just  the 
same  way  panic  arises  either  owing  to  an  increase 
of  the  common  danger  or  owing  to  the  disappearance 
of  the  emotional  ties  which  hold  the  group  together; 
and  the  latter  case  is  analogous  to  that  of  neurotic 
dread.^ 

^  ['Cathexis',  from  the  Greek  'Katexco',  'I  occupy'.  The 
German  word  ^Besetzung'  has  become  of  fundamental  importance 
in  the  exposition  of  psycho-analytical  theory.  Any  attempt  at  a  short 
definition  or  description  is  likely  to  be  misleading,  but  speaking 
very  loosely,  we  may  say  that  'cathexis'  is  used  on  the  analogy 
of  an  electric  charge,  and  that  it  means  the  concentration  or 
accumulation  of  mental  energy  in  some  particular  channel.  Thus, 
when  we  speak  of  the  existence  in  someone  of  a  libidinal  cathexis 
of  an  object,  or,  more  shortly,  of  an  object-cathexis,  we  mean 
that  his  libidinal  energy  is  directed  towards,  or  rather  infused 
into,  the  idea  {Vorstellung)  of  some  object  in  the  outer  world. 
Readers  who  desire  to  obtain  a  more  precise  knowledge  of  the 
term  are  referred  to  the  discussions  in  'Zur  Einfuhrung  des 
Narzissmus  *  and  the  essays  on  metapsychology  in  Kleine  Schriften 
zur  Neurosenlekre,  Vierte  Folge. —  Translator.^ 

^  See  Vorlesungen  zur  Einfuhrung  in  die  Psychoanalyse. 
XXV,  3.  Auflage,  1920.  {Introductory  Lectures  on  Psycho- Analysis. 
Lecture  XXV.  George  Allen  and  Unwin,  1922.] 

^  Compare  Bela  v.  Felszeghy's  interesting  though  somewhat 
fantastic  paper  'Panik  und  Pankomplex'.  Imago,   1920,  Bd.  VI. 


Two  Artificial  Groups:  the  Church  and  the  Army     49 

Anyone  who,  like  McDougall  (1.  c),  describes 
a  panic  as  one  of  the  plainest  functions  of  the 
'  group  mind ' ,  arrives  at  the  paradoxical  position  that 
this  group  mind  does  away  with  itself  in  one  of  its 
most  striking  manifestations.  It  is  impossible  to 
doubt  that  panic  means  the  disintegration  of  a  group; 
it  involves  the  cessation  of  all  the  feelings  of  con- 
sideration which  the  members  of  the  group  otherwise 
show  one  another. 

The  typical  occasion  of  the  outbreak  of  a  panic 
is  very  much  as  it  is  represented  in  Nestroy's  parody 
of  Hebbel's  play  about  Judith  and  Holofernes.  A 
soldier  cries  aut :  '  The  general  has  lost  his  head ! ' 
and  thereupon  all  the  Assyrians  take  to  flight.  The 
loss  of  the  leader  in  some  sense  or  other,  the  birth 
of  misgivings  about  him,  brings  on  the  outbreak  of 
panic,  though  the  danger  remains  the  same;  the 
mutual  ties  between  the  members  of  the  group  dis- 
appear, as  a  rule,  at  the  same  time  as  the  tie  with 
their  leader.  The  group  vanishes  in  dust,  like  a 
Bologna  flask  when  its  top  is  broken  off. 

The  dissolution  of  a  religious  group  is  not  so 
easy  to  observe.  A  short  time  ago  there  came  into 
my  hands  an  English  novel  of  Catholic  origin,  recom- 
mended by  the  Bishop  of  London,  with  the  title 
When  It  Was  Dark,  It  gave  a  clever  and,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  a  convincing  picture  of  such  a  possi- 
bility and    its    consequences.     The    novel,     which    is 


50     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

supposed  to  relate  to  the  present  day,  tells  how  a 
conspiracy  of  enemies  of  the  figure  of  Christ  and  of 
the  Christian  faith  succeed  in  arranging  for  a 
sepulchre  to  be  discovered  in  Jerusalem.  In  this 
sepulchre  is  an  inscription,  in  which  Joseph  of  Ari- 
mathaea  confesses  that  for  reasons  of  piety  he 
secretly  removed  the  body  of  Christ  from  its  ^rave 
on  the  third  day  after  its  entombment  and  buried  it 
in  this  spot.  The  resurrection  of  Christ  and  his 
divine  nature  are  by  this  means  disposed  of,  and  the 
result  of  this  archaeological  discovery  is  a  convulsion 
in  European  civilisation  and  an  extraordinary  increase 
in  all  crimes  and  acts  of  violence,  which  only  ceases 
when  the  forgers'  plot  has  been  revealed. 

The  phenomenon  which  accompanies  the  disso- 
lution that  is  here  supposed  to  overtake  a  religious 
group  is  not  dread,  for  which  the  occasion  is  wanting. 
Instead  of  it  ruthless  and  hostile  impulses  towards 
other  people  make  their  appearance,  which,  owing  to 
the  equal  love  of  Christ,  they  had  previously  been 
unable  to  do.^  But  even  during  the  kingdom  of 
Christ  those  people  who  do  not  belong  to  the  com- 
munity of  believers,  who  do  not  love  him,  and  whom 
he  does  not  love,    stand    outside  this  tie.     Therefore 

*  Compare  the  explanation  of  similar  phenomena  after  the 
abolition  of  the  paternal  authority  of  the  sovereign  given  in 
P.  Federn's  Die  vaterlose  Gesellschaft.  Vienna,  Anzengruber- 
Verlag,  1919. 


Two  Artificial  Groups :  the  Church  and  the  Army     5  I 

a  religion,  even  if  it  calls  itself  the  religion  of  love, 
must  be  hard  and  unloving  to  those  who  do  not 
belong  to  it.  Fundamentally  indeed  every  religion  is 
in  this  same  way  a  religion  of  love  for  all  those 
whom  it  embraces;  while  cruelty  and  intolerance 
towards  those  who  do  not  belong  to  it  are  natural 
to  every  religion.  However  difficult  we  may  find  it 
personally,  we  ought  not  to  reproach  believers  too 
severely  on  this  account;  people  who  are  unbelieving 
or  indifferent  are  so  much  better  off  psychologically 
in  this  respect.  If  to-day  that  intolerance  no  longer 
shows  itself  so  violent  and  cruel  as  in  former  cen- 
turies,  we  can  scarcely  conclude  that  there  has  been 
a  softening  in  human  manners.  The  cause  is  rather \ 
to  be  found  in  the  undeniable  weakening  of  religious  / 
feelings  and  the  libidinal  ties  which  depend  upon 
them.  If  another  group  tie  takes  the  place  of  the 
/religious  one — and  the  socialistic  tie  seems  to  be 
succeeding  in  doing  so — ,  then  there  will  be  the 
same  intolerance  towards  outsiders  as  in  the  age  of 
the  Wars  of  Religion;  and  if  differences  between 
scientific  opinions  could  ever  attain  a  similsir  signifi- 
cance for  groups,  the  same  result  would  again  be 
repeated  with  this  new  motivation. 


BOSTON   UNIVERSITY 

SCHOOL  OF  SOCIAL  WORK 

LIBRARY 


VI 
FURTHER  PROBLEMS  AND   LINES   OF  WORK 


We  have  hitherto  considered  two  artificial  groups 
and  have  found  that  they  are  dominated  by  two 
emotional  ties.  One  of  these,  the  tie  with  the  leader, 
seems  (at  all  events  for  these  cases)  to  be  more  of 
a  ruling  factor  than  the  other,  which  holds  between 
the  members  of  the  group. 

Now  much  else  remains  to  be  examined  and 
described  in  the  morphology  of  groups.  We  should 
have  to  start  from  the  ascertained  fact  that  a  mere 
collection  of  people  is  not  a  group,  so  long  as  these 
ties  have  not  been  established  in  it;  but  we  should 
have  to  admit  that  in  any  collection  of  people  the 
tendency  to  form  a  psychological  group  may  very 
easily  become  prominent.  We  should  have  to  give 
our  attention  to  the  different  kinds  of  groups,  more 
or  less  stable,  that  arise  spontaneously,  and  to  study 
the  conditions  of  their  origin  and  of  their  dissolution. 
We  should  above  all  be  concerned  with  the  distinction 


Fu7'ther  Problems  and  Lines  of  Work  53 

between  groups  which  have  a  leader  and  leaderless 
groups.  We  should  consider  whether  groups  with 
leaders  may  not  be  the  more  primitive  and  complete, 
whether  in  the  others  an  idea,  an  abstraction,  may 
not  be  substituted  for  the  leader  (a  state  of  things 
to  which  religious  groups,  with  their  invisible  head, 
form  a  transition  stage),  and  whether  a  common  ten- 
dency, a  wish  in  which  a  number  of  people  can  have 
a  share,  may  not  in  the  same  way  serve  as  a 
substitute.  This  abstraction,  again,  might  be  more 
or  less  completely  embodied  in  the  figure  of  what 
we  might  call  a  secondary  leader,  and  interesting 
varieties  w^ould  arise  from  the  relation  between  the 
idea  and  the  leader.  The  leader  or  the  leading  idea 
might  also,  so  to  speak,  be  negative;  hatred  against 
a  particular  person  or  institution  might  operate  in 
just  the  same  unifying  way,  and  might  call  up  the 
same  kind  of  emotional  ties  as  positive  attachment. 
Then  the  question  would  also  arise  whether  a  leader 
is  really  indispensable  to  the  essence  of  a  group — 
and  other  questions  besides. 

But  all  these  questions,  which  may,  moreover, 
have  been  dealt  w^ith  in  part  in  the  literature  of 
Group  Psychology,  will  not  succeed  in  diverting  our 
interest  from  the  fundamental  psychological  problems 
that  confront  us  in  the  structure  of  a  group.  And 
our  attention  will  first  be  attracted  by  a  consideration 
which   promises   to   bring   us   in  the  most  direct  way 


54     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

^to   a   proof  that   libidinal  ties   are   what  characterize 
/    a  group. 

j  Let  us  keep   before  our  eyes  the  nature  of  the 

/     emotional  relations  which  hold  between  men  in  general. 

According   to    Schopenhauer's    famous    simile    of    the 

freezing  porcupines  no  one  can  tolerate  a  too  intimate 

approach  to  his  neighbour.^ 

The  evidence  of  psycho-analysis  shows  that  almost 
every  intimate  emotional  relation  bets^^een  two  people 
which  lasts  for  some  time — marriage,  friendship,  the 
relations  between  parents  and  children^ — leaves  a 
sediment  of  feelings  of  aversion  and  hostility,  which 
have  first  to  be  eliminated  by  repression.  This  is 
less  disguised  in  the  common  wrangles  between 
business  partners  or  in  the  grumbles  of  a  subordinate 

*  *A  company  of  porcu'^ines  crowded  themselves  very 
close  together  one  cold  winter's  day  so  as  to  profit  by  one 
another's  warmth  and  so  save  themselves  from  being  frozen  to 
death.  But  scon  they  felt  one  another's  quills,  which  induced 
them  to  separate  again.  And  now,  when  the  need  for.  warmth 
brought  them  nearer  together  again,  the  second  evil  arose  once 
more.  So  that  they  were  driven  backwards  and  forwards  from 
one  trouble  to  the  other,  until  they  had  discovered  a  mean 
distance  at  which  they  could  most  tolerably  exist'  {Parerga  und 
Paralipomena,  II.  Teil,  XXXI.,  'Gleichnisse  und  Parabeln'.) 

^  Perhaps    with   the   solitary   exception   of  the  relation  of  a 
mother    to    her    son,    which    is   based    upon    narcissism,    is    not     j 
disturbed  by  subsequent  rivalry,  and  is  reinforced  by  a  rudimentary 
attempt  at  sexual  object-choice. 


Further  Problems  and  Lines  of  Work  55 

at  his  superior.  The  same  thing  happens  when  men 
come  together  in  larger  units.  Every  time  two 
families  become  connected  by  a  marriage,  each  of 
them  thinks  itself  superior  to  or  of  better  birth 
than  the  other.  Of  two  neighbouring  towns  each 
is  the  other's  most  jealous  rival;  every  little  canton 
looks  down  upon  the  others  with  contempt.  Closely 
related  races  keep  one  another  at  arm's  length; 
the  South  German  cannot  endure  the  North  German, 
the  Englishman  casts  every  kind  of  aspersion  upon 
the  Scotchman,  the  Spaniard  despises  the  Portuguese. 
We  are  no  longer  astonished  that  greater  differences 
should  lead  to  an  almost  insuperable  repugnance, 
such  as  the  Gallic  people  feel  for  the  German,  the 
Aryan  for  the  Semite,  and  the  white  races  for  the 
coloured. 

When    this   hostility    is    directed   against   people  1 
who  are  otherwise  loved  we  describe  it  as  ambivalence/ 
of    feeling;     and    we    explain    the    fact,    in    what    is 
probably  far  too  rational  a  manner,  by  means  of  the 
numerous    occasions    for    conflicts    of    interest    which 
arise    precisely    in    such    intimate    relations.      In    the 
undisguised    antipathies    and    aversions    which    people 
feel   towards    strangers  with  whom   they  have   to    do 
we    may    recognize    the    expression    of  self-love— of 
narcissism.     This  self-love  works  for  the  self-assertion 
of  the   individual,    and  behaves  as  though  the  occur-    s 
rence    of    any    divergence    from    his    own    particular 


f 


56      Group  Psychology  mid  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

lines  of  development  involved  a  criticism  of  them 
and  a  demand  for  their  alteration.  We  do  not  know 
why  such  sensitiveness  should  have  been  directed  to 
just  these  details  of  differentiation;  but  it  is  unmis- 
takable that  in  this  whole  connection  men  give 
evidence  of  a  readiness  for  hatred,  an  aggressiveness, 
the  source  of  which  is  unknown,  and  to  which  one 
is  tempted  to  ascribe  an  elementary  character.^ 

But  the  whole  of  this  intolerance  vanishes,  tem- 
porarily or  permanently,  as  the  result  of  the  formation 
of  a  group,  and  in  a  group.  So  long  as  a  group 
formation  persists  or  so  far  as  it  extends,  individuals 
behave  as  though  tliey  were  uniform,  tolerate  other 
people's  peculiarities,  put  themselves  on  an  equal  level 
with  them,  and  have  no  feeling  of  aversion  towards 
them.  Such  a  limitation  of  narcissism  can,  according 
to  our  theoretical  views,  only  be  produced  by  one 
factor,  a  libidinal  tie  with  other  people.  Love  for 
oneself  knows  only  one  barrier — love  for  others,  love 
for    objects.^     The    question    will    at    once    be    raised 

*  In  a  recently  published  study,  Jenseits  des  Lustprinzips 
(1920)  [Beyond  the  Pie  astir e  Principle,  International  Psycho- 
Analytical  Library,  No.  4],  I  have  attempted  to  connect  the 
polarity  of  love  and  hatred  with  a  hypothetical  opposition  between 
instincts  of  life  and  death,  and  to  establish  the  sexual  instincts 
as  the  purest  examples  of  the  former,  the  instincts  of  life. 

^See  *Zur  Einfuhrung  des  Narzissmus',  19 14.  Kleine  Schriften 
znr  Neurosenlehre,  Vierte  Folge,  191 8. 


Further  Problems  and  Lines  of  Work  57 

whether  community  of  interest  in  itself,  without  any  \ 
addition  of  libido,  must  not  necessarily  lead  to  the 
toleration  of  other  people  and  to  considerateness  for 
them.  This  objection  may  be  met  by  the  reply  that 
nevertheless  no  lasting  limitation  of  narcissism  is 
effected  in  this  way,  since  this  tolerance  does  not 
persist  longer  than  the  immediate  advantage  gained 
from  the  other  people's  collaboration.  But  the  practical 
importance  of  the  discussion  is  less  than  might  be 
supposed,  for  experience  has  shown  that  in  cases  of 
collaboration  libidinal  ties  are  regularly  formed  be- 
tween the  fellow-workers  which  prolong  and  solidify 
the  relation  between  them  to  a  point  beyond  what 
is  merely  profitable.  The  same  thing  occurs  in  men's 
social  relations  as  has  become  familiar  to  psycho- 
analytic research  in  the  course  of  the  development 
of  the  individual  libido.  The  libido  props  itself  upon 
the  satisfaction  of  the  great  vital  needs,  and  chooses  as 
its  first  objects  the  people  who  have  a  share  in  that 
process.  And  in  the  development  of  mankind  as  a'l 
whole,  just  as  in  individuals,  love  alone  acts  as  I 
the  civilizing  factor  in  the  sense  that  it  brings  ry 
change  from  egoism  to  altruism.  And  this  is  true 
both  of  the  sexual  love  for  women,  with  all  the 
obligations  which  it  involves  of  sparing  what  wornen 
are  fond  of,  and  also  of  the  desexualised,  sublimated 
homosexual  love  for  other  men,  which  springs  from 
Avork  in  common. 


5  8      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

If  therefore  in  groups  narcissistic  self-love  is 
subject  to  limitations  which  do  not  operate  outside 
them,  that  is  cogent  evidence  that  the  essence  of  a 
group  formation  consists  in  a  new  kind  of  libidinal 
ties  among  the  members  of  the  group. 

But  our  interest  now  leads  us  on  to  the  pressing 
question  as  to  what  may  be  the  nature  of  these  ties 
which  exist  in  groups.  In  the  psycho-analytic  study 
of  neuroses  we  have  hitherto  been  occupied  almost 
exclusively  with  ties  that  unite  with  their  objects  those 
love  instincts  which  still  pursue  directly  sexual  aims.  In 
groups  there  can  evidently  be  no  question  of  sexual 
aims  of  that  kind.  We  are  concerned  here  with  love 
instincts  which  have  been  diverted  from  their  original 
aims,  though  they  do  not  operate  w^ith  less  energy 
on  that  account.  Now  we  have  already  observed 
within  the  range  of  the  usual  sexual  object-cathexis 
[Objektbesetzung]  phenomena  w^hich  represent  a  di- 
version of  the  instinct  from  its  sexual  aim.  We 
have  described  them  as  degrees  of  being  in  love, 
and  have  recognized  that  they  involve  a  certain 
encroachment  upon  the  ego.  We  shall  now  turn 
our  attention  more  closely  to  these  phenomena  of 
being  in  love,  in  the  firm  expectation  of  finding  in 
them  conditions  which  can  be  transferred  to  the  ties 
that  exist  in  groups.  But  we  should  also  like  to 
know  whether  this  kind  of  object-cathexis,  as  we 
know    it    in    sexual    life,    represents   the   only   manner 


Further  Problems  and  Lines  of  Work  59 

of  emotional  tie  with  other  people,  or  whether  we 
must  take  other  mechanisms  of  the  sort  into  account. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  we  learn  from  psycho-analysis 
that  there  do  exist  other  mechanisms  for  emotional 
ties,  the  so-called  identifications^  insufficiently-known 
processes  and  hard  to  describe,  the  investigation  of 
which  will  for  some  time  keep  us  away  from  the 
subject  of  Group  Psychology. 


VII 
IDENTIFICATION 


Identification  is  known  to  psycho-analysis  as  the 
earliest  expression  of  an  emotional  tie  with  another 
person.  It  plays  a  part  in  the  early  history  of  the 
Oedipus  complex.  A  little  boy  will  exhibit  a  special 
interest  in  his  father;  he  would  like  to  grow  like  him 
and  be  like  him,  and  take  his  place  everywhere.  We 
may  say  simply  that  he  takes  his  father  as  his  ideal. 
This  behaviour  has  nothing  to  do  with  a  passive  or 
feminine  attitude  towards  his  father  (and  towards 
males  in  general);  it  is  on  the  contrary  typically 
masculine.  It  fits  in  very  well  with  the  Oedipus 
complex,  for  which  it  helps  to  prepare  the  way. 

At  the  same  time  as  this  identification  with  his 
father,  or  a  little  later,  the  boy  has  begun  to  develop 
a  true  object-cathexis  towards  his  mother  according 
to    the    anaclitic    type    \Anlehnungstypus\}     He    then 

*  [Literally, '  leaning-up-against  type ';  from  the  Greek*  dvaicXCva' ' 
*I   lean    up    against'.   In   the  first  phase  of  their  development  the 


Identi/ication  6 1 

exhibits,  therefore,  two  psychologically  distinct  ties: 
a  straightforward  sexual  object-cathexis  towards  his 
mother  and  a  typical  identification  towards  his  father. 
The  two  subsist  side  by  side  for  a  time  without  any 
mutual  influence  or  interference.  In  consequence  ol 
the  irresistible  advance  towards  a  unification  of  mental 
life  they  come  together  at  last;  and  the  normal 
Oedipus  complex  originates  from  their  confluence^ 
The  little  boy  notices  that  his  father  stands  in  his 
way  with  his  mother.  His  identification  with  his 
father  then  takes  on  a  hostile  colourincr  and  becomes 
identical  with  the  wish  to  replace  his  father  in  regard 
to  his  mother  as  well.  Identification,  in  fact,  is 
ambivcdent  from  the  very  first;  it  can  turn  into  an 
expression  of  tenderness  as  easily  as  into  a  wish  for 
someone's  removal.  It  behaves  like  a  derivative 
the  first  oral  phase  of  the  organisation  of  the  libido, 
in  which  the  object  that  w^e  long  for  and  prize  is 
assimilated  by  eating  and  is  in  that  way  annihilated 
as  such.   The  cannibal,  as  we  know,  has  remained  at 


sexual  instincts  have  no  independent  means  of  finding  satisfaction; 
they  do  so  by  propping  themselves  upon  or  Meaning  up  against' 
the  self-preser\'ative  instincts.  The  individual's  first  choice  of  a 
sexual  object  is  said  to  be  of  the  'anaclitic  type'  when  it  follows 
this  path;  that  is,  when  he  choses  as  his  first  sexual  object  the 
same  person  who  has  satisfied  his  early  non-sexual  needs.  For  a 
full  discussion  of  the  anaclitic  and  narcissistic  types  of  object- 
choice  compare  'Zur  Einfuhrung  des  Narzissmus'. — Translator.'] 


62      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

this  standpoint;  he  has  a  devouring  affection  for  his 
enemies  and  only  devours  people  of  whom  he  is 
fond.^ 

The  subsequent  history  of  this  identification  with 
the  father  may  easily  be  lost  sight  of.  It  may  happen 
that  the  Oedipus  complex  becomes  inverted,  and 
that  the  father  is  taken  as  the  object  of  a  feminine 
attitude,  an  object  from  which  the  directly  sexual 
instincts  look  for  satisfaction;  in  that  event  the  identi- 
fication with  the  father  has  become  the  precursor  of 
an  object  tie  with  the  father.  The  same  holds  good, 
with  the  necessary  substitutions,  of  the  baby  daughter 
as  well. 

It  is  easy  to  state  in  a  formula  the  distinction 
between  an  identification  with  the  father  and  the 
choice  of  the  father  as  an  object.  In  the  first  case 
one's  father  is  what  one  would  like  to  be^  and  in  the 
second  he  is  what  one  would  like  to  have.  The 
distinction,  that  is,  depends  upon  whether  the  tie  at- 
taches to  the  subject  or  to  the  object  of  the  ego. 
The  former  is  therefore  already  possible  before  any 
sexual  object-choice  has  been  made.     It  is  much  more 

*  See  Drei  Abhandlungen  zur  Sexualtheorie,  and  Abraham's 
*  Untersuchungen  iiber  die  friiheste  pragenitale  Entwicklungs- 
stufe  der  Libido',  Internationale  Zeitschrift  fur  Psychoanalyse, 
1916,  Bd,  rV;  also  included  in  his  Klinische  Beitrdge  zur  Psycho- 
analyse (Internationale  psychoanalytische  Bibliothek.  Nr.  10, 
1921). 


Identification  63 

difficult  to  give  a  clear  metapsychological  representa- 
tion of  the  distinction.  We  can  only  see  that 
identification  endeavours  to  mould  a  person's  own 
ego  after  the  fashion  of  the  one  that  has  been  taken 
as  a  'model'. 

Let  us  disentangle  identification  as  it  occurs  in 
the  structure  of  a  neurotic  symptom  from  its  rather 
complicated  connections.  Supposing  that  a  little^  girl 
(and  we  will  keep  to  her  for  the  present)  develops 
the  same  painful  symptom  as  her  mother — for  instance, 
the  same  tormenting  cough.  Now  this  may  come 
about  in  various  ways.  The  identification  may  come 
from  the  Oedipus  complex;  in  that  case  it  signifies 
a  hostile  desire  on  the  girl's  part  to  take  her 
mother's  place,  and  the  symptom  expresses  her 
object  love  tow^ards  her  father,  and  brings  about 
a  realisation,  under  the  influence  of  a  sense  of 
guilt,  of  her  desire  to  take  her  mother's  place: 
^  You  wanted  to  be  your  mother,  and  now  you 
are — anyhow  as  far  as  the  pain  goes'.  This  is 
the  complete  mechanism  of  the  structure  of  a 
hysterical  symptom.  Or,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
symptom  may  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  person 
who  is  loved — (so,  for  instance,  Dora  in  the 
'  Bruchstiick  einer  Hysterieanalyse'^  imitated  her 
father's   cough);    in   that   case   we   can   only  describe 

*  \Kleine  Schriften  zur  Neurosenlehre.  Zweite  Folge.] 


64      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

^.the  state  of  things  by  saying  that  identification  has 
<^  appeared  instead  of  object-choice ,  and  that  object- 
'hoice  has  regressed  to  identification.  We  have  heard 
that  identification  is  the  earliest  and  original  form  of 
emotional  tie;  it  often  happens  that  under  the  con- 
ditions in  which  symptoms  are  constructed,  that  is, 
where  there  is  repression  and  where  the  mechanisms 
of  the  unconscious  are  dominant,  object-choice  is 
turned  back  into  identification — the  ego,  that  is,  as- 
sumes the  characteristics  of  the  object.  It  is  noticeable 
that  in  these  identifications  the  ego  sometimes  copies 
the  person  who  is  not  loved  and  sometimes  the  one 
who  is  loved.  It  must  also  strike  us  that  in  both 
cases  the  identification  is  a  partial  and  extremely 
limited  one  and  only  borrows  a  single  trait  from  the 
person  who  is  its  object. 

There  is  a  third  particularly  frequent  and  im- 
portant case  of  symptom  formation,  in  which  the 
identification  leaves  any  object  relation  to  the  person 
who  is  being  copied  entirely  out  of  account.  Sup- 
posing, for  instance,  that  one  of  the  girls  in  a  boarding 
school  has  had  a  letter  from  someone  with  whom  she 
is  secretly  in  love  which  arouses  her  jealousy,  and 
that  she  reacts  to  it  with  a  fit  of  hysterics;  then 
some  of  her  friends  who  know  about  it  will  contract 
the  fit,  as  we  say,  by  means  of  mental  infection. 
The  mechanism  is  that  of  identification  based  upon 
the  possibility  or  desire  of  putting  oneself  in  the  same 


Identification  65 

situation.  The  other  girls  would  like  to  have  a  secret 
love  affair  too,  and  under  the  influence  of  a  sense  of 
guilt  they  also  accept  the  pain  involved  in  it.  It 
would  be  wrong  to  suppose  that  they  take  on  the 
symptom  out  of  sympathy.  On  the  contrary,  the\ 
sympathy  only  arises  out  of  the  identification,  and 
this  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  infection  or  imitation 
of  this  kind  takes  place  in  circumstances  where  even 
less  pre-existing  sympathy  is  to  be  assumed  than 
usually  exists  between  friends  in  a  girls'  school.  One 
ego  has  perceived  a  significant  analogy  with  another 
upon  one  point — in  our  example  upon  a  similar 
readiness  for  emotion;  an  identification  is  thereupon 
constructed  on  this  point,  and,  under  the  influence 
of  the  pathogenic  situation,  is  displaced  on  to  the 
symptom  which  the  one  ego  has  produced.  The 
identification  by  means  of  the  symptom  has  thus 
become  the  mark  of  a  point  of  coincidence  between 
the  tv\^o  egos  which  has  to  be  kept  repressed. 

What  we  have  learned  from  these  three  sources 
may  be  summarised  as  follows.  First,  identification 
is  the  original  form  of  emotional  tie  with  an  object; 
secondly,  in  a  regressive  way  it-  becomes  a  substitute 
for  a  libidinal  object  tie,  as  it  were  by  means  of  the 
introjection  of  the  object  into  the  ego;  and  thirdly, 
it  may  arise  with  every  new  perception  of  a  common 
quality  shared  with  some  other  person  who  is  not  an 
object    of  the    sexual   instinct.     The   more    important 


66      Group  Psychology  a7td  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

this  common  quality  is,  the  more  successful  may  this 
partial  identification  become,  and  it  may  thus  repre- 
sent the  beginning  of  a  new  tie. 

We  already  begin  to  divine  that  the  mutual  tie 
between  members  of  a  group  is  in  the  nature  of  an 
identification  of  this  kind,  based  upon  an  important 
emotional  common  quality;  and  we  may  suspect  that 
this  common  quality  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  tie  with 
the  leader.  Another  suspicion  may  tell  us  that  we 
are  far  from  having  exhausted  the  problem  of  identi- 
fication, and  that  we  are  faced  by  the  process  which 
psychology  calls  ^  empathy  \Einfuhlung\ '  and  which 
plays  the  largest  part  in  our  understanding  of  what 
is  inherently  foreign  to  our  ego  in  other  people.  But 
we  shall  here  limit  ourselves  to  the  immediate  emo- 
tional effects  of  identification,  and  shall  leave  on  one 
side  its  significance  for  our  intellectual  life. 

Psycho-analytic  research,  which  has  already 
occasionally  attacked  the  more  difficult  problems  of 
the  psychoses,  has  also  been  able  to  exhibit  iden- 
tification to  us  in  some  other  cases  which  are  not 
immediately  comprehensible.  I  shall  treat  two  of 
these  cases  in  detail  as  material  for  our  further 
consideration. 

The  genesis  of  male  homosexuality  in  a  large 
class  of  cases  is  as  follows.  A  young  man  has 
been  unusually  ~  long  and  intensely  fixated  upon  his 
mother    in   the    sense    of  the  Oedipus   complex.    But 


Identification  67 

at  last,  after  the  end  of  his  puberty,  the  time  comes 
for  exchanging  his  mother  for  some  other  sexual 
object.  Things  take  a  sudden  turn:  the  young  man 
does  not  abandon  his  mother,  but  identifies  himself 
with  her;  he  transforms  himself  into  her,  and  now 
looks  about  for  objects  which  can  replace  his  ego 
for  him,  and  on  which  he  can  bestow  such  love  and 
care  as  he  has  experienced  from  his  mother.  This  is 
a  frequent  process,  which  can  be  confirmed  as  often 
as  one  likes,  and  which  is  naturally  quite  independent 
of  any  hypothesis  that  may  be  made  as  to  the  or- 
ganic driving  force  and  the  motives  of  the  sudden 
transformation.  A  striking  thing  about  ^  this  identific-  \ 
ation  is  its  ample  scale;  it  remoulds  the  ego  in  one  j 
of  its  important  features — in  its  sexual  character —  / 
upon  the  model  of  w^hat  has  hitherto  been  the  object. 
In  this  process  the  object » itself  is  renounced — whether 
entirely  or  in  the  sense  of  being  preserved  only  in 
the  unconscious  is  a  question  outside  the  present 
discussion.  Identification  with  an  object  that  is  re- 
nounced or  lost  as  a  substitute  for  it,  introjection  of 
this  object  into  the  ego,  is  indeed  no  longer  a  novelty 
to  us.  A  process  of  the  kind  may  sometimes  be 
directly  observed  in  small  children.  A  short  time 
ago  an  observation  of  this  sort  was  published  in  the 
Internationale  Zeitschrift  fiir  Psychoanalyse.  A  child 
\vho  was  unhappy  over  the  loss  of  a  kitten  declared 
straight   out  that  now  he  himself  was  the  kitten,  and 


68      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

accordingly  crawled  about  on  all  fours,  would  not  eat 
at  table,  etc.^ 

/  Another  such  instance  of  introjection  of  the 
object  has  been  provided  by  the  analysis  of  melan- 
cholia, an  affection  which  counts  among  the  most 
remarkable  of  its  exciting  causes  the  real  or  emotio- 
nal loss  of  a  loved  object.  A  leading  characteristic 
of  these  cases  is  a  cruel  self-depreciation  of  the  ego 
combined  with  relentless  self-criticism  and  bitter  self- 
reproaches.  Analyses  have  shown  that  this  disparage- 
ment and  these  reproaches  apply  at  bottom  to  the 
object  and  represent  the  ego's  revenge  upon  it.  The 
shadow  of  the  object  has  fallen  upon  the  ego,  as  I  have 
said  elsewhere.^  The  introjection  of  the  object  is  here 
unmistakably  clear. 

But  these  melancholias  also  show  us  something 
else,  which  may  be  of  importance  for  our  later  dis- 
cussions. They  show  us  the  ego  divided,  fallen  into 
two  pieces,  one  of  which  rages  against  the  second. 
This  second  piece  is  the  one  which  has  been  altered 
by  introjection  and  which  contains  the  lost  object. 
But  the  piece  which  behaves  so  cruelly  is  not  un- 
known  to    us    either.    It  comprises  the  conscience,    a 

*  Marcuszewicz :  '  Beitrag  zum  autistischen  Denken  bei 
Kindern.'  Internationale  Zeiischrift  fur  Psychoanalyse,  1920, 
Bd.  VI. 

^  ['Trauer  und  Melancholic'  Kleine  Schrifien  zur  Neurosen- 
lekre,  Vierte  Folge,  191 8.] 


Identification  69 

critical  faculty  \histanzY  vi\\}c{\x\  the  ego,  which  even 
in  normal  times  takes  up  a  critical  attitude  towards 
the  ego,  though  never  so  relentlessly  and  so  unjusti- 
fiably. On  previous  occasions  we  have  been  driven  to 
the  hypothesis^  that  some  such  faculty  develops  in 
our  ego  which  may  cut  itself  off  from  the  rest  of 
the  ego  and  come  into  conflict  with  it.  We  have 
called  it  the  '  ego  ideal ' ,  and  by  way  of  functions 
we  have  ascribed  to  it  self-observation,  the  moral 
conscience,  the  censorship  of  dreams,  and  the  chief 
influence  in  repression.  We  have  said  that  it  is  the 
heir  to  the  original  narcissism  in  which  the  childish 
ego  found  its  self-sufficiency;  it  gradually  gathers  up 
from  the  influences  of  the  environment  the  demands 
which  that  environment  makes  upon  the  ego  and 
which  the  ego  cannot  always  rise  to;  so  that  a  man, 
when  he  cannot  be  satisfied  with  his  ego  itself,  may 
nevertheless  be  able  to  find  satisfaction  in  the  ego 
ideal  which  has  been  differentiated  out  of  the  ego. 
In  delusions  of  observation,  as  we  have  further  shown, 
the  disintegration  of  this  faculty  has  become  patent, 
and  has    thus    revealed    its    origin   in   the  influence  of 


*  \^Instanz* — like  *  instance'  in  the  phrase  'court  of  first 
instance' — was  originally  a  legal  term.  It  is  now  used  in  the  sense 
of  one  of  a   hierarchy   of  authorities    or  functions. — Translator.] 

^  'Zur  Einfiihrung  des  Narzissmus',  'Trauer  und  Melan- 
cholic'. 


1 


/ 


/O     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

superior  powers,  and  above  all  of  parents/  But  we 
have  not  forgotten  to  add  that  the  amount  of  distance 
between  this  ego  ideal  and  the  real  ego  is  very  vari- 
able from  one  individual  to  another,  and  that  with 
many  people  this  differentiation  within  the  ego  does 
not  go  further  than  with  children. 

But  before  we  can  employ  this  material  for 
understanding  the  libidinal  organisation  of  groups,  we 
must  take  into  account  some  other  examples  of  the 
mutual  relations  between  the  object  and  the  ego.^ 

*  *Zur  Einfiihrung  des  Narzissmus.' 

^  We  ?ire  very  well  aware  that  we  have  not  exhausted  the 
nature  of  identification  with  these  examples  taken  from  pathology, 
and  that  we  have  consequently  left  part  of  the  riddle  of  group 
formations  untouched.  A  far  more  fundamental  and  comprehen- 
sive psychological  analysis  would  have  to  intervene  at  this  point. 
A  path  leads  from  identification  by  way  of  imitation  to  empathy, 
that  is,  to  the  comprehension  of  the  mechanism  by  means  of 
which  we  are  enabled  to  take  up  any  attitude  at  all  towards 
another  mental  life.  Moreover  there  is  still  much  to  be  explained 
in  the  manifestations  of  existing  identifications.  These  result  among 
other  things  in  a  person  limiting  his  aggressiveness  towards  those 
with  whom  he  has  identified  himself,  and  in  his  sparing  them 
and  giving  them  help.  The  study  of  such  identifications,  like 
those,  for  instance,  which  lie  at  the  root  of  clan  feeling,  led 
Robertson  Smith  to  the  surprising  result  that  they  rest  upon  the 
recognition  of  a  common  substance  {Kinship  and  Marriage,  1885), 
and  may  even  therefore  be  brought  about  by  a  meal  eaten  in 
common.  This  feature  makes  it  possible  to  connect  this  kind  of 
identification  with  the  early  history  of  the  human  family  which  I 
constructed  in  Totem  iind  Tabu. 


VIII 
BEING  IN  LOVE  AND  HYPNOSIS 


Even  in  its  caprices  the  usage  of  language  remains 
true  to  some  kind  of  realit3'\  Thus  it  gives  the 
name  of  *  love '  to  a  great  many  kinds  of  emotional 
relationship  which  we  too  group  together  theoretically 
as  love;  but  then  again  it  feels  a  doubt  whether 
this  love  is  real,  true,  actual  love,  and  so  hints  at 
a  whole  scale  of  possibilities  within  the  range  of  the 
phenomena  of  love.  We  shall  have  no  difficulty  in 
making  the  same  discovery  empirically. 

In  one  class  of  cases  being  in  love  is  nothing 
more  than  object-cathexis  on  the  part  of  the  sexual 
instincts  with  a  view  to  directly  sexual  satisfaction,  a 
cathexis  which  expires,  moreover,  when  this  aim  has 
been  reached;  this  is  what  is  called  common,  sensual 
love.  But,  as  we  know,  the  libidinal  situation  rarely 
remains  so  simple.  It  was  possible  to  calculate  with 
certainty  upon  the  revival  of  the  need  which  had  just 
expired;   and  this  must  no  doubt  have  been  the  first 


'J2      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

motive  for  directing  a  lasting  cathexis  upon  the  sexual 
object  and  for  *  loving '  it  in  the  passionless  intervals 
as  well. 

To  this  must  be  added  another  factor  derived 
from  the  astonishing  course  of  development  which  is 
pursued  by  the  erotic  life  of  man.  In  his  first  phase, 
which  has  usually  come  to  an  end  by  the  time  he  is 
five  years  old,  a  child  has  found  the  first  object  for 
his  love  in  one  or  other  of  his  parents,  and  all  of 
his  sexual  instincts  with  their  demand  for  satisfaction 
have  been  united  upon  this  object.  The  repression 
which  then  sets  in  compels  him  to  renounce  the 
greater  number  of  these  infantile  sexual  aims,  and 
leaves  behind  a  profound  modification  in  his  relation 
to  his  parents.  The  child  still  remains  tied  to 
his  parents,  but  by  instincts  which  must  be  de- 
scribed as  being  'inhibited  in  their  aim  \zielgehemmte\\ 
The  emotions  which  he  feels  henceforward  towards 
these  objects  of  his  love  are  characterized  as  'tender'. 
It  is  well  known  that  the  earlier  '  sensual '  tendencies 
remain  more  or  less  strongly  preserved  in  the  un- 
conscious, so  that  in  a  certain  sense  the  whole  of  the 
original  current  continues  to  exist.  ^ 

At  puberty,  as  we  know,  there  set  in  new  and 
very  strong  tendencies  with  directly  sexual  aims.  In 
unfavourable  cases  they  remain  separate,  in  the  form 

*  Cf.  Drei  Abhandlungen  zur  Sexualtheorie,  I.e. 


Being  in  Love  and  Hypnosis  73 

of  a  sensual  current,  from  the  *  tender*  emotional 
trends  which  persist.  We  are  then  faced  by  a  picture 
the  two  aspects  of  which  certain  movements  in 
literature  take  such  delight  in  idealising.  A  man  of 
this  kind  will  show  a  sentimental  enthusiasm  for 
women  whom  he  deeply  respects  but  who  do  not 
excite  him  to  sexual  activities,  and  he  will  only  be 
potent  with  other  women  whom  he  does  not  '  love  * 
but  thinks  little  of  or  even  despises.^  More  often, 
however,  the  adolescent  succeeds  in  bringing  about 
a  certain  degree  of  synthesis  between  the  unsensual, 
heavenly  love  and  the  sensual,  earthly  love,  and  his 
relation  to  his  sexual  object  is  characterised  by  the 
interaction  of  uninhibited  instincts  and  of  instincts 
inhibited  in  their  aim.  The  depth  to  which  anyone 
is  in  love,  as  contrasted  with  his  purely  sensual 
desire,  may  be  measured  by  the  size  of  the  share 
taken  by  the  inhibited  instincts  of  tendem*ess. 

In  connection  with  this  question  of  being  in  love  we 
have  always  been  struck  by  the  phenomenon  of  sexual 
over-estimation — the  fact  that  the  loved  object  enjoys 
a  certain  amount  of  freedom  from  criticism,  and  that 
all  its  characteristics  are  valued  more  highly  than  those 
of  people  who  are  not  loved,  or  than  its  own  were 
at  a  time  when  it  itself  was  not  loved.     If  the  sensual 

*  *Uber  die  allgemeinste  Emiedrigung  des  Liebeslebens. ' 
Kleine  Schriften  zur  Neurosenlehre,  Vierte  Folge,  19 1 8. 

F 


74      Group  Psychology  and  the  Autolysis  of  the  Ego 

tendencies  are  somewhat  more  effectively  repressed 
or  set  aside,  the  illusion  is  produced  that  the  object 
has  come  to  be  sensually  loved  on  account  of  its 
spiritual  merits,  whereas  on  the  contrary  these  merits 
may  really  only  have  been  lent  to  it  by  its  sensual 
charm. 

The  tendency  which  falsifies  judgement  in  this 
respect  is  that  of  idealisation.  But  this  makes  it 
easier  for  us  to  find  our  way  about.  We  see  that 
the  object  is  being  treated  in  the  same  way  as  our 
own  ego,  so  that  when  we  are  in  love  a  considerable 
'amount  of  narcissistic  libido  overflows  on  to  the  object. 
It  is  even  obvious,  in  many  forms  of  love  choice,  that 
the  object  serves  as  a  substitute  for  some  unattained 
ego  ideal  of  our  own.  We  love  it  on  account  of  the 
perfections  which  we  have  striven  to  reach  for  our 
own  ego,  and  which  we  should  now  like  to  procure 
in  this  roundabout  way  as  a  means  of  satisfying  our 
narcissism. 

If  the  sexual  over-estimation  and  the  being  in 
love  increase  even  further,  then  the  interpretation  of 
the  picture  becomes  still  more  unmistakable.  The 
tendencies  whose  trend  is  tovv-ards  directly  sexual 
satisfaction  may  now  be  pushed  back  entirely,  as 
regularly  happens,  for  instance,  with  the  young  man's 
sentimental  passion;  the  ego  becomes  more  and  more 
unassuming  and  modest,  and  the  object  more  and  more 
sublime   and   precious,    until   at  last  it  gets  possession 


Being  in  Love  and  Hypnosis 

of  the  entire  self-love  of  the  ego,  whose  self-sacrifice 
thus  follows  as  a  natural  consequence.  The  object 
has,  so  to  speak,  consumed  the  ego.  Traits  of 
humility,  of  the  limitation  of  narcissism,  and  of  self- 
injury  occur  in  every  case  of  being  in  love;  in  the 
extreme  case  they  are  only  intensified,  and  as  a 
result  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  sensual  claims  they 
remain  in  solitary  supremacy. 

This  happens  especially  easily  with  love  that  is 
unhappy  and  cannot  be  satisfied;  for  in  spite  of 
ever}^thing  each  sexual  satisfaction  ahvays  involves  a 
reduction  in  sexual  over-estimation.  Contemporaneously 
with  this  'devotion'  of  the  ego  to  the  object,  w^hich 
is  no  longer  to  be  distinguished  from  a  sublimated 
devotion  to  an  abstract  idea,  the  functions  allotted  to 
the  ego  ideal  entirely  cease  to  operate.  The  criticism 
exercised  by  that  faculty  is  silent;  everything  that  the 
object  does  and  asks  for  is  right  and  blameless. 
Conscience  has  no  application  to  anything  that  is  done 
for  the  sake  of  the  object;  in  the  blindness  of  love 
remorselessness  is  carried  to  the  pitch  of  crime.  The 
whole  situation  can  be  completely  summarised  in  a  \i 
formula:  The  object  has  taken  the  place  of  the  ego  / 
ideal,  J' 

It  is  now  easy  to  define  the  distinction  between 
identification  and  such  extreme  developments  of  being 
in  love  as  may  be  described  as  fascination  or  infatua- 
tion.    In  the  former  case   the  ego  has  enriched  itself 


'j^      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

with  the  properties  of  the  object,  it  has  *  introjected ' 
the  object  into  itself,  as  Ferenczi  expresses  it.  In  the 
second  case  it  is  impoverished,  it  has  surrendered  itself 
to  the  object,  it  has  substituted  the  object  for  its  most 
important  constituent.  Closer  consideration  soon  makes 
it  plain,  however,  that  this  kind  of  account  creates 
an  illusion  of  contradistinctions  that  have  no  real 
existence.  Economically  there  is  no  question  of  impov- 
erishment or  enrichment;  it  is  even  possible  to 
describe  an  extreme  case  of  being  in  love  as  a  state 
in  which  the  ego  has  introjected  the  object  into  itself. 
Another  distinction  is  perhaps  better  calculated  to 
meet  the  essence  of  the  matter.  In  the  case  of 
identification  the  object  has  been  lost  or  given  up; 
it  is  then  set  up  again  inside  the  ego,  and  the  ego 
makes  a  partial  alteration  in  itself  after  the  model  of 
the  lost  object.  In  the  other  case  the  object  is 
retained,  and  there  is  a  hyper-cathexis  of  it  by  the 
ego  and  at  the  ego's  expense.  But  here  again  a 
difficulty  presents  itself.  Is  it  quite  certain  that  iden- 
tification presupposes  that  object-cathexis  has  been 
given  up?  Can  there  be  no  identification  with  the 
object  retained?  And  before  we  embark  upon  a  dis- 
cussion of  this  delicate  question,  the  perception  may 
already  be  beginning  to  dawn  on  us  that  yet  another 
alternative  embraces  the  real  essence  of  the  matter, 
namely,  whether  the  object  is  put  in  the  place  of  the 
ego  or  of  the  ego  ideal. 


Being  in  Love  a7id  Hypnosis  yy 

From  being  in  love  to  hypnosis  is  evidently 
only  a  short  step.  The  respects  in  which  the  two 
agree  are  obvious.  There  is  the  same  humble  sub- 
jection, the  same  compliance,  the  same  absence  of 
criticism,  towards  the  hypnotist  just  as  towards  the 
loved  object.  There  is  the  same  absorption  of  one*s 
own  initiative;  no  one  can  doubt  that  the  hypnotist 
has  stepped  into  the  place  of  the  ego  ideal.  It  is 
only  that  everything  is  even  clearer  and  more  intense 
in  hypnosis,  so  that  it  would  be  more  to  the  point 
to  explain  being  in  love  by  means  of  hypnosis  than 
the  other  way  round.  The  hypnotist  is  the  sole  object, 
and  no  attention  is  paid  to  any  but  him.  The  fact 
that  the  ego  experiences  in  a  dream-like  way  whatever 
he  may  request-  or  assert  reminds  us  that  we  omitted 
to  mention  among  the  functions  of  the  ego  ideal  the 
business  of  testing  the  reality  of  things.^  No  wonder 
that  the  ego  takes  a  perception  for  real  if  its  reality 
is  vouched  for  by  the  mental  faculty  which  ordinarily 
discharges  the  duty  of  testing  the  reality  of  things. 
The  complete  absence  of  tendencies  which  are  unin- 
hibited in  their  sexual  aims  contributes  further  towards 
the  extreme  purity  of  the  phenomena.  The  hypnotic 
relation  is  the  devotion  of  someone  in  love  to  an 
unlimited  degree  but  with  sexual  satisfaction  excluded; 


*  Cf.     *Metapsychologische    Erganzung     zur    Traumlehre. ' 
Kleine  Schrifien  zur  Neurosenlehre,  Vierte  Folge,  191 8. 


78      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

whereas  in  the  case  of  being  in  love  this  kind  of 
satisfaction  is  only  temporarily  kept  back,  and  remains 
in  the  background  as  a  possible  aim  at  some  later  time. 

But  on  the  other  hand  we  may  also  say  that 
the  hypnotic  relation  is  (if  the  expression  is  permis- 
sible) a  group  formation  with  two  members.  Hypnosis 
is  not  a  good  object  for  comparison  with  a  group 
formation,  because  it  is  truer  to  say  that  it  is  identi- 
cal with  it.  Out  of  the  complicated  fabric  of  the 
group  it  isolates  one  element  for  us — the  behaviour 
of  the  individual  to  the  leader.  Hypnosis  is  distin- 
guished from  a  group  formation  by  this  limitation  of 
number,  just  as  it  is  distinguished  from  being  in  love 
by  the  absence  of  directly  sexual  tendencies.  In  this 
respect  it  occupies  a  middle  position  between  the  two. 

It  is  interesting  to  see  that  it  is  precisely  those 
sexual  tendencies  that  are  inhibited  in  their  aims  which 
achieve  such  lasting  ties  between  men.  But  this  can 
easily  be  understood  from  the  fact  that  they  are  not 
capable  of  complete  satisfaction,  while  sexual  tenden- 
cies which  are  uninhibited  in  their  aims .  suffer  an 
extraordinary  reduction  through  the  discharge  of 
energy  every  time  the  sexual  aim  is  attained.  It  is 
the  fate  of  sensual  love  to  become  extinguished  when 
it  is  satisfied;  for  it  to  be  able  to  last,  it  must  from 
the  first  be  mixed  with  purely  tender  components — 
with  such,  that  is,  as  are  inhibited  in  their  aims — or 
it  must  itself  undergo  a  transformation  of  this  kind. 


Being  in  Love  and  Hypnosis  79 

Hypnosis  would  solve  the  riddle  of  the  libidinal 
constitution  of  groups  for  us  straight  away,  if  it  were 
not  that  it  itself  exhibits  some  features  which  are 
not  met  by  the  rational  explanation  we  have  hitherto 
given  of  it  as  a  state  of  being  in  love  with  the 
directly  sexual  tendencies  excluded.  There  is  still  a 
great  deal  in  it  which  we  must  recognise  as  unex- 
plained and  mystical.  It  contains  an  additional  element 
of  paralysis  derived  from  the  relation  between  someone 
with  superior  power  and  someone  who  is  without 
powder  and  helpless — which  may  afford  a  transition 
to  the  hypnosis  of  terror  which  occurs  in  animals. 
The  manner  in  which  it  is  produced  and  its  relation- 
ship to  sleep  are  not  clear;  and  the  puzzling  way  in 
which  some  people  are  subject  to  it,  while  others 
resist  it  completely,  points  to  some  factor  still  un- 
known which  is  realised  in  it  and  which  perhaps  alone 
makes  possible  the  purity^  of  the  attitudes  of  the 
libido  which  it  exhibits.  It  is  noticeable  that,  even 
when  there  is  complete  suggestive  compliance  in  other 
respects,  the  moral  conscience  of  the  person  hypnotized 
may  show  resistance.  But  this  may  be  due  to  the 
fact  that  in  hypnosis  as  it  is  usually  practised  some 
knowledge  may  be  retained  that  what  is  happening 
is  only  a  game,  an  untrue  reproduction  of  another 
situation  of  far  more  importance  to  life. 

But  after  the  preceding  discussions  we  are  quite 
in   a   position    to   give   the   formula    for    the    libidinal 


8o      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

constitution  of  groups:  or  at  least  of  such  groups  as 
we  have  hitherto  considered,  namely,  those  that  have 
a  leader  and  have  not  been  able  by  means  of  too  much 
'  organisation '  to  acquire  secondarily  the  characteristics 
of  an  individual.  A  primary  group  of  this  kind  is 
a  number  of  individuals  who  have  substituted  07ie  and 
the  same  object  for  their  ego  ideal  and  have  conse- 
quently identified  themselves  with  one  another  in  their 
ego.  This  condition  admits  of  graphic  representation: 


Ego  Ideal 


Object 


Outer 
Object 

:-x 


IX 
THE  HERD  INSTINCT 


We  cannot  for  long  enjoy  the  illusion  that  we  have 
solved  the  riddle  of  the  group  with  this  formula.  It 
is  impossible  to  escape  the  immediate  and  disturbing 
recollection  that  all  we  have  really  done  has  been  to 
shift  the  question  on  to  the  riddle  of  hypnosis,  about 
which  so  many  points  have  yet  to  be  cleared  up.  And 
now  another  objection  shows  us  our  further  path. 

It  might  be  said  that  the  intense  emotional  ties 
which  we  observe  in  groups  are  quite  sufficient  to 
explain  one  of  their  characteristics — the  lack  of  inde- 
pendence and  initiative  in  their  members,  the  similarity 
in  the  reactions  of  all  of  them,  their  reduction,  so  to 
speak,  to  the  level  of  group  individuals.  But  if  we 
look  at  it  as  a  whole,  a  group  shows  us  more  than 
this.  Some  of  its  features — the  weakness  of  intellectual 
ability,  the  lack  of  emotional  restraint,  the  incapadty 
for  moderation  and  delay,  the  inclination  to  exceed 
every  limit  in  the  expression  of  emotion  and  to  work 


\ 


82      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

it  off  completely  in  the  form  of  action — these  and  similar 
features^  which  we  find  so  impressively  described  in 
Le  Bon,  show  an  unmistakable  picture  of  a  recession 

,    i  of  mental  activity  to  an  earlier  jtage  such  as  we  are  not 
surprised  to  find  among  savages  or  children.  A  regression 
of  this  sort  is  in  particular  an  essential  characteristic  of 
common  groups,  while,  as  we  have  heard,  in  organized 
and  artifiqial  groups  it  can  to  a  large  extent  be  checked. 
We  thus  have  an  impression  of  a  state  in  which 
an   individual's   separate   emotion   and   personal  intel- 
lectucd    act   are    too    weak    to    come   to    anything  by 
themselves  and  are  absolutely  obliged  to  wait  till  they 
are    reinforced   through    being   repeated  in    a    similar 
way  in   the    other   members    of   the    group.    We    are 
reminded  of  how  many  of  these  phenomena  of  depen- 
dence  are   part   of  the  normal  constitution  of  human 
society,  of  how  little  originality  and  personal  courage 
are  to  be  found  in  it,    of  how  much  every  individual 
is    ruled_  by  those  attitudes  of  the  group  mind  which 
exhibit  themselves  in  such  forms  as  racial  character- 
istics, class  prejudices,  public  opinion,  etc.  The  influence 
ot__suggestion  becomes  a  greater  riddle  for  us  when 
j    we  admit  that  it  is  not  exercised  only  by  the  leader, 
but  by   every  individual  upon  every  other  individual; 
and  we   must  reproach  ourselves  with  having  unfairly 
emphasized  the  relation  to  the  leader  and  with  having 

\     kept  the  other  factor  of  mutual  suggestion  too  much 
in  the  background. 


The  Herd  Instinct  83 

After  this  encouragement  to  modesty,  we  shall 
be  inclined  to  listen  to  another  voice,  which  promises 
us  an  explanation  based  upon  simpler  grounds.  Such 
a  one  is  to  be  found  in  Trotter's  thoughtful  book 
upon  the  herd  instinct,  concerning  which  my  only  regret 
is  that  it  does  not  entirely  escape  the  antipathies  that 
were  set  loose  by  the  recent  great  war.' 

Trotter  derives  the  mental  phenomena  that  are 
described  as  occurring  in  groups  from  a  herd  instinct 
{'gregariousness'))  which  is  innate  in  human  beings  just 
as  in  other  species  of  animals.  Biologically  this  gre- 
gariousness  is  an  analogy  to  multicellularity  and  as 
it  were  a  continuation  of  it.  From  the  standpoint  of 
the  libido  theory  it  is  a  further  manifestation  of  the 
inclination,  which  proceeds  from  the  libido,  and  which 
is  felt  by  all  living  beings  of  the  same  kind,  to  combine 
in  more  and  more  comprehensive  units. ^  The  individual 
feels  *  incomplete '  if  he  is  alone.  The  dread  shown 
by  small  children  would  seem  already  to  be  an  ex- 
pression of  this  herd  instinct.  Opposition  to  the  herd 
is  as  good  as  separation  from  it,  and  is  therefore 
aii^ously  avoided.  But  the  herd  turns  away  from 
anything   that   is   new  or  unusual.    The   herd  instinct 


^  W.  Trotter:    Instincts    of  the   Herd  in  Peace  and   War. 
Fisher  Unwin,  1916. 


See  my  essay  yenseits  des  Lustprinzipt 


84     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

would  appear  to  be  something  primary,  something 
Svhich  cannot  be  split  up'. 

Trotter  gives  as  the  list  of  instincts  which  he 
considers  as  primary  those  of  self-preservation,  of 
nutrition,  of  sex,  and  of  the  herd.  The  last  often 
comes  into  opposition  with  the  others.  The  feelings  of 
guilt  and  of  duty  are  the  peculiar  possessions  of  a 
gregarious  animal.  Trotter  also  derives  from  the  herd 
instinct  the  repressive  forces  which  psycho-analysis 
has  shown  to  exist  in  the  ego,  and  from  the  same 
source  accordingly  the  resistances  which  the  physician 
comes  up  against  in  psycho-analytic  treatment. 
Speech  owes  its  importance  to  its  aptitude  for  mutual 
understanding  in  the  herd,  and  upon  it  the  identi- 
fication of  the  individuals  with  one  another  largely 
rests. 

While  Le  Bon  is  principally  concerned  with  typical 
transient  group  formations,  and  McDougall  with  stable 
associations,  Trotter  has  chosen  as  the  centre  of  his 
interest  the  most  generalised  form  of  assemblage  in 
which  man,  that  C^cbov  jtoXitikov,  passes  his  life,  and  he 
gives  us  its  psychological  basis.  But  Trotter  is  under 
no  necessity  of  tracing  back  the  herd  instinct,  for  he 
characterizes  it  as  primary  and  not  further  reducible. 
Boris  Sidis's  attempt,  to  which  he  refers,  at  tracing 
the  herd  instinct  back  to  suggestibility  is  fortunately 
superfluous  as  far  as  he  is  concerned;  it  is  an  explan- 
ation  of  a   familiar   and   unsatisfactory  type,  and  the 


The  Herd  Instinct  85 

converse  proposition — that  suggestibility  is  a  derivative 
of  the  herd  instinct — would  seem  to  me  to  throw- 
far  more  light  on  the  subject. 

But  Trotter's  exposition,  with  even  more  justice 
than  the  others',  is  open  to  the  objection  that  it  takes 
too  little  account  of  the  leader's  part  in  a  group, 
while  we  incline  rather  to  the  opposite  judgement, 
that  it  is  impossible  to  grasp  the  nature  of  a  group  if 
the  leader  is  disregarded.  The  herd  instinct  leaves  no 
room  at  all  for  the  leader;  he  is  merely  thrown  in 
along  with  the  herd,  almost  by  chance;  it  follows, 
too,  that  no  path  leads  from  this  instinct  to  the 
need  for  a  God;  the  herd  is  without  a  herdsman. 
But  -besides  this  Trotter's  exposition  can  be  under- 
mined psychologically;  that  is  to  say,  it  can  be 
made  at  all  events  probable  that  the  herd  instinct  is 
not  irreducible,  that  it  is  not  primary  in  the  same 
sense  as  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  and  the  sexual 
instinct. 

It  is  naturally  no  easy  matter  to  trace  the  onto- 
genesis of  the  herd  instinct.  The  dread  w^hich  is 
shown  by  small  children  when  they  are  left  alone,  and 
which  Trotter  claims  as  being  akeady  a  manifestation 
of  the  instinct,  nevertheless  suggests  more  readily  an- 
other interpretation.  The  dread  relates  to  the  child's 
mother,  and  later  to  other  familiar  persons,  and  it  is 
the  expression  of  an  unfulfilled  desire,  which  the  child 
does   not   yet   know  how   to    deal   with   in   any  way 


86     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

except  by  turning  it  into  dread.^  Nor  is  the  child's  dread 
when  it  is  alone  pacified  by  the  sight  of  any  haphazard 
*  member  of  the  herd ' ,  but  on  the  contrary  it  is  only 
brought  into  existence  by  the  approach  of  a  ^  stranger ' 
of  this  sort.  Then  for  a  long  time  nothing  in  the  nature 
of  herd  instinct  or  group  feeling  is  to  be  observed  in 
children.  Something  like  it  grows  up  first  of  all,  in  a 
nursery  containing  many  children,  out  of  the  children's 
relation  to  their  parents,  and  it  does  so  as  a  reaction 
to  the  initial  envy  with  which  the  elder  child  receives 
the  younger  one.  The  elder  child  would  certainly 
like  to  put  its  successor  jealously  aside,  to  keep 
it  away  from  the  parents,  and  to  rob  it  of  all  its 
privileges;  but  in  face  of  the  fact  that  this  child 
(like  all  that  come  later)  is  loved  by  the  parents  in 
just  the  same  w^ay,  and  in  consequence  of  the  impos- 
sibility of  maintaining  its  hostile  attitude  without 
damaging  itself,  it  is  forced  into  identifying  itself  with 
the  other  children.  So  there  grows  up  in  the  troop  of 
children  a  communal  or  group  feeling,  which  is  then 
further  developed  at  school.  The  first  demand  made 
by  this  reaction-formation  is  for  justice,  for  equal 
treatment  for  all.  We  all  know  how  loudly  and  implac- 
ably this  claim  is  put  forward  at  school.  If  one  cannot 
be   the   favourite    oneself,    at    all    events  nobody  else 


^  See   the    remarks    upon   Dread  in    Vorlesungen   zur  Ein- 
fnhrung  in  die  Psychoanalyse.  XXV. 


The  Herd  Instinct  87 

shall  be  the  favourite.  This  transformation — the  replac- 
ing of  jealousy  by  a  group  feeling  in  the  nursery 
and  classroom — might  be  considered  improbable,  if 
the  same  process  could  not  later  on  be  observed 
again  in  other  circumstances.  We  have  only  to  think 
of  the  troop  of  women  and  girls,  all  of  them  in  love 
in  an  enthusiastically  sentimental  way,  who  crowd 
round  a  singer  or  pianist  after  his  performance.  It 
would  certainly  be  easy  for  each  of  them  to  be  jealous 
of  the  rest;  but,  in  face  of  their  numbers  and  the 
consequent  impossibility  of  their  reaching  the  aim  of 
their  love,  they  renounce  it,  and,  instead  of  pulling 
out  one  another's  hair,  they  act  as  a  united  group, 
do  homage  to  the  hero  of  the  occasion  with  their 
common  actions,  and  would  probably  be  glad  to  have 
a  share .  of  his  flowing  locks.  Originally  rivals,  they 
have  succeeded  in  identifying  themselves  with  one 
another  by  means  of  a  similar  love  for  the  same 
object.  When,  as  is  usual,  a  situation  in  the  field  of 
the  instincts  is  capable  of  various  outcomes,  we  need 
not  be  surprised  if  the  actual  outcome  is  one  which 
involves  the  possibility  of  a  certain  amount  of  satis- 
faction, while  another,  even  though  in  itself  more 
obvious,  is  passed  over  because  the  circumstances  of 
life  prevent  its  attaining  this  aim. 

What  appears  later  on  in  society  in  the  shape 
of  Gemeingeist^  esprit  de  corps  ^  *  group  spirit',  etc., 
does  not  belie  its  derivation  from  what  was  originally 


88     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

envy.     No    one   must   want   to    put   himself   forward, 
every  one    must   be   the    same    and   have    the    same. 
Social   justice    means   that   we    deny    ourselves    many 
things   so   that   others   may  have  to  do  without  them 
as  well,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  may  not  be  able 
to    ask    for   them.     This    demand   for   equality  is   the  4 
root   of  social   conscience  and  the  sense  of  duty.     It 
reveals    itself   unexpectedly    in   the   syphilitic 's    dread 
of  infecting   other   people,    which   psycho-analysis   has  ^ 
taught    us    to    understand.     The    dread    exhibited   by 
these    poor    wretches    corresponds    to    their    violent 
struggles  against  the  unconscious  wish  to  spread  their  ' 
infection    on   to    other    people;    for   why  -should   they 
alone   be   infected   and   cut   off  from  so   much?  why  I 
not  other  people  as  well?   And  the  same  germ  is  to  | 
be  found  in  the  pretty  anecdote  of  the  judgement  of 
Solomon.     If  one   woman's   child   is   dead,   the  other  -I 
shall    not    have    a    live    one    either.     The    bereaved 
woman  is  recognized  by  this  wish. 

Thus  social  feeling  is  based  upon  the  reversal  of 
what  was  first  a  hostile  feeling  into  a  positively-toned  i 
tie  of  the  nature  of  an  identification.  So  far  as  we  - 
have  hitherto  been  able  to  follow  the  course  of  events, 
this  reversal  appears  to  be  effected  under  the  influence 
of  a  common  tender  tie  with  a  person  outside  the 
group.  We  do  not  ourselves  regard  our  analysis  of 
identification  as  exhaustive,  but  it  is  enough  for  our 
present   purpose   that   we   should   revert   to   this   one 


The  Herd  Instinct  89 

feature — its  demand  that  equalization  shall  be  con- 
sistently carried  through.  We  have  already  heard  in 
the  discussion  of  the  two  artificial  groups,  church  and 
army,  that  their  preliminary  condition  is  that  all  their 
members  should  be  loved  in  the  same  way  by  one 
person,  the  leader.  Do  not  let  us  forget,  however,  that 
the  demand  for  equality  in  a  group  applies  only  to  its 
members  and  not  to  the  leader.  All  the  members 
must  be  equal  to  one  another,  but  they  all  want  to 
be  ruled  by  one  person.  Many  equals,  who  can 
identify  themselves  with  one  another,  and  a  single 
person  superior  to  them  all — that  is  the  situation 
that  we  find  realised  in  groups  which  are  capable  of 
subsisting.  Let  us  venture,  then,  to  correct  Trotter's 
pronouncement  that  man  is  a  herd  animal  and  assert 
that  he  is  rather  a  horde  animal,  an  individual  creature 
in  a  horde  led  by  a  chief. 


X 

THE  GROUP  AND  THE  PRIMAL  HORDE 


In  19 1 2  I  took  up  a  conjecture  of  Darwin's  to  the 
effect  that  the  primitive  form  of  human  society 
was  that  of  a  horde  ruled  over  despotically  by  a 
powerful  male.  I  attempted  to  show  that  the  fortunes 
of  this  horde  have  left  indestructible  traces  upon  the 
history  of  human  descent;  and,  especially,  that  the 
development  of  totemism,  which  comprises  in  itself 
the  beginnings  of  religion,  morality%  and  social  organisa- 
tion, is  connected  with  the  killing  of  the  chief  by 
violence  and  the  transformation  of  the  paternal  horde 
into  a  community  of  brothers.^  To  be  sure,  this  is 
only  a  hypothesis,  like  so  many  others  with  which 
archaeologists  endeavour  to  lighten  the  darkness  of 
prehistoric  times — a  *  Just-So  Story ' ,  as  it  was  amusingly 
called  by  a  not  unkind  critic  (Kroeger);  but  I  think  it 
is  creditable  to  such  a  hypothesis  if  it  proves  able  to 

^  Totem  und  Tabu. 


1 


The  Group  and  the  Primal  Horde  91 

bring    coherence    and    understanding    into    nk)re    and 
more  new  regions. 

Human  groups  exhibit  once  again  the  familiar 
picture  of  an  individual  of  superior  strength  among  a 
troop  of  similar  companions,  a  picture  which  is  also 
contained  in  our  idea  of  the  primal  horde.  The 
psychology  of  such  a  group,  as  w^e  know  it  from  the 
descriptions  to  Vv^hich  we  have  so  often  referred — the 
dwindling  of  the  conscious  individual  personality,  the 
focussing  of  thoughts  and  feelings  into  a  common 
direction,  the  predominance  of  the  emotions  and  of 
the  [unconscious  mental  life,  the  tendency  to  the  im- 
mediate carrying  out  of  intentions  as  they  emerge — 
all  this  corresponds  to  a  state  of  regression  to  a 
primitive  mental  activity,  of  just  such  a  sort  as  we 
should   be    inclined   to   ascribe  to   the  primal  horde/ 

*  What  we  have  just  described  in  our  general  characterisa- 
tion of  mankind  must  apply  especially  to  the  primal  horde. 
The  will  of  the  individual  was  too  weak;  he  did  not  venture 
upon  action.  No  impulses  whatever  came  into  play  except  col- 
lective ones;  there  was  only  a  common  will,  there  were  no  single 
ones.  An  idea  did  not  dare  to  turn  itself  into  a  volition  unless 
it  felt  itself  reinforced  by  a  perception  of  its  general  diffusion. 
This  weakness  of  the  idea  is  to  be  explained  by  the  strength  of 
the  emotional  tie  which  is  shared  by  all  the  members  of  the 
horde ;  but  the  similarity  in  the  circumstances  of  their  life  and  the 
absence  of  any  private  property  assist  in  determining  the  uniformity 
of  their  individual  mental  acts.  As  we  may  observe  with  children 
and  soldiers,  common  activity  is  not  excluded  even  in  the  ex- 
cremental  functions.    The  one  great  exception  is  provided  by  the 


\ 


92      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

Thus  the  group  appears  to  us  as  a  revival  of 
the  primal  horde.  Just  as  primitive  man  virtually 
survives  in  every  individual,  so  the  primal  horde  may 
arise  once  more  out  of  any  randorn  crowd;  in  so  far 
as  men  are  habitually  under  the  sway  of  group  form- 
ation we  recognise  in  it  the  survival  of  the  primal 
horde.  We  must  conclude  that  the  psychology  of  the 
group  is  the  oldest  human  psychology;  what  we  have 
isolated  as  individual  psychology,  by  neglecting 
all  traces  of  the  group,  has  only  since  come  into 
prominence  out  of  the  old  group  psychology,  by  a 
gradual  process  which  may  still,  perhaps,  be  described 
as  incomplete.  We  shall  later  venture  upon  an 
attempt  at  specifying  the  point  of  departure  of  this 
development. 

Further  reflection  will  show  us  in  what  re- 
spect this  statement  requires  correction.  Individual 
psychology  must,  on  the  contrary,  be  just  as  old  as 
group  psychology,  for  from  the  first  there  were  two 
kinds  of  psychologies,  that  of  the  individual  members 
of  the  group  and  that  of  the  father,  chief,  or  leader. 
The  members  of  the  group  were  subject  to  ties  just 
as  we  see  them  to-day,  but  the  father  of  the  primal 
horde  was  free.  His  intellectual  acts  were  strong  and 

sexual  act,  in  which  a  third  person  is  at  the  best  superfluous  and 
in  the  extreme  case  is  condemned  to  a  state  of  painful  expectancy. 
As  to  the  reaction  of  the  sexual  need  (for  genital  gratification) 
towards  gregariousness,  see  below. 


The  Group  and  the  Primal  Horde  93 

independent  even  in  isolation,  and  his  will  needed  no 
reinforcement  from  others.  Consistency  leads  us  to 
assume  that  his  ego  had  few  libidinal  ties;  he  loved 
no  one  but  himself,  or  other  people  only  in  so  far  as 
they  served  his  needs.  To  objects  his  ego  gave  away 
no  more  than  was  barely  necessary. 

He,  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  history  of 
mankind,  was  the  Superman  whom  Nietzsche  only 
expected  from  the  future.  Even  to-day  the  members 
of  a  group  stand  in  need  of  the  illusion  that  they  are 
equally  and  justly  loved  by  their  leader;  but  the  leader 
himself  need  love  no  one  else,  he  may  be  of  a  masterly 
nature,  absolutely  narcissistic,  but  self-confident  and 
independent.  We  know  that  love  puts  a  check  upon 
narcissism,  and  it  would  be  possible  to  show  how, 
by  operating  in  this  way,  it  became  a  factor  of 
civilisation. 

The  primal  father  of  the  horde  was  not  yet 
immortal,  as  he  later  became  by  deification.  If  he 
died,  he  had  to  be  replaced;  his  place  was  probably 
taken  by  a  youngest  son,  who  had  up  to  then  been 
a  member  of  the  group  like  any  other.  There  must 
therefore  be  a  possibility  of  transforming  group  psycho- 
logy into  individual  psychology;  a  condition  must  be 
discovered  under  which  such  a  transformation  is  easily 
accomplished,  just  as  it  is  possible  for  bees  in  case 
of  necessity  to  turn  a  larva  into  a  queen  instead  of 
into  a  worker.   One  can  imagine  only  one  possibility: 


94      Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

the  primal  father  had  prevented  Jiis_  sons  from  satis- 
fying their  directly  sexual  tendencies;  he  forced  them 
into  abstinence  and  consequently  into  the  emotional 
ties  with  him  and  with  one  another  which  could  arise 
out  of  those  of  their  tendencies  that  were  inhibited 
in  their  sexual  aim.  He  forced  them,  so  to  speak, 
into  group  psychology.  His  sexuaF  jealousy  and  intol- 
erance became  in  the  last  resort  the  causes  of  group 
psycholog}^^ 

.  Whoever  became  his  successor  was  also  given 
the  possibility  of  sexual  satisfaction,  and  w^as  by  that 
means  offered  a  way  out  of  the  conditions  of  group 
psychology.  The  fixation  of  the  libido  to  woman  and 
the  possibility  of  satisfaction  without  any  need  for  delay 
or  accumulation  made  an  end  of  the  importance  of 
those  of  his  sexual  tendencies  that  were  inhibited  in 
their  aim,  and  allowed  his  narcissism  always  to  rise 
to  its  full  height.  We  shall  return  in  a  postscript  to 
this  connection  between  love  and  character  formation. 
We  may  further  emphasize,  as  being  specially 
instructive,  the  relation  that  holds  between  the  con- 
trivance by  means  of  which  an  artificial  group  is  held 
together  and  the  constitution  of  the  primal  horde. 
We  have  seen   that  with   an  army  and  a  church  this 

^  It  may  perhaps  also  be  assumed  that  the  sons,  when  they 
were  driven  out  and  separated  from  their  father,  advanced  from 
identification  with  orje  another  to  homosexual  object  love,  and  in 
this  way  won  freedom  to  kill  their  father. 


^ 


The  Group  and  the  Primal  Horde  95 

contrivance  is  the  illusion  that  the  leader  loves  all  of 
the  individuals  equally  and  justly.     But  this  is  simply 
an  idealistic  remodelling  of  the  state  of  affairs  in  the 
primal   horde,   where   all   of  the  sons  knew  that  theyV 
were    equally   persecuted    by  the   primal    father,    and    ' 
feared  him  equally.     This  same  recasting  upon  which" 
all   social   duties   are  built  up  is  already  presupposed 
by    the    next    form   of  human   society,    the   totemistic 
clan.     The  indestructible  strength   of  the  family  as  a 
natural  group   formation  rests  upon  the  fact  that  this 
necessar}^    presupposition    of   the    father's    equal    love 
can  have  a  real  application  in  the  family. 

But  we  expect  even  more  of  this  derivation  of 
the  group  from  the  primal  horde.  It  ought  also  to 
help  us  to  understand  what  is  still  incomprehensible 
and  mysterious  in  group  formations — all  that  lies 
hidden  behind  the  enigmatic  words  hypnosis  and  sug- 
gestion. And  I  think  it  can  succeed  in  this  too.  Let 
us  recall  that  hypnosis  has  something  positively  uncanny 
about  it;  but  the  characteristic  of  uncanniness  sug- 
gests something  old  and  familiar  that  has  undergone 
repression.^  Let  us  consider  how  hypnosis  is  induced. 
The  hypnotist  asserts  that  he  is  in  possrjssion  of  a 
mysterious  power  which  robs  the  subject  of  his  own 
will,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  the  subject  believes 
it  of  him.  This  mysterious  power  (which  is  even  now 


1  < 


Das  Unheimliche.'  Imago,  1919,  Bd.  V. 


g6     Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

often  described  popularly  as  animal  magnetism)  must 
be  the  same  that  is  looked  upon  by  primitiv^e  people 
as  the  source  of  taboo,  the  same  that  emanates  from 
kings  and  chieftains  and  makes  it  dangerous  to 
approach  them  (mana).  The  hypnotist,  then,  is  sup- 
posed to  be  in  possession  of  this  power;  and  how 
does  he  manifest  it?  By  telling  the  subject  to  look 
him  in  the  eyes;  his  most  typical  method  of  hypnotising 
is  by  his  look.  But  it  is  precisely  the  sight  of  the 
chieftain  that  is  dangerous  and  unbearable  for  primitive 
people,  just  as  later  that  of  the  Godhead  is  for 
mortals.  Even  Moses  had  to  act  as  an  intermediary 
betw^een  his  people  and  Jehovah,  since  the  people 
could  not  support  the  sight  of  God;  and  when  he 
returned  from  the  presence  of  God  his  face  shone — 
some  of  the  mana  had  been  transferred  on  to  him, 
just  as  happens  with  the  intermediary  among  primitive 
people.^ 

Jt  is  true  that  hypnosis  can  also  be  evoked  in 
other  ways,  for  instance  by  fixing  the  'eyes  upon  a 
bright  object  or  by  listening  to  a  monotonous  sound. 
This  is  misleading  and  has  given  occasion  to  inad- 
equate physiological  theories.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
these  procedures  merely  serve  to  divert  conscious 
attention  and  to  hold  it  riveted.  The  situation  is 
the  same  as  if  the  hypnotist  had  said  to  the  subject: 

^  See  Totem  und  Tabu  and  the  sources  there  quoted. 


The  Group  and  the  Primal  Horde  97 

*  Now  concern  yourself  exclusively  with  my  person; 
the  rest  of  the  world  is  quite  uninteresting. '  It  would 
of  course  be  technically  inexpedient  for  a  hypnotist 
to  make  such  a  speech;  it  would  tear  the  subject 
away  from  his  unconscious  attitude  and  stimulate  him 
to  conscious  opposition.  The  hypnotist  avoids  directing 
the  subject's  conscious  thoughts  towards  his  own 
intentions,  and  makes  the  person  upon  whom  he  is 
experimenting  sink  into  an  activity  in  which  the 
world  is  bound  to  seem  uninteresting  to  him;  but  at 
the  same  time  the  subject  is  in  reality  unconsciously 
concentrating  his  whole  attention  upon  the  hypnotist, 
and  is  getting  into  an  attitude  of  rapport^  of  trans- 
ference on  to  him.  Thus  the  indirect  methods  of 
hypnotising,  like  many  of  the  technical  procedures 
used  in  making  jokes,  have  the  effect  of  checking 
certain  distributions  of  mental  energy  which  would 
interfere  with  the  course  of  events  in  the  unconscious, 
and  they  lead  eventually  to  the  same  result  as  the 
direct  methods  of  influence  by  means  of  staring  or 
stroking.^ 

^  This  situation,  in  which  the  subject's  attitude  is  uncon- 
sciously directed  towards  the  hypnotist,  while  he  is  consciously 
occupied  with  monotonous  and  uninteresting  perceptions,  finds  a 
parallel  among  the  events  of  psycho-analytic  treatment,  which 
deserves  to  be  mentioned  here.  At  least  once  in  the  course  of 
every  analysis  a  moment  comes  when  the  patient  obstinately 
maintains  that  just  now  positively  nothing  whatever  occurs  to 
his   mind.    His  free  associations   come   to   a  stop  and  the   usual 


98      Group  Psychology  and  the  Ayialysis  of  the  Ego 

Ferenczi  has  made  the  true  discovery  that  when 
a  hypnotist  gives  the  command  to  sleep,  which  is 
often  done  at  the  beginning  of  hypnosis,  he  is  putting 
himself  in  the  place  of  the  subject's  parents.  He 
thinks  that  two  sorts  of  hypnosis  are  to  be  distin- 
guished :  one  coaxing  and  soothing,  which  he  con- 
siders is  modelled  upon  the  mother,  and  another 
threatening,  which  is  derived  from  the  father.^  Now 
the  command  to  sleep  in  hypnosis  means  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  an  order  to  withdraw  all  interest 
from  the  world  and  to  concentrate  it  upon  the  person 
of  the  hypnotist.  And  it  is  so  understood  by  the 
subject;  for  in  this  withdrawal  of  interest  from  the 
outer  world  lies  the  psychological  characteristic  of 
sleep,  and  the  kinship  between  sleep  and  the  state  of 
hypnosis  is  based  upon  it. 


incentives  for  putting  them  in  motion  fail  in  their  effect.  As  a  result 
of  pressure  the  patient  is  at  last  induced  to  admit  that  he  is 
thinking  of  the  view  from  the  consulting-room  window,  of  the 
wall-paper  that  he  sees  before  him,  or  of  the  gas-lamp  hanging 
from  the  ceiling.  Then  one  knows  at  once  that  he  has  gone  off 
into  the  transference  and  that  he  is  engaged  upon  what  are  still 
unconscious  thoughts  relating  to  the  physician;  and  one  sees  the 
stoppage  in  the  patient's  associations  disappear,  as  soon  as  he  has 
been  given  this  explanation. 

^  Ferenczi:  *  Introjektion  und  Ubertragung.'  Jahrbuch  der 
Psycho  analyse^  1909,  Bd.  I.  [Contridjitions  to  Psycho- Analysis. 
Boston,  Badger,  1916,  Chapter  II.] 


The  Group  and  the  Primal  Horde  99 

By  the  measures  that  he  takes,  then,  the  hyp- 
notist awakens  in  the  subject  a  portion  of  his  archaic 
inheritance  which  had  also  made  him  compliant  to- 
wards his  parents  and  which  had  experienced  an 
individual  re-animation  in  his  relation  to  his  father; 
what  is  thus  awakened  is '  the  idea  of  a  paramount 
and  dangerous  personality,  towards  whom  only  a 
passive-masochistic  attitude  is  possible,  to  whom  one's 
will  has  to  be  surrendered, — while  to  be  alone  with 
him,  'to  look  him  in  the  face',  appears  a  hazardous 
enterprise.  It  is  only  in  some  such  way  as  this  that 
we  can  picture  the  relation  of  the  individual  member 
of  the  primal  horde  to  the  primal  father.  As  we 
know  from  other  reactions,  individuals  have  preserved 
a  variable  degree  of  personal  aptitude  for  reviving 
old  situations  of  this  kind.  Some  knowledge  that  in 
spite  of  everything  hypnosis  is  only  a  game,  a  decep- 
tive renewal  of  these  old  impressions,  may  however 
remain  behind  and  take  care  that  there  is  a  resist- 
ance against  any  too  serious  consequences  of  the 
suspension  of  the  will  in  hypnosis. 

The  uncanny  and  coercive  characteristics  of  group 
formations,  which  are  shown  in  their  suggestion 
phenomena,  may  therefore  with  justice  be  traced 
back  to  the  fact  of  their  origin  from  the  primal 
horde.  The  leader  of  the  group  is  still  J:h_e,  dreaded 
primal  father;  the  group  still  wishes  to  be  governed 
by  unrestricted  force:  it  has   an   extreme  passion   for 

.—  mil   ^11      1    ■—nil    .  ^-_^— ^^^,^ 


/ 


lOO    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

authority;  in  Le  Bon's  phrase,  it  has  a  thirst  for 
obedience.  The  primal  father  is  the  group  ideal, 
which  governs  the  ego  in  the  place  of  the  ego  ideal. 
Hypnosis  has  a  good  claim  to  being  described  as  a 
group  of  two;  there  remains  as  a  definition  for 
suggestion — a  conviction  which  is  not  based  upon 
perception  and  reasoning  but  upon  an  erotic  tie.^ 

*  It  seems  to  me  worth  emphasizing  the  fact  that  the  dis- 
cussions in  this  section  have  induced  us  to  give  up  Bernheim's 
conception  of  hypnosis  and  go  back  to  the  ndif  earlier  one. 
According  to  Bernheim  all  hypnotic  phenomena  are  to  be  traced 
to  the  factor  of  suggestion,  which  is  not  itself  capable  of  further 
explanation.  We  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  suggestion  is 
a  partial  manifestation  of  the  state  of  hypnosis,  and  that  hypnosis 
is  solidly  founded  upon  a  predisposition  which  has  survived  in  the 
unconscious  from  the  early  history  of  the  human  family. 


XI 

A  DIFFERENTIATING  GRADE  IN  THE  EGO 


If  we  survey  the  life  of  an  individual  man  of 
to-day,  bearing  in  mind  the  mutually  complementary 
accoimts  of  group  psychology  given  by  the  authorities, 
we  may  lose  the  courage,  in  face  of  the  complications 
that  are  revealed,  to  attempt  a  comprehensive  ex- 
position. Each  individual  is  a  component  part  of 
numerous  groups,  he  is  bound  by  ties  of  identification 
in  many  directions,  and  he  has  built  up  his  ego  ideal 
upon  the  most  various  models.  Each  individual  therefore  / 
has  a  share  in  numerous  group  minds — those  of  his  race,  / 
of  his  class,  of  his  creed,  of  his  nationality,  etc.— and 
he  can  also  raise  himself  above  them  to  the  extent 
of  having  a  scrap  of  independence  and  originality. 
Such  stable  and  lasting  group  formations,  with  their 
uniform  and  constant  effects,  are  less  striking  to  an 
observer  than  the  rapidly  formed  and  transient  groups 
from  which  Le  Bon  has  made  his  brilliant  psycho- 
logical character  sketch  of  the  group  mind.  And  it  is 
just  in  these  noisy  ephemeral  groups,  which  are  as  it 


1 02    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

were  superimposed  upon  the  others,  that  we  are  met 
by  the  prodigy  of  the  complete,,  even  though  only 
temporary,  disappearance  of  exactly  what  we  have 
recognized  as  individual  acquirements. 

We  have  interpreted  this  prodigy  as  meaning 
that  the  individual  gives  up  his  ego  ideal  and  substi- 
tutes for  it  the  group  ideal  as  embodied  in  the 
leader.  And  we  must  add  by  way  of  correction 
that  the  prodigy  is  not   equally   great   in   every   case. 

/  In  many  individuals   the   separation   between   the   ego 

(  and  the  ego  ideal  is  not  very  far  advanced;  the  two 
still  coincide  readily;  the  ego  has  often  preserved  its 
earlier  self-complacency.  The  selection  of  the  leader 
is  very  much  facilitated  by  this  circumstance.  He 
need  only  possess  the  typical  qualities  of  the  individ- 
uals concerned  in  a  particularly  clearly  marked  and 
pure  form,  and  need  only  give  an  impression  of 
greater  force  and  of  more  freedom  of  libido;    and  in 

\  that  case  the  need  for  a  strong  chief  will  often  meet 
him  half-way  and  invest  him  with  a  predominance  to 
which  he  would  otherwise  perhaps  have  had  no  claim. 
The  other  members  of  the  group,  whose  ego  ideal 
would  not,   apart  from   this,    have   become   embodied 

I  in  his  person  without  some  correction,  are  then 
carried  away  with  the  rest  by  ^suggestion',  that  is 
to  say,  by  means  of  identification. 

We  are  aware  that  what  we  have  been  able  to 
contribute    towards    the    explanation    of    the    libidinal 


A  Differentiating  Grade  in  the  Ego  103 

structure  of  groups  leads  back  to  the  distinction 
between  the  ego  and  the  ego  ideal  and  to  the 
double  kind  of  tie  which  this  makes  possible — identi- 
fication, and  substitution  of  the  object  for  the  ego 
ideal.  The  assumption  of  this  kind  of  differentiating 
grade  \Stufe\  in  the  ego  as  a  first  step  in  an 
analysis  of  the  ego  must  gradually  establish  its  justifi- 
cation in  the  most  various  regions  of  psychology.  In 
my  paper  *  Zur  Einfiihrung  des  Narzissmus '  I  have  put 
together  all  the  pathological  material  that  could  at  the 
moment  be  used  in  support  of  this  separation.  But  it 
may  be  expected  that  when  we  penetrate  deeper 
into  the  psycholog}^  of  the  psychoses  its  significance 
will  be  discovered  to  be  far  greater.  Let  us  reflect 
that  the  ego  now  appears  in  the  relation  of  an  object 
to  the  ego  ideal  which  has  been  developed  out  of 
it,  and  that  all  the  interplay  between  an  outer  object 
and  the  ego  as  a  whole,  with  which  our  study  of  the 
neuroses  has  made  us  acquainted,  may  possibly  be 
repeated  upon  this  new  scene  of  action  inside  the  ego. 

In  this  place  I  shall  only  follow  up  one  of  the 
consequences  which  seem  possible  from  this  point  of 
view,  thus  resuming  the  discussion  of  a  problem 
which  I  was  obliged  to  leave  unsolved  elsewhere.* 
Each  of  the  mental  differentiations  that  we  have 
become  acquainted  with  represents  a  fresh  aggravation 
of   the    difficulties  of  mental  functioning,    increases  its 

*  *Trauer  und  MelanchoUe.* 


1 04    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

instability,  and  may  become  the  starting-point  for  its 
breakdown,  that  is,  for  the  onset  of  a  disease.  Thus, 
by  being  bom  we  have  made  the  step  from  an  ab- 
solutely self-sufficient  narcissism  to  the  perception  of 
a  changing  outer  world  and  to  the  beginnings  of  the 
discovery  of  objects.  And  with  this  is  associated  the 
fact  that  we  cannot  endure  the  new  state  of  things 
for  long,  that  we  periodically  revert  from  it,  in  our 
sleep,  to  our  former  condition  of  absence  of  stimul- 
ation and  avoidance  of  objects.  It  is  true,  however, 
that  in  this  we  are  following  a  hint  from  the  outer 
world,  which,  by  means  of  the  periodical  change  of 
day  and  night,  temporarily  withdraws  the  greater  part 
of  the  stimuli  that  affect  us.  The  second  example, 
which  is  pathologically  more  important,  is  not  subject 
to  any  such  qualification.  In  the  course  of  our 
development  we  have  effected  a  separation  of  our 
mental  existence  into  a  coherent  ego  and  into  an 
unconscious  and  repressed  portion  which  is  left  outside 
it;  and  we  know  that  the  stability  of  this  new  acquis- 
ition is  exposed  to  constant  shocks.  In  dreams  and 
/in  neuroses  what  is  thus  excluded  knocks  for  admission 
at  the  gates,  guarded  though  they  are  by  resistances; 
and  in  our  waking  health  we  make  use  of  special 
artifices  for  allowing  what  is  repressed  to  circumvent 
the  resistances  and  for  receiving  it  temporarily  into 
our  ego  to  the  increase  of  our  pleasure.  Wit  and 
humour,  and   to   some   extent   the   comic   in   general, 


A  Differentiating  Grade  in  the  Ego  105 

may  be  regarded  in  this  light.  Everyone  acquainted 
with  the  psychology  of  the  neuroses  will  think  of 
similar  examples  of  less  importance;  but  I  hasten  on 
to  the  application  I  have  in  view. 

It  is  quite  conceivable  that  the  separation  of  the 
ego  ideal  from  the  ego  cannot  be  borne  for  long 
either,  and  has  to  be  temporarily  undone.  In  all 
renunciations  and  limitations  imposed  upon  the  ego 
a  periodical  infringement  of  the  prohibition  is  the  rule; 
this  indeed  is  shown  by  the  institution  of  festivals, 
which  in  origin  are  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
excesses  provided  by  law  and  which  owe  their  cheerful 
character  to  the  release  which  they  bring.^  The 
Saturnalia  of  the  Romans  and  our  modern  carnival 
agree  in  this  essential  feature  with  the  festivals  of 
primitive  people,  which  usually  end  in  debaucheries 
of  every  kind  and  the  transgression  of  what  are  at 
other  times  the  most  sacred  commandments.  But  the 
ego  ideal  comprises  the  sum  of  all  the  limitations  in 
which  the  ego  has  to  acquiesce,  and  for  that  reason 
the  abrogation  of  the  ideal  would  necessarily  be  a 
magnificent  festival  for  the  ego,  which  might  then 
once  again  feel  satisfied  with  itself.^ 

*  Totem  und  Tabu. 

^  Trotter  traces  repression  back  to  the  herd  instinct.  It  is 
a  translation  of  this  into  another  form  of  expression  rather  than 
a  contradiction  when  I  say  in  my  'Einfiihrung  des  Narzissmus' 
that  on  the  part  of  the  ego  the  construction  of  an  ideal  is  the 
condition  of  repression. 

H 


1 06    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

There  is  always  a  feeling  of  triumph  when 
something  in  the  ego  coincides  with  the  ego  ideal. 
And  the  sense  of  guilt  (as  well  as  the  sense  ot 
inferiority)  can  also  be  understood  as  an  expression 
of  tension  between  the  ego  and  the  ego  ideal. 

It  is  well  known  that  there  are  people  the  general 
colour  of  whose  mood  oscillates  periodically  from  an 
excessive  depression  through  some  kind  of  intermediate  | 
state  to  an  exalted  sense  of  well-being.  These  oscill- 
ations appear  in  very  different  degrees  of  amplitude, 
from  what  is  just  noticeable  to  those  extreme  instances 
which,  in  the  shape  of  melancholia  and  mania,  make 
the  most  painful  or  disturbing  inroads  upon  the  life 
of  the  person  concerned.  In  t}^pical  cases  of  this 
cyclical  depression  outer  exciting  causes  do  not  seem 
to  play  any  decisive  part;  as  regards  inner  motives, 
nothing  more  (or  nothing  different)  is  to  be  found  in 
these  patients  than  in  all  others.  It  has  consequently 
become  the  custom  to  consider  these  cases  as  not 
being  psychogenic.  We  shall  refer  later  on  to  those  j 
other  exactly  similar  cases  of  cyclical  depression  which 
can  nevertheless  easily  be  traced  back  to  mental 
traumata. 

Thus  the  foundation  of  these  spontaneous  oscill- 
ations of  mood  is  unknown;  we  are  without  insight 
into  the  mechanism  of  the  displacement  of  a  melan- 
cholia by  a  mania.  So  we  are  free  to  suppose  that, 
these    patients    are    people    in    whom    our    conjecture 


A  Differentiating  Grade  in  the  Ego  107 


\ 


might  find  an  actual  application — their  ego  ideal  might 
be    temporarily   resolved    into   their   ego    after   having  , 
previously  ruled  it  with  especial  strictness.  ) 

Let  us  keep  to  what  is  clear :  On  the  basis  of  our^ 
analysis  of  the  ego  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  in  cases 
of  mania  the  ego  and  the  ego  ideal  have  fused 
together,  so  that  the  person,  in  a  mood  of  triumph 
and  self-satisfaction,  disturbed  by  no  self-criticism,  can 
enjoy  the  abolition  of  his  inhibitions,  his  feelings  of 
consideration  for  others,  and  his  self-reproaches.  It 
is  not  so  obvious,  but  nevertheless  very  probable,  that 
the  misery  of  the  melancholiac  is  the  expression  of  a 
sharp  conflict  between  the  two  faculties  of  his  ego, 
a  conflict  in  which  the  ideal,  in  an  excess  of  sen-  | 
sitiveness,  relentlessly  exhibits  its  condemnation  of  the  ^ 
ego  in  delusions  of  inferiority  and  in  self-depreciation. 
The  only  question  is  whether  we  are  to  look  for  the 
causes  of  these  altered  relations  between  the  ego  and 
the  ego  ideal  in  the  periodic  rebellions,  which  we 
have  postulated  above,  against  the  new  institution,  or 
whether  we  are  to  make  other  circumstances  respon- 
sible for  them. 

A  change  into  mania  is  not  an  indispensable 
feature  of  the  symptomatology  of  melancholic  depres- 
sion. There  are  simple  melancholias,  some  in  single 
and  some  in  recurring  attacks,  which  never  show  this 
development.  On  the  other  hand  there  are  melancholias 
in  which  the  exciting  cause  clearly  plays  an  aetiological 


1 08    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

part.  They  are  those  which  occur  after  the  loss  of 
a  loved  object,  whether  by  death  or  as  a  result  of 
circumstances  which  have  necessitated  the  withdrawal 
of  the  libido  from  the  object.  A  psychogenic  melan- 
cholia of  this  sort  can  end  in  mania,  and  this  cycle 
can  be  repeated  several  times,  just  as  easily  as  in  a 
case  which  appears  to  be  spontaneous.  Thus  the 
state  of  things  is  somewhat  obscure,  especially  as  only 
a  few  forms  and  cases  of  melancholia  have  been 
submitted  to  psycho-analytical  investigation.^  So  far 
we  only  understand  those  cases  in  which  the  object 
is  given  up  because  it  has  shown  itself  unworthy  of 
love.  It  is  then  set  up  again  inside  the  ego,  by 
means  of  identification,  and  severely  condemned  by 
the  ego  ideal.  The  reproaches  and  attacks  directed 
towards  the  object  come  to  light  in  the  shape  of 
melancholic  self-reproaches.^ 

A  melancholia  of  this  kind  may  also  end  in  a 
change  to  mania;  so  that  the  possibility  of  this  happ- 
ening represents  a  feature  which  is  independent  of 
the  other  characteristics  in  the  symptomatology. 

*  Cf.  Abraham:  'Ansatze  zur  psychoanalytischen  Erforschung 
und  Behandliing  des  manisch-depressiven  Irreseins',  191 2,  in 
Klinische  Beitrdge  zur  Psychoanalyse,   192 1. 

^  To  speak  more  accurately,  they  conceal  themselves  behind 
the  reproaches  directed  towards  the  person's  own  ego,  and  lend 
them  the  fixity,  tenacity,  and  imperativeness  which  characterize 
the  self-reproaches  oi  a  melancholiac. 


A  Differentiating  Grade  in  the  Ego  109 

Nevertheless   I   see   no    difficulty    in   assigning   to 
the    factor    of    the    periodical    rebellion    of   the    ego 
against  the   ego  ideal   a  share  in  both  kinds  of  mel- 
ancholia, the  psychogenic  as  well  as  the  spontaneous. 
In    the    spontaneous    kind    it    may   be   supposed   that 
the  ego  ideal  is  inclined  to  display  a  peculiar  strictness, 
which    then    results    automatically    in    its    temporary 
suspension.     In  the  psychogenic  kind  the   ego  would  7 
be  incited  to  rebellion  by  ill-treatment  on  the  part  of  / 
its  ideal — an    ill-treatment  which  it    encounters  when  \ 
there  has  been  identification  with  a  rejected  object.  j 


XII 

POSTSCRIPT 


In  the  course  of  the  enquiry  which  has  just  been 
brought  to  a  provisional  end  we  came  across  a  number 
of  side-paths  w^hich  we  avoided  pursuing  in  the  first 
instance  but  in  which  there  was  much  that  offered 
us  promises  of  insight.  We  propose  now  to  take  up 
a  few  of  the  points  that  have  been  left  on  one  side 
in  this  way. 

A.  The  distinction  between  identification  of  the 
ego  with  an  object  and  replacement  of  the  ego  ideal 
by  an  object  finds  an  interesting  illustration  in  the 
two  great  artificial  groups  which  we  began  by  studying, 
the  army  and  the  Christian  church. 

It  is  obvious  that  a  soldier  takes  his  superior, 
that  is,  really,  the  leader  of  the  army,  as  his  ideal, 
while  he  identifies  himself  with  his  equals,  and  derives 
from  this  community  of  their  egos  the  obligations  for 
giving  mutual  help  and  for  sharing  possessions  which 
comradeship  implies.  But  he  becomes  ridiculous  if 
he    tries    to    identify   himself  with    the    general.     The 


I 


Postscript  III 

soldier   in   Wallensteins  Lager  laughs  at  the  sergeant 
for  this  very  reason: 

Wie  er  rauspert  und  wie  er  spuckt, 
Das  habt  ihr  ihm  gliicklich  abgeguckt  !  ^ 

It  is  otherwise  in  the  Catholic  Church.  Every 
Christian  loves  Christ  as  his  ideal  and  feels  himself 
united  with  all  other  Christians  by  the  tie  of  identific- 
ation. But  the  Church  requires  more  of  him.  He 
has  also  to  identify  himself  with  Christ  and  love  all 
other  Christians  as  Christ  loved  them.  At  both  points, 
therefore,  the  Church  requires  that  the  position  of 
the  libido  which  is  given  by  a  group  formation  should 
be  supplemented.  Identification  has  to  be  added 
where  object-choice  has  taken  place,  and  object  love 
where  there  is-  identification.  This  addition  evidently 
goes  beyond  the  constitution  of  the  group.  One  can 
be  a  good  Christian  and  yet  be  far  from  the  idea 
of  putting  oneself  in  Christ's  place  and  of  having  like 
him  an  all-embracing  love  for  mankind.  One  need 
not  think  oneself  capable,  weak  mortal  that  one  is, 
of  the  Saviour's  largeness  of  soul  and  strength  of 
love.  But  this  further  development  in  the  distribution 
of  libido  in  the  group  is  probably  the  factor  upon 
which  Christianity  bases  its  claim  to  have  reached  a 
higher  ethical  level. 

^  [Literally:   *How  he   clears  his   throat  and  how  he  spits, 
that  you  have  cleverly  copied  from  him,'] 


1 1 2    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

B.  We  have  said  that  it  would  be  possible  to 
specify  the  point  in  the  mental  development  of  man 
at  which  the  advance  from  group  to  individual  psycho- 
logy was  also  achieved  by  the  individual  members 
of  the  group/ 

For  this  purpose  we  must  return  for  a  moment 
to  the  scientific  myth  of  the  father  of  the  primal 
horde.  He  was  later  on  exalted  into  the  creator  of 
the  world,  and  with  justice,  for  he  had  produced  all 
the  sons  who  composed  the  first  group.  He  was  the 
ideal  of  each  one  of  them,  at  once  feared  and 
honoured,  a  fact  which  led  later  to  the  idea  of  taboo. 
These  many  individuals  eventually  banded  themselves 
together,  killed  him  and  cut  him  in  pieces.  None 
of  the  group  of  victors  could  take  his  place,  or, 
if  one  of  them  did,  the  battles  began  afresh,  until 
they  understood  that  they  must  all  renounce  their 
father's  heritage.  They  then  formed  the  totemistic 
community  of  brothers,  all  with  equal  rights  and 
united  by  the  totem  prohibitions  which  were  to 
preserve  and  to  expiate  the  memory  of  the  murder. 
But  the  dissatisfaction  with  what  had  been  achieved 
still  remained,  and  it  became  the  source  of  new 
developments.  The  persons  who  were  united  in  this 
group   of  brothers   gradually   came  towards   a  revival 


^  What  follows  at  this  point  was  written  under  the  influence 
of  an  exchange  of  ideas  with  Otto  Rank. 


Postscript  113 

of  the  old  state  of  things  at  a  new  level.  Man 
became  once  more  the  chief  of  a  family,  and  broke 
down  the  prerogatives  of  the  gynaecocracy  which  had 
become  established  during  the  fatherless  period.  As 
a  compensation  for  this  he  may  at  that  time  have 
acknowledged  the  mother  deities,  whose  priests  were 
castrated  for  the  mother's  protection,  after  the  example 
that  had  been  given  by  the  father  of  the  primal 
horde.  And  yet  the  new  family  was  only  a  shadow 
of  the  old  one;  there  were  numbers  of  fathers  and 
each  one  was  limited  by  the  rights  of  the  others. 

It  was  then,  perhaps,  that  some  individual,  in 
the  exigency  of  his  longing,  may  have  been  moved 
to  free  himself  from  the  group  and  take  over  the 
father's  part.  He  who  did  this  was  the  first  epic 
poet;  and  the  advance  was  achieved  in  his  imagination. 
This  poet  disguised  the  truth  with  lies  in  accordance 
with  his  longing.  He  invented  the  heroic  myth.  The 
hero  was  a  man  who  by  himself  had  slain  the  father 
— the  father  who  still  appeared  in  the  myth  as  a 
totemistic  monster.  Just  as  the  father  had  been  the 
boy's  first  ideal,  so  in  the  hero  who  aspires  to  the 
father's  place  the  poet  now  created  the  first  ego 
ideal.  The  transition  to  the  hero  was  probably 
afforded  by  the  youngest  son,  the  mother's  favourite, 
whom  she  had  protected  from  paternal  jealousy,  and 
who,  in  the  era  of  the  primal  horde,  had  been  the 
father's    successor.     In    the    lying    poetic    fancies    of 


114    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

prehistoric  times  the  woman,  who  had  been  the  prize 
of  battle  and  the  allurement  to  murder,  was  probably- 
turned  into  the  seducer  and  instigator  to  the  crime. 

The  hero  claims  to  have  acted  alone  in  accom- 
plishing the  deed,  which  certainly  only  the  horde  as  a 
whole  would  have  ventured  upon.  But,  as  Rank  has 
observed,  fairy  tales  have  preserved  clear  traces  of 
the  facts  which  were  disavowed.  For  we  often  find 
in  them  that  the  hero  who  has  to  carry  out  some 
difficult  task  (usually  a  youngest  son,  and  not  in- 
frequently one  who  has  represented  himself  to  the 
father  surrogate  as  being  stupid,  that  is  to  say, 
harmless) — we  often  find,  then,  that  this  hero  can 
carry  out  his  task  only  by  the  help  of  a  crowd  of 
small  animals,  such  as  bees  or  ants.  These  would 
be  the  brothers  in  the  primal  horde,  just  as  in  the 
same  way  in  dream  symbolism  insects  or  vermin 
signify  brothers  and  sisters  (contemptuously,  considered 
as  babies).  Moreover  every  one  of  the  tasks  in 
myths  and  fairy  tales  is  easily  recognisable  as  a 
substitute  for  the  heroic  deed. 

The  myth,  then,  is  the  step  by  which  the 
individual  emerges  from  group  psychology.  The  first 
myth  was  certainly  the  psychological,  the  hero  m)^h; 
the  explanatory  nature  myth  must  have  followed  much 
later.  The  poet  who  had  taken  this  step  and  had 
in  this  way  set  himself  free  from  the  group  in  his 
imagination,  is  nevertheless  able  (as  Rank  has  further 


Postscript  115 

observed)  to  find  his  way  back  to  it  in  reality.  For 
he  goes  and  relates  to  the  group  his  hero's  deeds 
which  he  has  invented.  At  bottom  this  hero  is  no 
one  but  himself.  Thus  he  lowers  himself  to  the  level 
of  reality,  and  raises  his  hearers  to  the  level  of 
imagination.  But  his  hearers  understand  the  poet, 
and,  in  virtue  of  their  having  the  same  relation  of 
longing  towards  the  primal  father,  they  can  identify 
themselves  with  the  hero.^ 

The  lie  of  the  heroic  myth  culminates  in  the 
deification  of  the  hero.  Perhaps  the  deified  hero 
may  have  been  earlier  than  the  Father  God  and 
may  have  been  a  precursor  to  the  return  of  the 
primal  father  as  a  deity.  The  series  of  gods,  then, 
would  run  chronologically:  Mother  Goddess — Hero — 
Father  God.  But  it  is  only  with  the  elevation  of  the 
never  forgotten  primal  father  that  the  deity  acquires 
the  features  that  we  still  recognise  in  him  to-day.^ 

C.  A  great  deal  has  been  said  in  this  paper  about 
directly  sexual  instincts  and  those  that  are  inhibited 

*  Cf»  Hanns  Sachs:  *Gemeinsame  Tagtraume*,  a  summary 
made  by  the  lecturer  himself  of  a  paper  read  at  the  Sixth  Psycho- 
analytical Congress,  held  at  the  Ha^e  in  1920.  Internationale 
Zeitschrift  fiir  Psychoanalyse,  1920,  Bd.  VI.  ['Day-Dreams  in 
Common'.  International  Journal  of  Psycho- Analysis,   1 920,  Vol.  I.] 

^  In  this  brief  exposition  I  have  made  no  attempt  to  bring 
forward  any  of  the  material  existing  in  legends,  myths,  fairy  tales, 
the  history  of  manners,  etc.,  in  support  of  the  construction. 


1 1 6    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

in  their  aims,  and  it  may  be  hoped  that  this  distinction 
will  not  meet  with  too  much  resistance.  But  a 
detailed  discussion  of  the  question  will  not  be  out  of 
place,  even  if  it  only  repeats  what  has  to  a  great 
extent  already  been  said  before. 

The  development  of  the  libido  in  children  has 
made  us  acquainted  with  the  first  but  also  tlie  best 
example  of  sexual  instincts  which  are  inhibited  in  their 
aims.  All  the  feelings  which  a  child  has  towards  its 
parents  and  those  who  look  after  it  pass  by  an  easy 
transition  into  the  wishes  which  gw^  expression  to 
the  child's  sexual  tendencies.  The  child  claims  from 
these  objects  of  its  love  all  the  signs  of  affection 
which  it  knows  of;  it  wants  to  kiss  them,  touch  them, 
and  look  at  them;  it  is  curious  to  see  their  genitals, 
and  to  be  with  them  when  they  perform  their  intimate 
excremental  functions;  it  promises  to  marry  its  mother 
or  nurse — w^hatever  it  may  understand  by  that;  it 
proposes  to  itself  to  bear  its  father  a  child,  etc.  Direct 
observation,  as  well  as  the  subsequent  analytic  investi- 
gation of  the  residue  of  childhood,  leave  no  doubt 
as'  to  the  complete  fusion  of  tender  and  jealous 
feelings  and  of  sexual  intentions,  and  show  us  in 
what  a  fundamental  way  the  child  makes  the  person 
it  loves  into  the  object  of  all  its  incompletely  centred 
sexual  tendencies.^ 

*  Cf.  Drei  Abkandlungen  zur  Sexualtheorie. 


Postscript  1 1 7 

This  first  configuration  of  the  child's  love,  which  in 
typical  cases  is  co-ordinated  with  the  Oedipus  complex, 
succumbs,  as  we  know,  from  the  beginning  of  the  period 
of  latency  onwards  to  a  wave  of  repression.  Such  ot 
it  as  is  left  over  shows  itself  as  a  purely  tender 
emotional  tie,  which  relates  to  the  same  people,  but 
is  no  longer  to  be  described  as  ^sexual'.  Psycho- 
analysis, which  illuminates  the  depths  of  mental  life, 
has  no  difficulty  in  showing  that  the  sexual  ties  of 
the  earliest  years  of  childhood  also  persist,  though 
repressed  and  unconscious.  It  gives  us  courage  to 
assert  that  wherever  we  come  across  a  tender  feeling 
it  is  the  successor  to  a  completely  ^sensual'  object 
tie  with  the  person  in  question  or  rather  with  that 
person's  prototype  (or  imago).  It  cannot  indeed 
disclose  to  us  without  a  special  investigation  whether 
in  a  given  case  this  former  complete  sexual  current 
still  exists  under  repression  or  whether  it  has  already 
been  exhausted.  To  put  it  still  more  precisely:  it  is 
quite  certain  that  it  is  still  there  as  a  form  and 
possibility,  and  can  always  be  charged  with  cathectic 
energy  and  put  into  activity  again  by  means  of 
regression;  the  only  question  is  (and  it  cannot  always 
be  answered)  what  degree  of  cathexis  and  operative 
force  it  still  has  at  the  present  moment.  Equal  care 
must  be  taken  in  this  connection  to  avoid  two  sources 
of  error— the  Scylla  of  under-estimating  the  importance 
of  the   repressed   unconscious,    and  the  Charybdis  of 


1 1 8    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

judging  the  normal  entirely  by  the  standards  of  the 
pathological. 

A  psychology  which  will  not  or  cannot  penetrate 
the  depths  of  what  is  repressed  regards  tender 
emotional  ties  as  being  invariably  the  expression  of 
tendencies  which  have  no  sexual  aim,  even  though 
they  are  derived  from  tendencies  which  have  such 
an  aim.^ 

We  are  justified  in  saying  that  they  have  been 
diverted  from  these  sexual  aims,  even  though  there 
is  some  difficulty  in  giving  a  representation  of  such 
a  diversion  of  aim  which  will  conform  to  the 
requirements  of  metapsychology.  Moreover,  those 
instincts  which  are  inhibited  in  their  aims  always 
preserve  some  few  of  their  original  sexual  aims;  even 
an  affectionate  devotee,  even  a  friend  or  an  admirer, 
desires  the  physical  proximity  and  the  sight  of  the 
person  who  is  now  loved  only  in  the  ^Pauline'  sense. 
If  we  choose,  we  may  recognise  in  this  diversion  of 
aim  a  beginning  of  the  sublimation  of  the  sexual 
instincts,  or  on  the  other  hand  we  may  fix  the  limits 
of  sublimation  at  some  more  distant  point.  Those 
sexual  instincts  which  are  inhibited  in  their  aims  have 
a  great  functional  advantage  over  those  which  are 
uninhibited.     Since    they    are    not    capable    of    really 


^  Hostile  feeling^s,   which  are  a  little  more  complicated  in 
their  construction,  offer  no  exception  to  this  rule. 


I 


Postscript  1 1 9 

complete  satisfaction,  they  are  especially  adapted  to 
create  permanent  ties;  while  those  instincts  which  are 
directly  sexual  incur  a  loss  of  energy  each  time  they 
are  satisfied,  and  must  wait  to  be  renewed  by  a 
fresh  accumulation  of  sexual  libido,  so  that  mean- 
while the  object  may  have  been  changed.  The 
inhibited  instincts  are  capable  of  any  degree  of 
admixture  with  the  uninhibited;  they  can  be  trans- 
formed back  into  them,  just  as  they  arose  out  of 
them.  It  is  well  known  how  easily  erotic  wishes 
develop  out  of  emotional  relations  of  a  friendly 
character,  based  upon  appreciation  and  admiration, 
(compare  Moliere's  'Embrassez-moi  pour  I'amour  du 
grec'),  between  a  master  and  a  pupil,  between  a 
performer  and  a  delighted  listener,  and  especially  in 
the  case  of  women.  In  fact  the  growth  of  emotional 
ties  of  this  kind,  with  their  purposeless  beginnings, 
provides  a  much  frequented  pathway  to  sexual  object- 
choice.  Pfister,  in  his  Frommigkeit  des  Graf  en  von 
Zinzendorf^  has  given  an  extremely  clear  and  certainly 
not  an  isolated  example  of  how  easily  even  an 
intense  religious  tie  can  revert  to  ardent  sexual 
excitement.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  also  very  usual 
for  directly  sexual  tendencies,  short-lived  in  themselves, 
to  be  transformed  into  a  lasting  and  purely  tender  tie; 

^  [Sckri/ten  zur  angewandten  Seelenkunde.  Heft  8.  Vienna, 
Deuticke;  1910.] 


1 20    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

and  the  consolidation  of  a  passionate  love  marriage 
rests  to  a  large  extent  upon  this  process. 

We  shall  naturally  not  be  surprised  to  hear  that 
the  sexual  tendencies  that  are  inhibited  in  their  aims 
arise  out  of  the  directly  sexual  ones  when  inner  or 
outer  obstacles  make  the  sexual  aims  unattainable. 
The  repression  during  the  period  of  latency  is  an 
inner  obstacle  of  this  kind — or  rather  one  which  has 
become  inner.  We  have  assumed  that  the  father  of 
the  primal  horde  owing  to  his  sexual  intolerance 
compelled  all  his  sons  to  be  abstinent,  and  thus 
forced  them  into  ties  that  were  inhibited  in  their 
aims,  while  he  reserved  for  himself  freedom  of  sexual 
enjoyment  and  in  this  way  remained  without  ties.  All 
the  ties  upon  which  a  group  depends  are  of  the 
character  of  instincts  that  are  inhibited  in  their  aims. 
But  here  we  have  approached  the  discussion  of  a 
new  subject,  which  deals  with  the  relation  between 
directly  sexual  instincts  and  the  formation  of  groups. 

D.  The  last  two  remarks  will  have  prepared  us 
for  finding  that  directly  sexual  tendencies  are  unfavour- 
able to  -the^ior^nation  jdI  _groups.  In  the  history  of 
the  development  of  the  family  there  have  also,  it 
is  true,  been  group  relations  of  sexual  love  (group 
marriages);  but  the  more  important  sexual  love 
became  for  the  ego,  and  the  more  it  developed  the 
characteristics  of  being  in  love,  the  more  urgently  it 
required     to    be    limited    to    two    people — una    cum 


Postscript  1 2  I 

uno — as  is  prescribed  by  the  nature  of  the  genital 
aim.  Polygamous  inclinations  had  to  be  content  to 
find  satisfaction  in  a  succession  of  changing  objects. 

Twe-^eople  coming— together  ior-  the  purpose  of 
sgxuaLaatisfaction, ,  in  so  far  as  they  seek-  for  solitii(ie, 
are^jnakiDg  a  dernQnstratiQa.,against  the  herd  instinct,, 
the  group  feeling.  Xhe— more-4h€y-~  are  in-Joai^^jthe 
more  completely  they  suffice  for  each  other.  The 
rejection  of  the  group's  influence  is  manifested  in  the 
shape  of  a  sense  of  shame.  The  extremely  violent 
feelings  of  jealousy  are  sutnmoned  up  in  order  to 
protect  the  sexual  object-choice  from  being  encroached 
upon  by  a  group  tie.  It  is  only—whea  the  tender^ 
that  Js^-thf^  personal,  factQr__Qf_a  love  relation  gives 
place  entir£ly,„tQ..  the  sensual   QQ£^__thaluit-is  possible 

for   two    people-Jt£X  have  sexual intercourse    in    the 

presence  of  ^thers  or  for  there  to  be  simultaneous 
sexual  acts  in  a  group  as  occurs  at  an  orgy.  But  at 
that  point  a  regression  has  taken  place  to  an  early 
stage  in  sexual  relations,  at  which  being  in  love  as 
yet  played  no  part,  and  all  sexual  objects  were 
judged  to  be  of  equal  value,  somewhat  in  the  sense 
of  Bernard  Shaw's  malicious  aphorism  to  the  effect 
that  being  in  love  means  greatly  exaggerating  the 
difference  between  one  woman  and  another. 

There  are  abundant  indications  that  being  in 
love  only  made  its  appearance  late  on  in  the  sexual 
relations    between    men    and    women:    so    that    the 


122    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

opposition  between  sexual  love  and  group  ties  is  also 
a  late  development.  Now  it  may  seem  as  though 
this  assumption  were  incompatible  with  our  myth  of 
the  primal  family.  For  it  was  after  all  by  their  love 
for  their  mothers  and  sisters  that  the  troop  of 
brothers  was,  as  we  have  supposed,  driven  to 
parricide;  and  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  this  love  as 
being  anything  but  unbroken  and  primitive — that  is, 
as  an  intimate  union  of  the  tender  and  the  sensual. 
But  further  consideration  resolves  this  objection  into 
a  confirmation.  One  of  the  reactions  to  the  parricide 
was  after  all  the  institution  of  totemistic  exogamy, 
the  prohibition  of  any  sexual  relation  with  those 
women  of  the  family  who  had  been  tenderly  loved 
since  childhood.  In  this  way  a  wedge  was  driven  in 
between  a  man's  tender  and  sensual  feelings,  one  still 
firmly  fixed  in  his  erotic  life  to-day.^  As  a  result  ot 
this  exogamy  the  sensual  needs  of  men  had  to  be 
satisfied  with  strange  and  unloved  women. 

In  the  great  artificial  groups,  the  church  and  the 
army,  there  is  no  room  for  woman  as  a  sexual 
object.  The  love  relation  between  men  and  women 
remains  outside  these  organisations.  Even  where 
groups  are  formed  which  are  composed  of  both  men 
and  women  the  distinction  between  the  sexes  plays 
no  part.  There  is  scarcely  any  sense  in  asking  whether 

*  See  *Ober  die  allgemeinste  Erniedri^ng  des  Liebeslebens.* 


Postscript  123 

the  libido  which  keeps  groups  together  is  of  a  homo- 
sexual or  of  a  heterosexual  nature,  for  it  is  not 
differentiated  according  to  the  sexes,  and  particularly 
shows  a  complete  disregard  for  the  aims  of  the  genital 
organisation  of  the  libido. 

Even  in  a  person  who  has  in  other  respects  become 
absorbed  in  a  group  the  directly  sexual  tendencies 
preserve  a  little  of  his  individual  activity.  If  they 
become  too  strong  they  disintegrate  every  group 
formation.  The  Catholic  Church  had  the  best  of 
motives  for  recommending  its  followers  to  remain 
unmarried  and  for  imposing  celibacy  upon  its  priests; 
but  falling  in  love  has  often  driven  even  priests  to 
leave  the  church.  In  the  same  way  love  for  women 
breaks  through  the  group  ties  of  race,  of  national 
separation,  and  of  the  social  class  system,  and  it 
thus  produces  important  effects  as  a  factor  in  civili- 
zation. It  seems  certain  that  homosexual  love  is 
far  more  compatible  with  group  ties,  even  when  it 
takes  the  shape  of  uninhibited  sexual  tendencies — a 
remarkable  fact,  the  explanation  of  which  might  carry 
us  far. 

The  psycho-analytic  investigation  of  the  psycho- 
neuroses  has  taught  us  that  their  symptoms  are  to 
be  traced  back  to  directly  sexual  tendencies  which 
are  repressed  but  still  remain  active.  We  can  complete 
this  formula  by  adding  to  it:  or,  to  tendencies  inhibited 
in  their  aims,  whose   inhibition  has  not  been  entirely 


124    Gronp  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

successful  or  has  made  room  for  a  return  to  the 
repressed  sexual  aim.  It  is  in  accordance  with  this 
that  a  neurosis  should  make  its  victim  asocial  and 
should  remove  him  from  the  usual  group  formations. 
It  may  be  said  that  a  neurosis  has  the  same  dis- 
integrating effect  upon  a  group  as  being  in  love. 
On  the  other  hand  it  appears  that  where  a  powerful 
impetus  has  been  given  to  group  formation  neuroses 
may  diminish  and  at  all  events  temporarily  disappear. 
Justifiable  attempts  have  also  been  made  to  turn  this 
antagonism  between  neuroses  and  group  formation  to 
therapeutic  account.  EyerLthose  who  do^  not  jcegret  the 
disappearance  of  religious  illnsionR^fcom  the  civilized 
WQild_  of  to-day  .will  adniil^  that  so  long  as  ^ey; 
were   in    force   they    offered    those    who    were   bound 

by    them    t];;t£-.^_i3qh^t:^j2nwerfnl     prntertion     against     the 

danger    of    neurosis.     Nor    is    it   hard   to    discern   in 


all  the  ties  with  mystico-religious  or  philosophico- 
religious  sects  and  communities  the  manifestation  of 
distorted  cures  of  all  kinds  of  neuroses.  All  of  this 
is  bound  up  with  the  contrast  between  directly 
sexual  tendencies  and  those  which  are  inhibited  in 
their  aims. 

If  he  is  left  to  himself,  a  neurotic  is  obliged  to 
replace  by  his  own  symptom  formations  the  great 
group  formations  from  which  he  is  excluded.  He 
creates  his  own  world  of  imagination  for  himself,  his 
own    religion,  his   own   system    of  delusions,  and  thus 


Postscript  1 2  5 

recapitulates  the  institutions  of  humanity  in  a  distorted 
way  which  is  clear  evidence  of  the  dominating  part 
played  by  the  directly  sexual  tendencies.^ 

E.  In  conclusion,  we  will  add  a  comparative 
estimate,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  libido  theory, 
of  the  states  with  which  we  have  been  concerned,  of 
being  in  love,  of  hypnosis,  of  group  formation,  and 
of  the  neurosis. 

Being  in  love  is  based  upon  the  simultaneous 
presence  of  directly  sexual  tendencies  and  of  sexual 
tendencies  that  are  inhibited  in  their  aims,  so  that 
the  object  draws  a  part  of  the  narcissistic  ego-libido 
to  itself.  It  is  a  condition  in  which  there  is  only 
room   for  the  ego  and  the  object. 

Hypnosis  resembles  being  in  love  in  being  limited 
to  these  two  persons,  but  it  is  based  entirely  upon 
sexual  tendencies  that  are  inhibited  in  their  aims 
and  substitutes  the  object  for  the  ego  ideal. 

The  group  multiplies  this  process;  it  agrees  with 
hypnosis  in  the  nature  of  the  instincts  which  hold  it 
together,  and  in  the  replacement  of  the  ego  ideal 
by  the  object;  but  to  this  it  adds  identification  with 
other  individuals,  which  was  perhaps  originally  made 
possible  by  their  having  the  same  relation  to  the 
object. 


*  See  Totem   und  Tabu,   towards   the   end  of  Part  II,   'Das 
Tabu  und  die  Ambivalenz '. 


1 26    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 

Both  states,  hypnosis  and  group  formation,  are 
an  inherited  deposit  from  the  phylogenesis  of  the 
human  libido — hypnosis  in  the  form  of  a  predisposition, 
and  the  group,  besides  this,  as  a  direct  survival. 
The  replacement  of  the  directly  sexual  tendencies  by 
those  that  are  inhibited  in  their  aims  promotes  in  both 
states  a  separation  between  the  ego  and  the  ego  ideal, 
a  separation  with  which  a  beginning  has  already  been 
made  in  the  state  of  being  in  love. 

The  neurosis  stands  outside  this  series.  It  also 
is  based  upon  a  peculiarity  in  the  development  of 
the  human  libido — the  twice  repeated  start  made  by 
the  directly  sexual  function,  with  an  intervening  period 
of  latency.^  To  this  extent  it  resembles  hypnosis  and 
group  formation  in  having  the  character  of  a  regression, 
which  is  absent  from  being  in  love.  It  makes  its 
appearance  wherever  the  advance  from  directly  sexual 
instincts  to  those  that  are  inhibited  in  their  aims  has 
not  been  completely  successful;  and  it  represents  a 
conflict  between  those  instincts  which  have  been 
received  into  the  ego  after  having  passed  through 
this  development  and  those  portions  of  the  same 
instincts  which,  like  other  instinctive  desires  that  have 
been  completely  repressed,  strive,  from  the  repressed 
unconscious,  to  attain  direct  satisfaction.    The  neurosis 


^  See    Drei  Abhandlungen    zur    Sexualtheorie,    4.    Auflage, 
1920,  S.  96. 


Postscript  1 27 

is  extraordinarily  rich  in  content,  for  it  embraces  all 
possible  relations  between  the  ego  and  the  object — 
both  those  in  which  the  object  is  retained  and  others 
in  which  it  is  abandoned  or  erected  inside  the  ego 
itself — and  also  the  conflicting  relations  between  the 
ego  and  its  ego  ideal. 


I 


INDEX 


Abraham,  62,  108. 
Affectivity.  See  ««<y«fr  Emotion. 
Altruism,  57. 
Ambivalence,  18,  55,  61. 
Anaclitic  type,  60. 
Archaic  inheritance,  10,  99. 
Army,  42-6,  89,  94,  no,  122. 
Autistic  mental  acts,  2. 

Be?'nheim,  35,  loo. 
Bleuler,  2. 
Brothers,  43,  114. 

in  Christ,  43. 

Community  of,  90,  112,  122. 
Brugeilles,   34. 

Caesar,  44. 

Cathexis,  18,  20,  28,  117. 

Object-,  48,  58,60-1,71-2,76. 
Catholic  Church,  42-3, 1 11, 123. 
Celibacy  of  priests,  123. 
Censorship  of  dreams,  16,  69. 
Chieftains,  Mana  in,  96. 
Children,  14,  16,  18-19,  30,  67, 
82,  91. 

Dread  in,  83,  85-6. 

Parents  and,  54,  86,  116. 

Sexual  object  of,  72,  116. 

Unconscious  of,  18. 
Christ,  42-5,  50,  III. 

Equal  love  of,  50. 

Identification  with,  in. 
Church,  42-3,   89,  94,  iio-ii, 

122-3. 
Commander-in-Chief,  42-5. 
Conflict,  18,  107,  126. 


Conscience,  10,  28,  68-9,75,  79 

Social,  88. 
Contagion,    Emotional,    10-13, 

27,  34-5,  46-7. 
Crowd,  I,  3,  26,  92. 

Danger,  Effect  on  groups,  46-9. 
Darwin,  90. 
Delusions : 

of  inferiority,  107. 

of  observation,  69. 
Devotion  to  abstract  idea,  17, 

Doubt: 

absence  in  groups,  15-16. 

interpretation  in  dreams, 
15-16. 
Dread : 

Children's,  83,  85-6. 

in  a  group,  46-8,  50. 

in  an  individual,  47-8. 

Neurotic,  48. 

of  society,  10. 

Panic,  45-9. 
Dream,  20,  69,  104. 

Interpretation  of  doubt  and 
uncertainty  in,  15-16. 

symbolism,   114. 
Duty,  Sense  of,  84,  88,  95. 

Ego,   10,  18-19,  62-70,  74,  84, 
93,  100-9,  120,  125-7. 

Relations  between  ego  ideal 
and,    68-70,    103,    105-10. 

Relations  between  object 
and,   62-70,  74-6,   108-10. 


1 30    Group  Psychology  aitd  the  Analysis  of  tJie  Ego 


Ego  ideal,  68-70,  74-7,  80, 
100-3,  105-10,  113,  126-7. 
Abrogation  of  the,  105. 
Hypnotist  in  the  place  of,  77. 
Object  as  substitute  for,  74-6, 

80,  103,  no. 
Relations  between  ego  and, 

68-70,  103,  105-10. 
Testing  reality  of  things,  77. 
The  first,  113. 
Egoism,  57. 
Emotion : 

Ambivalent,  18,  55. 
Charge  of,  28. 
Contagion  of.  See  Contagion. 
Intensification  of,  in  groups, 
16,  23,  27-30,  33,  46,  81. 
Primitive    induction   of,   27, 

34,  46-7. 
Tender,  72-3,  78,  1 16-17. 

Emotional  tie,  40,  43,  45,  52-3, 
59-60,64-5,81,88,91,94, 
100,  117-20. 

Cessation  of,  46-9. 
Empathy,    relation    to    identi- 
fication, 66,  70. 
Enthusiasm,  in  groups,  25. 
Envy,  87-8. 

Equality,  demand  for,  88,  89. 
Eros,  38-40. 

Esprit  de  corps,  origin  of,  87. 
Ethical : 

conduct  of  a  group,  18. 

level    of    Christianity,    in. 

standards  of  individual,  24-5. 

Fairy  tales,  the  hero  in,  114. 
Family,  70,  95,  100,  n3,  120. 

a  group  formation,  95. 

and  Christian  community,  43. 

and  social  instinct,  3. 

Primal,  122. 
Fascination,  11,  13,  21,  75. 


Father,  43,  92,  98-9. 

Equal  love  of,  95. 

God,  115. 

Identification  with,  60-2. 

Object  tie  with,  62. 

Primal,  92,  94-5,  9Q-100, 
112-13,    115,    120.    Deifi- 
cation of,  93,  115.  Killing 
the,  94,  1 12-13,  122. 

Surrogate,  43,  114. 
Federn,  P.,  50. 
Felszeghy,  Beta  v.,  48. 
Ferenczi,  'j6^  98. 
Festivals,  105. 
Folk-lore,  25. 
Folk-song,  25. 
French  Revolution,  26. 
Function: 

for  testing  reality,  20,  77. 

(Instanz),  15. 

Gemeingeist,  origin  of,  87. 
Genital  organisation,  19. 
God,  85,  5^. 

Father,  115. 
Gregariousness,  83-4,  92. 
Group : 

Artificial,  41-2,  52,  82,  89,94, 
no,  122. 

Different  kinds  of,  26,  41. 

Disintegration  of,  49-5 1« 

Dread  in,  47, 

Equality  in,  89. 

feeling,  86-7,  121. 

Heightened  affectivity  in. 
See  under  Emotion. 

ideal,  100,  102. 

Intellectual  capacity  of,   14, 

18,   23,  25,  29,   31,   33,  8i- 

Intensification  of  emotion  in. 
See  7mder  Emotion. 

Leaders  of.  See  under 
Leader. 


Index 


131 


Group  (continued) : 

Libidinal  structure  of,  37, 40, 

44-5.  47,  51,  53-4,  70, 
79-80,  102-3. 

marriages,  120. 

Mental  change  of  the  indi- 
vidual in,  6-I4j  33-4,  45> 
56,  81,  102. 

mind,   3,    5-27,   40,   49,   82. 

Organisation  in,  26,  30-1,  33, 
41-2,  80,  82,  90. 

Primitive,  31,  33,  41,  80. 

psychological  character  of, 
6-32. 

psychology,  1-4, 6,  25-6, 33-4, 

37,  45,  53,  59,  92-4,  loi, 

112,  114. 
Revolutionary,  26. 
Sexual  instincts  and,  120. 
spirit,  87. 

Stable,  26,  41,  84,  10 1. 
Suggestibility  of,  11,  13,  35, 

84-5. 
Transient,  25,  41,  84,    loi. 

Guilt,Senseof,20,63,65,84, 106. 

Gynaecocracy,  113. 

Hatred,  53,  56. 
Hebbel,  49. 
Herd,  83-5,  89. 

instinct,  3,  83-6,  105,  121. 
Hero,  17,  113-15- 
Homosexuality,    57,  66-7,  94, 

123. 
Horde  Primal,  89-95, 99, 1 1 3-14, 
120. 
Father    of    the.    See    under 
Father. 
Hypnosis,  10-13,  20-1,  77-9,  81, 
95-100,  125-6, 
a  group  of  two,  78,  100. 
and  sleep,  79,  98. 
of  terror,  79. 


Hypnotist,  13,  77,  95-9. 
Hysteria,  Identification  in,  63-5. 

Idealisation,  74. 
Identification,   59-70,  75-6,  84, 
86-9,  94,  101-3,   III,  125. 

Ambivalent,  61. 

in  hysterical  symptom,  63-5. 

Regression  of  object-choice 
to,  64. 

with  a  lost  or  rejected  object, 
67-8,  108-9. 

with  Christ,  iii. 

with  the  father,  60-2. 

with  the  hero,  115. 

with  the  leader,  iio-ii. 
Imitation,  34-5,  65,  70. 
Individual: 

a  member  of  many  groups, 

lOI. 
Dread  in,  47-8. 
Mental   change  in  a  group. 

6-14,  33-4,45,  56,81,  102, 
Psychology,    1-2,  92-3,   112, 

114. 
Induction  of  emotion,   27,  34, 

46-7. 
Infection,  mental,  64-65. 
Inferiority,  Delusions  of,  57, 

106-7. 
Inheritance,  archaic,  10,  99. 
Inhibition : 

Collective,  of  intellectual 

functioning,  23,  33. 
Removal  of,  17,  28,  33. 
Instinct: 

Herd,  3,  83-6,  105,  121. 
inhibited   in   aim,   72-3,   78, 

1 1 5-26. 
Life  and  death,  56. 
Love,  37,  39,  58. 
Nutrition,  85. 
Primary,  84-5. 


1 32    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 


Instinct  (continued)  : 
vSelf-preservative,  34,  85. 
Sexual,    19,    39,    56,    71-8, 

85-5,  94,  115-26. 
vSocial,  3. 
unhibited   in   aim,   73,  77-8, 

94,  115-26. 
Unconscious,  10. 
Intellectual  ability,"  lowering  of, 
in  groups,   14,   18,  23,  25, 

29.  31.  33.  81. 
Introjection,  of  object  into  ego, 
65,  67-8,  ^6. 

Jealousy,  121. 
Kings,  Mana  in,  96. 
Kraskovic,  B.  jnr.,  23. 
Kroeger^  90. 

Language,  25,  i'^,  71. 
Latency,  period  of,  72, 117,^  120. 

126. 
Leader,  20-2,  41,  44-5,  78,  82, 
85,  89,  92,  99,  no. 
Abstractions    as    substitutes 

for,  53. 
Equal  love  of,  93,  95. 
Identification    with,    iio-ii. 
Killing  the,  90. 
Loss  of,  49. 
Negative,  53. 
Prestige  of,  21-2. 
the  group  ideal,  100,  102, 1 10. 
Tie  with,  49,  52,  66. 
Le  Bon,    5-25,   29,  34,  82,  84, 

100- 1. 
Libidinal : 

structure   of  the   group,  37, 

40,  44-5,47,  53,  7o,  79-8o, 

102-3. 
The  word,  44. 
ties,  44,   56-8,  65,  93,    100. 
in  the   group,  45,  51,  54. 


Libido,   33-40,  44,   57,  79,  83, 

102,  III,  116, 119, 123, 126. 
Narcissistic,  58,  74,  93,   104, 

125. 
Oral  phase  of,  61. 
theory,  57,  83,  125. 
Unification  of,  19. 
Withdrawal  of,  108. 
Love,   37-40,  42,   73,   87,  108, 

122. 
a  factor  of  civilisation,  57, 93. 
and  character  formation,  94, 

118-20. 
and  hatred,  56. 
Being    in,    58,    71-9,    120-1, 

124-6. 
Child's,  1 16-17. 
Christ's,  43. 
Equal,  42,  50,  89,  93. 
Pauline,   118. 

Self-.  See  under  Narcissism. 
Sensual,  71-3,  78,  117. 
Sexual,  37-8,  57,  120-2. 
Sublimated  homosexual,  57. 
The  word,  37-9,  71. 
Unhappy,  75. 
Unsensual,  73. 

McDougali,   I,  26-31,  34-6, 

46-7,  49,  84. 
Magical  power  of  words,  19. 
Magnetic  influence,  11. 
Magnetism,  animal,  96. 
Mana,  96. 
Mania,  106-9. 
Marcuszezciez,  68. 
Marriage,  54,  120. 
Melancholia,  68,  106-9. 
Metapsychology,  63,  118. 
Moede,    Walter,  24. 
Moliere,    119. 
IMorality,  Totemism  the  origin 

of,  90. 


Index 


133 


Mother  deities,   113,   115. 
^^llticellularit^',  7,  32,  83. 
Myth,   1 1 3-1 5.' 

Nacluiiansohn,  39. 

Names,  Taboo  upon,  19. 

Napoleon,  44. 

Narcissism,  2,  38,  54-8, 69,  74-5, 

93,  94,   104. 
Nestroy,  49. 

Neurosis,    18,   20,    37,  44,   58, 

63,  103-4,123-26. 

Nietzsche,  93. 

Nutrition,  Instinct  of,  84. 

Object,    57-8,   62,   68,   74,   87, 
93,  104,  125,  127. 
cathexis,  48,  58,  60-1,  71-2, 

76. 
Change  of,  18,  119,  121. 
Child's,  72. 
-choice,  54,  62^  64,  74,  III, 

119,  121. 
Eating  the,  61-62.  ' 
Hyper-cathexis  of,  76. 
Identification  with  ego,  108. 
Less  or  Renunciation  of,  68, 

108. 
-love,  56,  63,  74,  III. 
Relations  with   the   ego,  65, 

67-8,  70,  76. 
Sexual,  ^^,  72-3,  116. 
Substituted  for  ego  ideal,  74, 
80,  103,  125. 
Observation,   delusions  of,  69. 
Oedipus    complex,   60-61,   63, 
66,  117. 
Inverted,  62. 
Oral  phase  of  organisation  of 

the  libido,  61. 
Organisation  in  groups,  26j 

30-1,    33,   41-2,    80,   82,   90. 
Orgy,  121. 


Panic,  45-9. 

Pan-sexualism,  39. 

Paul,  Saint,  39,   118. 

PJister,    39,   119. 

Plato,   38. 

Poet,    the   first   epic,    113-114. 

Power,  9,  15,  28. 

of  leaders,  21. 

of  words,  19. 
Prestige,  21-2,  34. 
Primitive    peoples,    14,    18-19, 

24,  92,  96,   105. 
Psycho-Analysis,   4,    7    14,   18, 

36,  38-9.  59-60,  84,  97. 
Psychology: 

Group,  i-4,  6,  25-6,  33-4,  37» 

45.  53.  59.  92,  94,  loi. 
Group    and    individual,    1-2, 

92-93,   112,   114. 
Psychoses,  ^^,  103. 
Puberti%  ^^,  72-73- 

Races,  repugnance  between 

related,  S5. 
Rank,    Otto,   112,  114. 
Rapport,  97. 
Reality: 

Function  for  testing,  20,  i']. 
Contrast  between  Objective 
and  Psychological,  20. 
Regression,   82,  91,    117,    121, 

126. 
Religion,  51,  90. 

Wars  of,  51. 
Repressed : 

Sexual  tendencies,   74,  117, 

123-4. 
The,    10,    104,   117-18,   126. 
Repression,    9,    54,    64-5,    69, 

72,  84,  95,  105,  117,  120, 
Resistance,  84,  104. 
Responsibility,  Sense  of,  9-10, 

29-30. 


1 34    Group  Psychology  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Ego 


Rickter,  Konrad,  36. 

Sachs,  HannSy  16,  115. 
Schopenhauer,    54. 
Self- : 

consciousness,  30-1, 

depreciation,  107. 

love.  See  under  Narcissism. 

observation,  69. 

preservation,    15,    34,    84-5. 

sacrifice,  11,  38,  75. 
Sex,  39. 
Sexual : 

act,  92,  121. 

aims,  58,  72.  Diversion  of 
instinct  from,  58.  Infantile, 
72.  Obstacles  to,  120. 

life,  19,  72. 

over-estimation,  53-5. 

Tendencies,  Inhibited  and 
unhibited.  72-3,  77-8,  94, 
1 1 5-16,  125-26. 

union,  37-8. 
Shaw,  Bernard,   121. 
Sidis,  Boris,  84. 
Sighele,  24-5. 
Simmel,  E.,  44. 
Sleep,  98,  104. 

and  hypnosis,  98. 
Smith,  Robertson,  70. 
Social: 

duties,  88,  95. 

relations,  2-3,  57. 
Socialistic  tie,  51. 
Society,  24,  26,  28,  90. 

Dread  of,  10. 
Sociolo^.  See  under  Group 

Psychology. 
Speech,  84. 
Sublimated: 

devotion,  17,  75. 

homosexual  love,  57. 
Sublimation,  118. 


Suggestibility,  u,  13,  35,  84-5. 
Suggestion,  12-13,  17,  29,  34-7, 
40,  82,  95,  99,  102. 

Counter-,  35. 

Definition  for,  100. 

Mutual,  12,  27,  34,  82. 
Superman,  93. 

Taboo,  19,  96,  112. 
Tarde,  34. 

Totemism,  90,  1 12-13. 
Totemistic : 

clan,  95. 

community  of  brothers,  112. 

exogamy,  122. 
Tradition,  17,  21. 

of  the  group,  31. 

of  the  individual,  32. 
Transference,  97-8. 
Trotter,  32,  83-5,  89,  105. 

Uncanniness,  95,  99, 
Uncertainty,  absence  in  groups, 
15-16. 
interpretation  in  dreams, 
15-16. 
Unconscious,  8,  10,  12,  14-16, 
18,  23-4,  64,  67,  72,97. 
100,  104. 
Groups  led  by,  14. 
instincts,  10. 
Le  Bon's,   10,   14,  24. 
of  children,  18,  117. 
of  neurotics,  18. 
Racial,  9. 

Wallenstein,  44. 
Wcir  neuroses,  44. 
War,  The,  44. 
Wilson,  President,  44. 
Wishes,  Affective   cathexis  of, 

20. 
Words,  magical  power  of,  19. 


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